Creating interpersonal reality through conversational interactions

In Michael Schmitz, Beatrice Kobow & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Background of Social Reality: Selected Contributions from the Inaugural Meeting of ENSO. Springer. pp. 91--104 (2013)
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Abstract

We understand interpersonal reality as consisting of those social facts that are informally created by people for themselves in everyday interactions, and involve the collective acceptance of positive and negative deontic powers. We submit that, in the case of interpersonal reality, Gilbert’s concept of a joint commitment is a suitable view of what collective acceptance amounts to. We then argue that creating interpersonal reality, even in common everyday-life situations, typically requires conversational exchanges involving several layers of joint commitments, and in particular joint commitments to projects, joint meaning, and the joint commitments that are constitutive of conversations.

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Marco Colombetti
Politecnico di Milano

Citations of this work

Why the extended mind is nothing special but is central.Giulio Ongaro, Doug Hardman & Ivan Deschenaux - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (4):841-863.
Interpersonal responsibilities and communicative intentions.Antonella Carassa & Marco Colombetti - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):145-159.

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Group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Philip Pettit.

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