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The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person
Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Edited by Josh Dever (2013)
Abstract
Cappelen and Dever present a forceful challenge to the standard view that perspective, and in particular the perspective of the first person, is a philosophically deep aspect of the world. Their goal is not to show that we need to explain indexical and other perspectival phenomena in different ways, but to show that the entire topic is an illusionAuthor Profiles
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The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person, by Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever.Wolfram Hinzen - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):898-904.
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2014-01-26
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221 (#116,723)
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Citations of this work
De se thoughts and immunity to error through misidentification.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3311-3333.
First personal modes of presentation and the structure of empathy.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):189-207.
Consequentialism and the Agent’s Point of View.Nathan Robert Howard - 2022 - Ethics 132 (4):787-816.
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