Abstract

Through my interpretation of Aquinas, I argue that no theory of ethics is adequate which neglects the question of character and the human need for the moral virtues. The virtues, as Aquinas understands them, enable us to judge and act ethically. Although one may be well versed in the study of ethics, without the virtues one has neither an adequate ability to discern the good to be done nor the character to choose and act accordingly. This argument is made in steps. First, the virtues enable us to act with integrity, that is, to reconcile good judgment and action. For to know the good is not necessarily to be ready to do the good. They do more, however, because the problem of knowing the good goes beyond the need to obtain an abstract or theoretical knowledge of ethics. There is also always the need to be able to reason practically about the singular situations one faces and discern the good to be done. Yet one cannot make such judgments without well-formed affective and intentional habits. Thus, the moral virtues enable one to both discern and do the good. ;These learned abilities are needed by all human beings. The moral virtues, therefore, in their most essential aspects, are not culturally relative. They address the universal human need to live meaningfully, the need, that is, to act according to the good that one knows. In a meaningful existence one pursues the good consistent with one's judgment, and one judges about what to do here and now in light of one's self-understanding and knowledge of the human good. The moral virtues enable one to live this way because they are habits of intention, habits enabling good judgment and habits enabling the cooperation between one's emotions, imagination, will and intellect. Thus, the virtuous person gains a new level of autonomy, directing himself through the cooperation of intellect and will. Meaningful action is an effective expression of one's self and the good one aspires to