For Their Eyes Only

Belgrade Philosophical Annual 35 (2):89-105 (2022)
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Abstract

When and why do we need the indexical ‘I’? Perry (1979) thinks that ‘I’ is an essential ingredient to the explanation and prediction of action. We need ‘I’ to classify the kind of belief that causes an agent to produce a new action. In his view, classifying the agent’s belief in terms of ‘I’ makes sense because, when asked to explain her behavior, the agent will be disposed to say ‘I’. Here, we argue that this dispositional assumption is problematic. The disposition to act according to an essential indexical and the disposition to make a speech act that contains ‘I’ are two very different things that are not always related. The most common circumstances in which we need to say ‘I’ to explain ourselves involve other agents: when we coordinate in joint actions or when we engage in self-talk to save face before the eyes of potential witnesses. Finally, we revisit Perry’s famous messy shopper anecdote to offer a better story about why its main character is disposed to say ‘I’.

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Author Profiles

Ernesto Perini-Santos
Federal University of Minas Gerais

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References found in this work

Mental Files.François Récanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Quantifiers and propositional attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1955 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
Quantifying in.David Kaplan - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.
Making Sense of Self Talk.Bart Geurts - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):271-285.

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