On Second Thought, Libet-style Unreflective Intentions May Be Compatible With Free Will

Logoi 39 (23):17-28 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Some have argued that our sense of free will is an illusion. And some base this free will skepticism on claims about when we become consciously aware of our intentions. Evidence suggests that unreflective intentions form before we are conscious of them. And that is supposed to challenge our sense of free will. This inference from unreflective intention to free will skepticism may seem intuitive at first. However, upon reflection, this argument seems to entail a magical view of free will. So, insofar as free will does not require magic, unreflective intentions do not necessarily undermine our sense of free will.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,225

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Effective intentions: the power of conscious will.Alfred Mele - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Testing free will.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - Neuroethics 3 (2):161-172.
Libet's impossible demand.Neil Levy - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):67-76.
The place of Free Will: the freedom of the prisoner.Paolo Nichelli - 2024 - Neurological Sciences 45 (3):861-871.
Conscious Deciding and the Science of Free Will.Alfred Mele - 2010 - In Al Mele, Kathleen Vohs & Roy Baumeister (eds.), Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? (New York: OUP, 2010). New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 43.
Taking Free Will Skepticism Seriously.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):833-852.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-06-29

Downloads
98 (#215,208)

6 months
10 (#404,653)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nick Byrd
Geisinger College of Health Sciences

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Motivation and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Effective intentions: the power of conscious will.Alfred Mele - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Do we have free will?Benjamin W. Libet - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):47-57.

View all 13 references / Add more references