Hoffman’s “proof” of the possibility of spectrum inversion

Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):48-50 (2006)
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Abstract

Philosophers have devoted a great deal of discussion to the question of whether an inverted spectrum thought experiment refutes functionalism. (For a review of the inverted spectrum and its many philosophical applications, see Byrne, 2004.) If Ho?man is correct the matter can be swiftly and conclusively settled, without appeal to any empirical data about color vision (or anything else). Assuming only that color experiences and functional relations can be mathematically represented, a simple mathematical result.

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Author Profiles

Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
David R. Hilbert
University of Illinois, Chicago

References found in this work

Materialism and the metaphysics of modality.David J. Chalmers - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):473-96.
Is There a Problem About Substitutional Quantification?Saul A. Kripke - 1976 - In Gareth Evans & John McDowell (eds.), Truth and meaning: essays in semantics. Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. pp. 324-419.
Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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