The Local Prospect Theory of Subjective Experience: A Soft Solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 31 (11):122-152 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We propose a new theory to explain the nature and function of subjective experience, as a mechanism that guides the organism towards beneficial outcomes. In simple animals, that guidance takes the form of an affect producing a fitness-enhancing response. In human consciousness, there is not a single response, but a range of potential developments allowing a free choice. That range can be modelled as a local prospect: a field of possibilities centred on the present situation and coloured by valence. Building on neural models of global workspace and adaptive resonance, we suggest how such a prospect could be implemented in the brain: as a halo of activation diffusing from, and feeding back into, a core of circulating activation. Using the thought experiment of qualia inversion, we argue that local prospect theory solves the ‘hard problem of consciousness’. We show how our theory explains key characteristics of consciousness: subjectivity, feeling, free will, agency, transience, continuity, integration, selectivity, intentionality, and ‘what it is like’.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,247

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-12-11

Downloads
10 (#1,469,896)

6 months
10 (#407,001)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Francis Heylighen
Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Complexity and the Evolution of Consciousness.Walter Veit - 2023 - Biological Theory 18 (3):175-190.
Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience.Evan Thompson - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):407-427.
Autopoiesis, biological autonomy and the process view of life.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-16.

View all 8 references / Add more references