11. What Does Knowledge Explain? Commentary on Jennifer Nagel,'Knowledge as a Mental State'

Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:309 (2013)
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Stephen Andrew Butterfill
University of Warwick

Citations of this work

Young children's conceptions of knowledge.Rachel Dudley - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (6):e12494.
Acting on true belief.Jens Kipper - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2221-2237.
Knowledge-first believing the unknowable.Simon Wimmer - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3855-3871.

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