Knowledge-first believing the unknowable

Synthese 198 (4):3855-3871 (2019)
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Abstract

I develop a challenge for a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief that turns, primarily, on unknowable propositions. I consider and reject several responses to my challenge and sketch a new knowledge-first account of belief that avoids it.

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2021

DOI

10.1007/s11229-019-02314-6

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Simon Wimmer
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

Citations of this work

What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.
Ways to Knowledge-First Believe.Simon Wimmer - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1189-1205.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher, Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.

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