Scientific Objectivity and Scientific Objectives
Dissertation, Northwestern University (
2002)
Copy
BIBTEX
Abstract
Objectivity is generally understood either as a correspondence between theory and reality or as the achievement of a neutral, detached perspective. As a term of approval, "objectivity" also provides support to particular research programs and technological applications. Thus, a philosophical treatment of scientific objectivity ought to be sensitive to the conditions under which scientific theory choice and scientific policy decisions are actually made so as to better understand what may be involved when science is regarded as objective. ;This project engages recent accounts of scientific objectivity proposed in this spirit: namely, those articulated by Wesley Salmon, David Bloor, and Helen Longino. Salmon uses a frequency interpretation of Bayesianism to analyze objectivity. His analysis assumes that objective and subjective influences are easily distinguishable---which, I argue, they are not. Bloor highlights the role of social interests in determining theory choice. However, his approach fails to distinguish responsible inquiry from fraudulent or exploitive research. Finally, Longino emphasizes the importance of critical dialogue and inclusivity but fails, I argue, to recognize how this dialogue can be shaped by relations of power. ;I respond to these accounts and propose thinking about scientific objectivity as contextual, social, procedural, and normative. Objectivity is contextual in that there are no formalizable, universal conditions for its achievement. It is social in that it can only be achieved when there is open critical evaluation of assumptions and values. It is procedural because it demands that communities take steps to identify and evaluate bias. Finally, it is normative in that objectivity requires epistemic and moral responsibility. ;I conclude that scientific objectivity can be assessed at various stages ranging from the articulation of a research program to the practical applications of scientific knowledge. In addition, I argue that assessments of objectivity play a crucial role in weighing the value of various scientific objectives