Retributivism and Legal Moralism

Ratio Juris 25 (4):496-512 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article examines whether a retributivist conception of punishment implies legal moralism and asks what liberalism implies about retributivism and moralism. It makes a case for accepting the weak retributivist thesis that culpable wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for blame and punishment and the weak moralist claim that moral wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for legal regulation. This weak moralist claim is compatible with the liberal claim that the legal enforcement of morality is rarely all‐thing‐considered desirable. Though weak moralism has some plausibility, it does not follow from weak retributivism if legitimate state functions are limited in certain ways

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 102,394

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Retributivism and Fallible Systems of Punishment.George Schedler - 2011 - Criminal Justice Ethics 30 (3):240-266.
Legal moralism reconsidered.Carl F. Cranor - 1979 - Ethics 89 (2):147-164.
A Hegelian Theory of Punishment.Jami L. Anderson - 1999 - Legal Theory 5 (4):363-388.
Why not ‘weak’ retributivism?Katrina L. Sifferd - 2021 - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 46 (2):138-143.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-11-20

Downloads
67 (#321,636)

6 months
6 (#818,268)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Brink
University of California, San Diego

Citations of this work

Situationism, responsibility, and fair opportunity.David O. Brink - 2013 - Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):121-149.
Liberty and the constitution.Michael S. Moore - 2015 - Legal Theory 21 (3-4):156-241.
Shame, Embarrassment, and the Subjectivity Requirement.Erick J. Ramirez - 2018 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14 (1):97-114.
First Acts, Last Acts, and Abandonment.David O. Brink - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (2):114-123.
Master Principles of Criminalisation.James Edwards - 2016 - Jurisprudence 7 (1):138-148.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Law’s Empire.Ronald Dworkin - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.
Liberalism, Community, and Culture.Will Kymlicka - 1989 - Oxford University Press.

View all 19 references / Add more references