In defense of impenetrable zombies

Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):348-351 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Moody is right that the doctrine of conscious inessentialism is false. Unfortunately, his zombie-based argument against , once made sufficiently clear to evaluate, is revealed as nothing but legerdemain. The fact is -- though Moody has convinced himself otherwise -- certain zombies are impenetrable: that they are zombies, and not conscious beings like us, is something beyond the capacity of humans to divine.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 106,894

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Zombies and the function of consciousness.Owen J. Flanagan & Thomas W. Polger - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):313-21.
Varieties of zombiehood.Guven Guzeldere - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):326-33.
Zombies and the Turing test.Mary Midgley - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):351-352.
Todd Moody's zombies.John McCarthy - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):345-347.
Yes, we are zombies, but we can become conscious.Charles T. Tart - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):361-364.
Chalmers' Zombie Argument.Amy Kind - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone, Just the Arguments. Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 327–329.
Conversations with zombies.Todd C. Moody - 1994 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):196-200.
Consciousness can no longer be ignored.Avshalom C. Elitzur - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):353-58.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
160 (#152,957)

6 months
12 (#301,168)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Selmer Bringsjord
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

References found in this work

What Robots Can and Can’t Be.Selmer Bringsjord - 1992 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Could, how could we tell if, and should - androids have inner lives?Selmer Bringsjord - 1994 - In Kenneth M. Ford, Clark N. Glymour & Patrick J. Hayes, Android Epistemology. MIT Press.

Add more references