Abstract

The thesis has two major goals: to advance an account of justification in public policy, and to illustrate that account by offering discussions of several issues in the justification of affirmative action programs. ;Some contemporary ethicists such as Bernard Williams have argued in favor of ethical pluralism and against the idea that there is some single value in terms of which all other values can be expressed. This idea is discouraging for some recent liberal theorists , many of whom seek to demarcate one area of life--the public--in which ethical pluralism does not hold, agreement is always possible, and public policy debates may take place. This public space is held to be neutral with respect to individual conceptions of the good. I argue, however, that there is no way to characterize individual conceptions of the good independent of our choices as to what to regard as private matters or as public matters. ;In contrast, I seek to characterize justification in public policy along the lines of a modified version of Dworkin's theory of integrity in law. I argue that justifications in public policy will normally be highly contextualized and localized; they will be offered relative to particular institutional arrangements and histories out of which the need for justification arises. I then characterize what I call a "narrative explanation," a kind of justification that places the story of a particular policy in the context of other values and commitments we already hold. I illustrate the value of this by showing how it makes sense of seemingly disparate arguments in favor of affirmative action programs. ;I go on to examine several particular issues in the affirmative action debate. These include the question of "reverse" discrimination, whether it is individuals or groups who are to be benefitted, whether affirmative action is consistent with meritocracy, what benefits beneficiaries of such programs should get, and further issues involved in deciding in concrete cases what is to count as merit