Debunking Arguments and the Cognitive Science of Religion

Theology and Science 14 (3):268-287 (2016)
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Abstract

Do the cognitive origins of our theistic beliefs debunk them or explain them away? This paper develops an empirically-motivated debunking argument and defends it against objections. First, we introduce the empirical and epistemological background. Second, we develop and defend the main argument, the debunking argument from false god beliefs. Third, we characterize and evaluate the most prominent religious debunking argument to date, the debunking argument from insensitivity. It is found that insensitivity-based arguments are problematic, which makes them less promising than the debunking argument from false god beliefs.

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2016-05-18

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Matthew Braddock
University of Tennessee, Martin

Citations of this work

Debunking arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12):e12638.
Is supernatural belief unreliably formed?Hans Van Eyghen - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85 (2):125-148.

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