Decentering epistemologies and challenging privilege: critical care ethics perspectives

New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Care ethics first emerged as an attempt to decenter ethics; feminist scholars like Carol Gilligan argued that women's moral experiences were not reflected in the dominant, masculinist approaches to ethics, which were centered on a rational, disembodied, atomistic moral subject. Care ethics challenged this model by positing ethics as relational, contextualized, embodied, and realized through practices rather than principles. Over the past decades, many care ethics scholars have sought to further this project by considering care politically and epistemologically, in relation to various intersecting hierarchies of power and knowledge. This book advances this project by discussing the ways care ethics contributes to the de-centering of dominant epistemologies and to the challenging of privilege, and by considering how to decenter care ethics itself via an encounter with non-Western philosophical traditions and alternative epistemologies. Written by scholars from different countries, disciplines, and intellectual traditions, the volume offers original care ethics contributions on epistemic injustice, privileged irresponsibility, ecofeminism, settler colonialism, social movements such as BLM, and on various racialized and gendered inequities tied to care work.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,449

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Decenterings elsewhere and the epistemic dimensions of care.Vrinda Dalmiya - 2024 - In Sophie Bourgault, Maggie Fitzgerald & Fiona Robinson, Decentering epistemologies and challenging privilege: critical care ethics perspectives. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-07-16

Downloads
17 (#1,196,561)

6 months
9 (#328,796)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references