Double bookkeeping in delusions: Explaining the gap between saying and doing

In Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New waves in philosophy of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 237--256 (2010)
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Abstract

In this chapter I defend the doxastic account of delusions and offer some reasons to believe that the double-bookkeeping argument against doxasticism (delusions are not beliefs because they do not drive action) should be resisted.

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Lisa Bortolotti
University of Birmingham

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