Determinism and ontology

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (1):85 – 101 (1995)
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Abstract

Abstract In the philosophical literature, there are two common criteria for a physical theory to be deterministic. The older one is due to the logical empiricists, and is a purely formal criterion. The newer one can be found in the work of John Earman and David Lewis and depends on the intended interpretation of the theory. In this paper I argue that the former must be rejected, and something like the latter adopted. I then discuss the relevance of these points to the current debate over the hole argument

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Gordon Belot
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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References found in this work

New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
What price spacetime substantivalism? The hole story.John Earman & John Norton - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):515-525.
The hole truth.Jeremy Butterfield - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (1):1-28.
Readings in the philosophy of science.Herbert Feigl - 1953 - New York,: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Edited by May Brodbeck.

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