Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism

In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 292-307 (2017)
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Abstract

This chapter discusses the difference between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in metaethics. It considers the main arguments for and against each view, as well as arguments that the distinction cannot survive critical scrutiny.

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Matthew Bedke
University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

Cognitivism and Metaphysical Weight: A Dilemma for Relaxed Realism.Annika Böddeling - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):546-559.
Quasi-Realism for Realists.Bart Streumer - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
Superspreading the word.Bart Streumer - 2024 - Noûs 58 (4):927-947.
Ethical Evidence.Steven Diggin - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-24.

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