Literary Examples and Philosophical Confusion

Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 16:59-73 (1983)
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Abstract

It is by no means unusual in works of philosophy for writers to make use of examples from literature or to bemoan the lack of literary examples in the work of other philosophers. Nor is it unusual for philosophers to write substantial tomes without ever mentioning any work of literature or to condemn the use of literary examples as a threat to clarity of thought. This contradiction in practice and principle might lead us to suspect that what we are here dealing with is at least to some extent a philosophical disagreement, and I believe this to be the case. Unfortunately, what is extremely unusual is any direct discussion of the philosophical issues involved, that is to say any discussion of what philosophers are doing when they appeal in their writings to works of literature, and of what if anything is lost by those who fail to do so

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reprint Beardsmore, R. W. (1983) "Literary Examples and Philosophical Confusion". Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 16():59-73

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Citations of this work

Replies to Three Critics.Colin Radford - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (247):93 - 97.

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References found in this work

XIV*—What You Don't Know Doesn't Hurt You.André Gombay - 1979 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79 (1):239-250.

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