Understanding and its Relation to Knowledge

In Christoph Jäger Winfrid Löffler (ed.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 16-18 (2011)
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Abstract

Is understanding the same as or at least a species of knowledge? This question has to be answered with respect to each of three types of understanding and of knowledge. I argue that understanding-why and objectual understanding are not reducible to one another and neither identical with nor a species of the corresponding or any other type of knowledge. My discussion reveals important characteristics of these two types of understanding and has consequences for propositional understanding.

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Christoph Baumberger
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich

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