Self-deception: A paradox revisited

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):16-17 (2011)
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Abstract

A major challenge to von Hippel & Trivers's evolutionary analysis of self-deception is the paradox that one cannot deceive oneself into believing something while simultaneously knowing it to be false. The authors use biased information seeking and processing as evidence that individuals knowingly convince themselves of the truth of their falsehood. Acting in ways that keep one uninformed about unwanted information is self-deception. Acting in selectively biasing and misinforming ways is self-bias

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References found in this work

A Study Of Self-Deception.Mary Rowland Haight - 1980 - Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Sussex: Harvester Press.
Self-Deception: A Reflexive Dilemma.T. S. Champlin - 1977 - Philosophy 52 (201):281 - 299.
Reconstrual of "Free Will" from the Agentic Perspective of Social Cognitive Theory.Albert Bandura - 2008 - In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister, Are we free?: psychology and free will. New York: Oxford University Press.

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