MacIntyre and the Limits of Kierkegaardian Rationality

Faith and Philosophy 12 (1):126-132 (1995)
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Abstract

Recently in this journal Marilyn Gaye Piety argued both that the critique of Kierkegaardian choice Alasdair MacIntyre offers in After Virtue misconstrues Kierkegaard and that a reformulated version of Kierkegaardian choice offers an important gain for philosophy. I argue that Piety has underestimated the power of the Maclntyrean critique of Kierkegaard, that consequently an adequate account of rational choice remains unavailable from that quarter, and that at crucial points MacIntyre’s own socially teleological approach to choice offers a superior account.

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Kierkegaard on Rationality.Marilyn Gaye Piety - 1993 - Faith and Philosophy 10 (3):365-379.

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