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Debunking Biased Thinkers
Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):141--162 (2015)
Abstract
ABSTRACT: Most of what we believe comes to us from the word of others, but we do not always believe what we are told. We often reject thinkers' reports by attributing biases to them. We may call this debunking. In this essay, I consider how debunking might work and then examine whether, and how often, it can help to preserve rational belief in the face of disagreementAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
The Obligation to Diversify One's Sources: Against Epistemic Partisanship in the Consumption of News Media.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - In Joe Saunders & Carl Fox (eds.), Media Ethics, Free Speech, and the Requirements of Democracy. Routledge. pp. 240-264.
Implicit bias, ideological bias, and epistemic risks in philosophy.Uwe Peters - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (3):393-419.
Can Novices Trust Themselves to Choose Trustworthy Experts? Reasons for (Reserved) Optimism.Johnny Brennan - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (3):227-240.
The Significance of Unpossessed Evidence.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):315-335.
References found in this work
Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.
Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism.David Christensen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.
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