The Principle of Restraint: Public Reason and the Reform of Public Administration

Political Studies 68 (1):110-127 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Normative political theorists have been growing more and more aware of the many difficult questions raised by the discretionary power inevitably left to public administrators. This article aims to advance a novel normative principle, called ‘principle of restraint’, regulating reform of established administrative agencies. I argue that the ability of public administrators to exercise their power in accordance with the requirements of public reason is protected by an attitude of restraint on the part of potential reformers. Specifically, they should refrain from any reform of an administrative agency that involves a switch to a considerably more loosely interconnected system of values underlying the work of that agency. To illustrate the importance of the principle of restraint, I examine a case from British health policy, showing that a recent reform of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence well exemplifies the serious problems brought by any violation of that principle.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-02-07

Downloads
404 (#74,609)

6 months
114 (#52,636)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gabriele Badano
University of York

References found in this work

Inclusion and Democracy.Iris Marion Young - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Why Deliberative Democracy?Amy Gutmann & Dennis F. Thompson - 2004 - Princeton University Press.
The philosophy of evidence-based medicine.Jeremy Howick - 2011 - Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, BMJ Books.
Public Reason.Jonathan Quong - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 7 references / Add more references