Abstract

This essay undertakes a critical analysis of Kevin Vallier’s Principle of Convergent Restraint (PCR) within the framework of public reason liberalism. It begins by examining the first provision, intelligibility, arguing that Vallier’s formulation is at odds with the demands of public justification in liberal democracies. In particular, it contends that Vallier’s privileging of intelligibility over accessibility undermines the foundational commitments of public reason and pluralistic liberalism. The second section evaluates narrow restraint, asserting that a more precise understanding of public reason liberalism accommodates diverse justificatory reasons without precluding the emergence of overlapping comprehensive doctrines. Finally, the essay critiques proposal restraint, rejecting Vallier’s position that justificatory constraints should apply only to public officials. It argues that the distinction between citizens and public officials is conceptually tenuous and that justificatory restraints must be applied universally, given the intricate interplay between public deliberation, political opinion, and legislative decision-making.