Psychological Concept Acquisition

In Nicolas Payette & Benoit Hardy-Vallée (eds.), Connected Minds: Cognition and Interaction in the Social World. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press (2012)
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Abstract

This essay adjudicates between theoretical models of psychological concept acquisition. I provide new reasons to be skeptical about both simulationist and modularist models. I then defend the scientific-theory-theory account against familiar objections. I conclude by arguing that the scientific-theory-theory account must be supplemented by an account of hypothesis discovery.

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Theodore Bach
Bowling Green State University Firelands, Philosophy

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