A Polanyian Epistemology Manqué

Tradition and Discovery 43 (3):4-13 (2017)
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Abstract

These reflections attempt to clarify and strengthen Dreyfus and Taylor’s defense of a realist understanding of knowing by comparing it to features of Michael Polanyi’s theory of personal knowledge. I believe this overcomes some ambiguities such as their use of “mediation” and strengthens their case in discussing science without recourse to the notion of a “view from nowhere.” These in turn provide a more robust understanding of their understanding of realism within a pluralist framework. For students of Polanyi’s thought, this comparative effort provides an opportunity to place Polanyi’s theory within the wider world of contemporary philosophical thinking that they bring to their exposition of a “contact” theory of knowing. This might provide a basis for developing Polanyi’s thought through these contemporary channels.

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