Hegelian Beginning and Resolve

Idealistic Studies 13 (3):249-265 (1983)
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Abstract

For a writer who forces his readers to plunge fast and deeply into a wealth of material and experience, Hegel nonetheless spends an inordinate amount of time and effort in prefaces and introductions in order to prepare the reader for the explorations to be undertaken. Hegel clearly seems to think that how one begins philosophical investigation is crucial. Yet, ironically, he commits us to beginning everywhere and all at once. The tension of this irony may be localized as we consider the “beginning” of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit with sense certainty and the “beginning” of the Logic with Being. The very possibility of beginning in such radically different ways, as well as the relationship between them, will be the subject of our essay. We must follow the remarks of the introductory materials to both works in order to address these questions. More specifically, for each work we will investigate what Hegel understands by “beginning” and by the “resolve” to begin as a means for establishing some sense of the relationship between, and development of, the Phenomenology and the Logic.

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