Blur

Philosophical Studies 162 (2):257-273 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper presents an ‘over-representational’ account of blurred visual experiences. The basic idea is that blurred experiences provide too much, inconsistent, information about objects’ spatial boundaries, by representing them as simultaneously located at multiple locations. This account attempts to avoid problems with alternative accounts of blurred experience, according to which blur is a property of a visual field, a way of perceiving, a form of mis-representation, and a form of under-representation.

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2011-06-20

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Keith Allen
University of York

Citations of this work

Tracking Representationalism.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey, Philosophy of mind: the key thinkers. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 209-235.
Naïve realism and phenomenal similarity.Sam Clarke & Alfonso Anaya - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):885-902.
The Object View of Perception.Bill Brewer - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):215-227.

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References found in this work

Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.

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