Kant’s Theory of Judgment, Explicit Predication or Implicit one?

Journal of Philosophical Investigations 13 (26):247-270 (2019)
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Abstract

Theory of judgment is a significant problem in contemporary philosophy. Epistemology, logic, semantics and cognitive psychology are important philosophical areas which deal with different faces of the theory of judgment. One of the greatest problems in contemporary Kant Studies concerns Kant’s theory of judgment. Until 1970, an accepted reading of Kant’s theory of judgment was widespread among Kant’s English-speaking interpreters. Since 1970, some scholars began to understand and interpret Kant’s theory of judgment in a different way. This shift has led to huge and wide interpretive-philosophical discussions among Kant’s scholars. According to some scholars, traces of two different theories of judgment are found in Kant’s works: explicit theory of judgment and implicit theory of judgment. In this paper, considering interpretive viewpoints of some of Kant scholars, we contrast these two theories of predication and explicate their differences. Our conclusion is that Kant’s implicit or hidden theory of judgment is more consistent with Kant’s works and philosophical views. Moreover, one of the main implications of implicit theory of judgment is that we must interpret Chapter of Schematism and logico-semantic structure of a priori synthetic judgments in a different way.

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Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
From a Logical Point of View.Richard M. Martin - 1955 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (4):574-575.
Kant and the foundations of analytic philosophy.Robert Hanna - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Problems from Kant.James van Cleve - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):637-640.

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