Arguing from Ignorance

Abstract

Arguments from ignorance should be schematized: It has not been proven false that p. So it is possible that p. So, it is reasonable to believe p. Also, in opposition to standard views they should be distinguished from burden of proof and absence of evidence arguments. Much of the persuasiveness of such arguments can be located in the slippery uses of "possible." Besides equivocations on "possible" the argument is a fallacy for two reasons. First, the possibility implied by the first premise does not yield the serious possibility that is needed for establishing the conclusion. Second, ignorance is never sufficient reason for belief, only adequate evidence.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,319

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Arguing from ignorance.Richard Robinson - 1971 - Philosophical Quarterly 21 (83):97-108.
Arguing from Ignorance: Maimonides and Spinoza on Contingency.Kenneth Seeskin - 2006 - Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society:182-201.
Two Arguments for Evidentialism.Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):805-818.
The New View on Ignorance Undefeated.Rik Peels - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):741-750.
God, ignorance and existence.Giovanni Mion - 2012 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (2):85-88.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-02

Downloads
52 (#457,538)

6 months
5 (#840,382)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan H. Adler
Case Western Reserve University

References found in this work

Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.
Epistemic possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.
Reason and Belief in God.Alvin Plantinga - 1983 - In Alvin Plantinga & Nicholas Wolterstorff, Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God. University of Notre Dame Press. pp. 16-93.
The Will to Believe.William James - 1896 - The New World 5:327--347.

View all 10 references / Add more references