Within the psy- disciplines, Foucauldian discourse analysis has shown that those who exercise power in defining psychological experiences seek to maintain existing power hierarchies through this labeling. In that way, it is a fitting method to examine how the use of specific language constructs reality for individuals and society as a whole. Currently, the use of the word "triggered" has proliferated beyond the common mental health usage to refer to posttraumatic stress disorder or a re-experiencing symptom of a trauma. In (...) this qualitative investigation, we analyze "triggered" experiences written about in participants' vignettes to explore how using the word "triggered" does something in terms of power, hierarchy, and expression of vulnerability for individuals, and how this is impacted by the way they position themselves and others in speaking about their experiences. We understand the experience of being "triggered" to be constructed differently depending on the source of the trigger. The difference is particularly salient for those who use "triggered" to refer to a microaggression as opposed to those who are referring to a sexual assault. We discuss the tension between supporting a psychiatric status quo regarding trauma and the subversion of this status quo via the expanded use of the word "triggered.". (shrink)

Boredom is a frequently expressed feeling in anorexia. However, boredom is rarely a subject of study. We propose that boredom has a central place in the understanding of anorexia. Boredom, in that it reveals the ontological condition of each one, pushes the subject to face its existence and the burden it constitutes. Anorexia would thus be an attempt to fight against boredom to avoid this ontological encounter. Certain characteristics of existence proposed by Heidegger are thus brought to the forefront: ability-to-be, (...) temporality or the impossible banality. With the help of two clinical cases, we will see how boredom can also be a therapeutic lever in the treatment of anorexia. (shrink)

Thomas Szasz famously argued that mental illness is a myth. Less famously, Szasz argued that since mental illness is a myth, so too is psychotherapy. Szasz's claim that mental illness is a myth has been much discussed, but much less attention has been paid to his claim that psychotherapy is a myth. In the first part of this essay, I critically examine Szasz's discussion of psychotherapy to uncover the strongest version of his case for thinking that it is a myth. (...) As we'll see, this involves an understanding of psychotherapeutic interventions as treatments of psychopathological problems. In the rest of this essay, I turn to this directly and argue that psychotherapy has an important non-pathocentric dimension. I argue that we fail to appreciate the nature and variety of psychotherapy if we concentrate only on its pathocentric dimensions. Though I use Szasz as a stalking horse, the substantive topic is the nature of psychotherapy. This enquiry falls into the philosophy of psychotherapy as distinct from the philosophy of psychiatry and the philosophy of psychoanalysis. (shrink)

The role of loneliness in shaping the interpersonal experience of patients with social anxiety disorder (SAD) is poorly understood. The present study begins to close this gap through phenomenological analysis of a series of experiential interviews with eight people suffering from SAD. The analysis shows that in socially anxious experiences, the sense of being an outsider to a seamlessly unfolding interpersonal situation constitutes the self-other relationship in which the patient finds themselves. In this experience of an unamendable separation from others, (...) there is profound loneliness. The impossibility of becoming absorbed in the interpersonal situation forces the patient to act as if they naturally belonged with others. This performative way of relating to others gives rise to anxiety, manifesting as the fear of being revealed as imposters. This conceptualization challenges the dominant cognitive-behavioral account of SAD by decentralizing fearfulness and underscoring loneliness as a constitutive aspect of the patient's interpersonal experiences. Further, it highlights the importance of considering a wider array of experiential manifestations in addition to thoughts and behaviors in conceptualizing the psychopathology of socially anxious patients. (shrink)

Kristiansen's "Feeling like a perpetual outsider: relationality in Social Anxiety Disorder" offers a valuable analysis of loneliness within social anxiety disorder (SAD). Although phenomenological psychopathology has given extensive attention to conditions like schizophrenia, depression, and disordered eating, a more nuanced phenomenological examination of SAD is needed (Bortolan, 2023; Tanaka, 2020; Trigg, 2016). Kristiansen's work addresses this deficit and contributes to broader philosophical and phenomenological discussions of loneliness, including recent work on loneliness within psychopathology (e.g., Krueger et al., 2023; Motta, 2021; (...) Roberts & Krueger, 2021; Seemann, 2022). We propose that first-person narratives illuminate two additional, phenomenologically and clinically relevant aspects: bodily doubt and experiences of absence. Understanding these aspects enriches our descriptive understanding of SAD and potentially informs more effective treatment strategies. (shrink)

This paper offers a phenomenologically informed critique of the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) model of trauma in cross-cultural contexts. Using the case of the Iranian political lifeworld, where the psychiatric discourse of trauma in delineations of various heterogenous experiences of distress is dominant, I demonstrate how trauma can be conceptualized and experienced as temporally extended and collectively shared—contrary to the paradigmatic understanding. First, the PTSD model of trauma as seen in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is (...) examined, where I highlight how the model fails to recognize the importance of sociocultural environments in bringing about states of psychological (ill)health. Second, using first-person accounts by Iranians, I examine how trauma finds meaning and significance within a particular sociocultural setting. Third, by revisiting the notion of continuous traumatic stress (CTS) as a feature of the social environment, I show how a re-coupling of environments and individuals within them can offer a more complete understanding of trauma and the distressing and/or pathological states it may give rise to. Highlighting the common threads with growing interest in enactive and extended approaches in philosophy of psychiatry, I therefore argue for the recognition of the socioculturally constructed conceptions of trauma in shaping experiences and responses to it. (shrink)

In this paper, first, I will argue why the definition of mental imagery in terms of its stimulus (external vs. internal) does not capture some essential properties of mental imagery; second, I will offer an alternative in which I define it in terms of phenomenological similarities and differences between mental imagery and perception. There, I will argue that the fact that mental imagery is essentially neutral with respect to the spatial location of its object indicates a fundamental feature, which refers (...) to the fact that mental imagery, contrary to perception, does not necessarily represent its object as something located in space. This feature can explain some other important phenomenological differences mentioned in the literature, such as external phenomenology of perception as opposed to internal phenomenology of imagery, informativeness of perception as opposed to uninformativeness of imagery, and seeming reality of the percept as opposed to seeming nothingness of mental image. (shrink)

This is the first of two papers charting the decline of psychoanalysis and the ascendancy of cognitivebehavioral therapy (CBT). In this paper, which adopts the methodology of integrated history and philosophy of science, I evaluate the 'origin story' presented by CBT proponents which describes the efforts of Aaron Beck to disprove the psychoanalytic theory of depression and present an alternate understanding of mental illness. I argue that contrary to the presentation of CBT as uniquely possessing evidence for its theoretical account (...) and its efficacy, there is a more complex disagreement between the two therapeutic modalities about what constitutes legitimate evidence. (shrink)

This is the second of two papers charting the decline of psychoanalysis and the ascendancy of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT). In this paper, which adopts the methodology of integrated history and philosophy of science (HPS), I consider the impact of psychopharmaceuticals on the decline of psychoanalysis and the ascendancy of CBT. I argue that contrary to certain accounts given of this period where psychopharmaceuticals straightforwardly supplanted psychoanalysis, their influence was largely related to the introduction of a new evidential standard, namely, clinical (...) trials. It is only once clinical trials become the accepted evidential standard and become institutionally entrenched that CBT rises to prominence. The paper concludes by considering the impact of this evidential shift on contemporary research on talking therapy and offers some methodological reflections. (shrink)