Hope is a complex notion currently attracting a notable degree of scholarly and public attention. In particular, technological and scientific progress is frequently viewed as located somewhere on a continuum between hope and despair. Considering the many ways in which technology and hope are interlinked, in the present article I propose to look at how the latter should be understood in the digital age. In the first part of the analysis, the definition of hope will be discussed. To draw valid (...) conclusions, notions like utopia and optimism will also be taken into account. In the second part, I consider whether the digital space should be thought of as an environment providing conditions for the enhancement of hope—or, rather, for its reduction. In the third part, the notion of “hoping beyond the human” is analyzed in relation to the debate over “sentient” machines and the psychological changes humans undergo in digital spaces. The article is meant to serve as an addition to current publications on hope, given that the focus of the latter is usually on debates surrounding humanism and/or political power. It also aims to demonstrate the necessity of paying critical attention to hope itself within the context of an understanding of technological progress. (shrink)

Vague names, like “Everest” and “Belle Epoque” seem to refer to objects without clear boundaries. Supervaluationism claims that this vagueness is a feature of language, not of the objects referred to; vagueness in names is just ambiguity between many possible referents. This general idea admits of two more specific versions. Both give similar treatments of standard uses of vague names, but have very different results for other cases, such as reference achieved by descriptions including mentioned names. Considering two examples, I (...) show neither variant of supervaluationism can account for the truth of all types of sentences about those names themselves. If I am right that these types exhaust supervaluationism, the theory is shown to be false. This problem closely resembles others in the super-valuationist literature about disquotation failure for truth. Treatments of vague truth and vague reference come apart though, and I show that the two problems are different enough that none of the popular solutions will succeed for reference. I consider—and reject—several specific objections, and two more general ways to recover supervaluationism following my arguments. I conclude that supervaluationism is at best a useful formalism for some kinds of vagueness reference, but fails as a general account. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider a number of philosophical critiques of language and describe how their criticisms compare. In particular, I discuss how the current trend in the philosophy of language known as conceptual engineering fits into this tradition and to what extent it can be considered a critique of language per se, rather than a method of addressing dissatisfactions with certain individual terms. I suggest that criticisms can be divided allegations of two types of shortcoming: dangers and deficiencies. In (...) the category of dangers, I consider some well-known examples from the history of philosophy, and suggest that they partly rely on an unexpressed from of Linguistic Determinism. I then move on to the deficiencies highlighted in the critiques offered by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and Mauthner in his Contributions to a Critique of Language. These form a pair of apparently opposite ways of considering the flaws in language, but I shall argue that they have much in common. I then describe the conceptual engineering movement and its mission to provide ‘improved’ meanings of certain terms. I show that implicit in the assumptions behind conceptual engineering are criticisms of language of both varieties – current meanings are seen as dangerous as they represent a threat to social justice, and the system of allocation of meaning is seen as flawed and in need of external intervention. (shrink)

On March 26th, 2024, an online debate organized by the Institute of Philosophy of Ignatianum University in Cracow took place. The debate was centered around the book "Fenomenologia i jej cień. Zwrot estetyczny w post-fenomenologii francuskiej" ("Phenomenology and its Shadow. The Aesthetic Turn in French Post-Phenomenology"), written by Monika Murawska (Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw) and published by Wydawnictwo Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk in 2023. Besides the author of the book, the following guests were also in (...) attendance: Anna Alichniewicz (Medical University of Łódź), Mateusz Bednarkiewicz (Aleksander Zelwerowicz National Academy of Dramatic Art in Warsaw), Iwona Lorenc (University of Warsaw) and Piotr Schollenberger (University of Warsaw). The debate was led by Magdalena Kozak (Ignatianum University in Cracow). (shrink)

In some articles published over the past fifteen years, I have tried to show that the scientific arguments that have been made against there ever having been merely two human beings do not require a revision of the Catholic doctrine of the monogenetic origin of the human race. In a recent issue of Forum Philosophicum, Fr. Michał Chaberek says that my argument fails. Here is my reply.

Ernest Nagel’s two-part article entitled “Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe” undoubtedly played a crucial role in the development of analytic philosophy in both Europe and the United States. Nagel articulates the shared metaphilosophical assumptions embraced by philosophers from various centres, including Prague, Vienna, Lviv, Warsaw, and Cambridge. Nevertheless, it is important to note that philosophers began to describe themselves using the term “analytical philosopher,” or a similar term, particularly within the intellectual centre of Cambridge, in the early (...) 1930s in Britain. In this article, I shall compare how these philosophers conceptualized “analytic philosophy” with the metaphilosophical assumptions outlined by Nagel. Then, I shall draw a comparison between the understanding of analytic philosophy in the early 1930s in Britain, and contemporary conceptions such as “conceptual creativity” and “conceptual engineering.” As it turns out, a part of contemporary analytic philosophy is more open to social-practical issues than it was in the early 1930s in Britain, especially in the intellectual centre that was Cambridge. (shrink)

Despite the fact that natural language has always been one of the most important resources for the study of ontology, many authors continue to regard it as a deceptive guide to the inquiry into what there is. The notion of natural language as a trap is carried over into contemporary metaontological studies, which typically reject natural language as ontologically committing. From a deflationary perspective, this paper aims to argue that ontological commitment occurs in natural languages, with implications for the linguistic (...) relativity hypothesis. To this end, a view based on naturalized epistemology and other aspects of Quine’s philosophy is presented. The perspective of Natural Language Ontology proposed by Moltmann is also introduced, with the goal of offering a new approach that allows a specific analysis of the ontological commitments of natural languages. While Moltmann herself indicates some motivations for this, its potential attractiveness for the study of linguistic relativity will be emphasized here. Finally, it will be suggested that there may be a linguistic bias around the proposed criteria of ontological commitment. (shrink)

The present text aims to discuss a certain kind of internet meme, construed here as an image macro, in the context of Conceptual Blending Theory (Fauconnier and Turner 2002). Image-based memes (image macros) that contain a verbal layer appear to be the most popular form of such memes. Their concise form demonstrates a creative potential: memes are packed with meaning, reflected in various conceptual packets integrated into their verbal and visual semiosis. Blending theory thus seems an appropriate framework for a (...) discussion of the cognitive mechanisms of memes and the relation between the verbal and the visual, as well as for tracing how the analogy between given domains/input spaces contributes to the effectiveness of a message. (shrink)

Amodality is the thesis that concepts are not constituted by modal-specific representations. In this paper I assess the prospects for uncovering support for this claim in language by two different means. First, I examine the question of the amodal character of abstract concepts, but find it to be inconclusive pending a clearer account of the role of sensorimotor representations in language processing. Second, I evaluate the possibility of there being amodal primitive concepts in the context of Carey’s account of representational (...) primitives in core cognition. Despite their alleged iconicity, which seems to favor a modal view, I contend that there are grounds for regarding them as amodal in nature. I also challenge the discontinuity thesis that regards early primitives as being unrelated to mature, newly linguistically created primitives. (shrink)

In this publication, readers with only a somewhat limited philosophical background will encounter a wonderful and clear introduction to the metaphysics of Aristotle and St. Thomas, while supporters of personalism will become familiar with Burgos’s interesting and original proposal (which is nevertheless deeply rooted in the tradition associated with this current of thought). At the same time, critically minded readers will be able to familiarize themselves with the author’s lucidly presented arguments and reflect on their strength and plausibility. To sum (...) up, it can be said that this is a book worth recommending to a wide audience. (shrink)

This issue features a translation of another paper by Franciszek Bargieł, this time dedicated to the profile of another Jesuit philosopher, Adam Quirinus Krasnodębski. The article was originally published in Latin in Forum Philosophicum 9, (2004): 259–63. It has since been translated into English.

This paper offers an Aristotelian-Thomistic response to the question whether AI is capable of developing virtue. On the one hand, it could be argued that this is possible on the assumption of the minimalist (thin) definition of virtue as a stable (permanent) and reliable disposition toward an actualization of a given power in the agent (in various circumstances), which effects that agent’s growth in perfection. On the other hand, a closer inquiry into Aquinas’s understanding of both moral and intellectual virtues, (...) and a more detailed analysis of the ontological status of AI, show that it is highly unlikely to envision the design of specifically human-like reason-based and/or behavioral-based (“strong”) AI that would possess properly human virtues. Still, virtuous “weak AI” might be possible, although a question ought to be asked whether we should classify artifacts’ virtues using categories developed in reference to specifically human dispositions and actions. (shrink)

This article analyzes the notion of memory in the philosophy of religion. The area of this problematic is defined by Descartes, who, in a thought experiment, postulates an all-powerful, evil demon capable of falsifying human perception. The problem of solipsism raised here also implies doubt about claims based on memory. Descartes’ assumptions are taken up constructively by Alvin Plantinga in his attempt to solve problems in the epistemology of religion by raising the following new question: is belief in God rational, (...) and, if so, is it justified? Peter van Inwagen, for his part, uses memory analysis to construct arguments in support of theodicy. In considering these issues, other key topics within the philosophy of religion, such as the afterlife and the existence of the soul, which are closely related to the analysis of personal identity, inevitably arise. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the arguments presented by Kenneth W. Kemp in his two articles proposing a form of reconciliation between the evolutionary concept of human origins and polygenism. At the beginning, it is explained that Kemp’s understanding of the relationship between science and faith strays from what Augustine (whom Kemp claims to follow) teaches. Then the current state of science is scrutinized with the conclusion that current scientific evidence does not exclude the belief in the traditional form of monogenism. (...) After presenting Kemp’s solution to the alleged conflict between science and Catholic dogma it is shown that Kemp’s solution is based on some confusion in terms and it also encounters several metaphysical and biological difficulties. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, the protagonist of his most famous book, can be regarded as a philosopher who works towards becoming a sage—something that, towards the end of the narrative, ultimately seems to happen. Over the course of the account, he travels between his lonely cave and human society several times, walking up and down a mountain. In this article, I focus on how Nietzsche describes those walks using language that breaks with Cartesian dualism through its employment of such expressions as (...) “lead-drop thoughts.” As a systematic frame of reference intended to support the analysis of these descriptions, I make use of Antoni Kempinski’s concept of energetic-informational metabolism. Then, motivated by the preceding observations, I outline the philosophico-therapeutic hypothesis of a human transformation taking place as a two-phase procedure: (1) replacing the view of Cartesian dualism with what I call the “theatre of forces,” and (2) “de-selfing” the stage, or regarding this theatre as impersonal. Finally, reaching out to a Buddhist philosophical conception of the impersonal, I consider the possibility of a metaphysics entirely derived from sensations. (shrink)

This article will reflect on diversity of thought as an educational task and a remedy for the challenges of the contemporary world, where uncertainty, disorientation, and fear are strongly felt. The main areas of creating diversity will be highlighted, primarily criticality, with a focus on the idea of critical thinking, as well as social diversity and traveling. Diversity is primarily associated with stepping beyond one’s own boundaries (egocentric, sociocentric, etc.) and actively embracing otherness. Therefore, I will strive to present my (...) understanding of criticality against the backdrop of key and model concepts of critical thinking to emphasize zetetic criticism as an attitude leading to diversity of thought. Simultaneously, I will connect criticality with DEI efforts and the value of travel. Both of these activities illustrate two possible dimensions of stepping beyond the boundaries of one’s own perception of the world (trans-personal dimension, trans-objective dimension), and both should be supported by shaping a critical attitude. (shrink)

This article is introductory in nature, seeking as it does to shed preliminary light on issues relating to the connections between philosophy and travel. Its primary claim is that it is valuable to conceive of philosophy as a specific type of journey, and to contrast it with the philosophical conception of travel. Both philosophy and travel may converge in a specific activity that is worth characterizing, at least in broad terms, in order to enrich each of them with aspects that (...) would not be visible when considering them separately. Initially, some of the earliest uses of terms related to philosophical activity in early Greek thought, as well as an iconic fragment from Plato’s Symposium, are analyzed. On this basis, certain characteristics of the philosophical journey will be demonstrated. Subsequently, the phenomenon of travel itself will be subjected to philosophical reflection, resulting in the delineation of one of its possible forms—the eidetic journey. As a result, it will be possible to outline selected connections between the philosophy of the journey and philosophy as a journey. (shrink)

In recent years there has been growing interest in adapting virtue ethics to the ethics of technology. However, it has most typically been invoked to address some particular issue of moral importance, and there is only a limited range of works dealing with the methodological question of how virtue ethics may contribute to this field. My approach in this paper is threefold. I start with a brief discussion of Aristotelian virtue ethics, with a view to constructing a framework in which (...) to then address at least some of the aspects of the growing technicization of life that call for scrutiny. I subsequently proceed further by outlining three possible models of virtue-theoretical analysis within the ethics of technology, giving special attention to those changes in human agency where technicization can be seen to exert a significant influence. Finally, I focus on the third such possibility, the extended virtue model, as a basis for calling for a more inclusive account of moral agency. (shrink)

Researchers’ attention has been drawn to parallels between Homer’s Odyssey and the Epic of Gilgamesh. However, hitherto, no connections have been observed between Kazantzakis’s Sequel and the Mesopotamian work. Convergent are the primary motivations and actions undertaken by the protagonists of both poems, particularly their “peregrinations” to the boundaries of the world, dictated by eschatological anxieties. Moreover, the hero of Kazantzakis’s Sequel undergoes a transformation analogous to the legendary ruler of Uruk: under the influence of concerns, the proud kings opt (...) for solitary wanderings, which results in better self-understanding and higher axiological awareness. The comparison of symbols, such as the sun, fire, lightning, the Water of Life and Death, and theriomorphic allegories, indicates Kazantzakis’s utilization of numerous intermediary sources stemming from the ancient Near Eastern tradition. An additional aim of the article is to indicate interpretative possibilities of books describing the wanderings of the Odyssean spirit after abandoning the project of building the “ideal city,” as versions of ars moriendi: the art of overcoming the fear of death. (shrink)

This is a translation of four Hegel's lectures (1819, 1820/21, 1823/24, 1825/26) on Plato's Dialectics with an extensive crticial introduction from the translator.

In Forsaking the Fall, Daniel Spencer argues that a Christianity which takes the Bible as authoritative for faith and which holds continuity with the deep tradition of the Church can still dispense with Original Sin and the lapsarian reading of Genesis and Romans 5. While not explicit in the introduction, the motivation for this move to reject the Fall and Original Sin seems to be a desire to account for humanity’s evolutionary origin. Without a historical Garden of Eden or Adam (...) and Eve, can a fully satisfying account of soteriology, Christology, and faithfulness to the biblical text still be held? (shrink)

This paper explores the pervasive use of journey and traveller metaphors in everyday language, and their applications in philosophical discourse. While these metaphors offer rich insights into abstract concepts such as love and philosophy, they also introduce ambiguities that can impede effective communication. By dissecting the nuances of these metaphorical figures, the paper aims to clarify their meanings and enhance their explanatory power. Divided into three main sections, the paper first discusses different types of metaphors and their general structure, providing (...) a foundation for understanding metaphorical language. The second section delves into the specific metaphor of journey and traveller, analyzing its various connotations and implications with insights from scholars such as Dariusz Kubok and Steven Shaviro. Through this analysis, the distinctions between a traveller and a tourist are explored to deepen our understanding of metaphorical frameworks in philosophical discourse. Finally, the paper examines a specific journey strategy, focusing on Object-Oriented Ontology as an exemplification of a philosophical journey. Building upon prior conclusions, this last section elucidates the meaning and implications of this journey strategy, seeking to shed light on the multifaceted nature of philosophical discourse. (shrink)