Value Theory

While much has been written regarding the harms of Digital Blackface, within this paper I argue that Digital Blackface is harmful on an argumentative level, as opposed to merely socio-political. My position is that the usage of Black GIFs/memes should be curtailed by non-Black and non-users of African American Argumentation (AAA). Rather than offering socio-political reasons members of these groups ought not to use Digital Blackface, I utilize the Pragma-Dialectical model of argumentation. My argument hinges on Black GIFs/memes utilized by (...) non-Blacks and non-AAA users violating two Pragma-Dialectical rules: 1 – the starting point rule and 2 – the usage rule. (shrink)

In this paper I formulate three objections to Axel Gosseries’s account of what we owe to future generations when it comes to addressing problems related to climate change. First, I challenge Gosseries’s use of the term justice, quite generally, to apply to both human-induced as well as to natural, that is, non-human-induced, detrimental effects. I argue that this liberal use of the term justice constructs a view that implausibly lacks reference to human agency. Second, I challenge the way Gosseries applies (...) the notion of distributive justice, more specifically, across generations. I show that he makes use of this notion too indiscriminately, as if principles of distributive justice simply applied between humans across time and space, regardless of whether they stand in any relationship of cooperation to each other. Third, I reject the claim that our concern with justice _across_ generations should persuade us not to save for the future if those who are worst-off across time—and who can be “reached” by transfers—are among the currently living. I suggest that there may be value connected to saving for the future for all concerned, including the presently worst-off. Saving therefore does not necessarily directly compete with the duty to maximize the position of the worst-off, wherever in time they may be situated. (shrink)

How do adults acquire the moral right to rear a child? In Luara Ferracioli’s new Parenting and the Goods of Childhood, she argues that adults acquire this right when they morally commit to a child. In this note, I’ll critically evaluate Ferracioli’s account. I’ll first describe the moral commitment view in further detail. After this, I’ll argue that it suffers from what I call the Swooping Problem. Contrary to Ferracioli’s defenses, her view permits adults to swoop in and acquire a (...) right to rear a child just by asserting a moral commitment to them even when the mother is still gestating the child or when there is already an established parent-child relationship in place. Since these are undesirable and counterintuitive results, we should modify the moral commitment view to avoid them. Along the way, then, I’ll suggest ways Ferracioli could modify her view to avoid these objections. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that we never owe others gratitude in return for their treating us in ways that we are owed. Instead, we owe others gratitude only for treating us in ways that go above and beyond the demands of morality. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken: we sometimes owe others gratitude for treating us in ways that we are owed. In particular, I argue that some moral duties require us to act in ways that express (...) good will to one another, and when we act in accordance with these duties, we trigger duties of gratitude on the part of others. (shrink)

This paper investigates the claim that immigrants have a moral duty to integrate. I argue that socially excluded immigrant minorities have a moral permission to form enclaves, which means that they have at most only limited duties to integrate. Positively, I argue that enclaves can play an important role in supporting the self-respect of socially excluded immigrants. Negatively, I argue social exclusion makes the putative duty to integrate—when it conflicts with enclave formation—unreasonably burdensome. I also argue that even if integration (...) is a genuine duty, it cannot be permissibly enforced as a social expectation vis-à-vis socially excluded immigrants because members of dominant social groups lack standing to blame socially excluded immigrants for failing to integrate. My argument is pessimistic because it recognizes that integration may nonetheless play an important role in tackling relational inequality. Social exclusion thus means that immigrant minorities have only limited duties to integrate, but it also makes integration particularly valuable. (shrink)

The suggestion that crime be treated as a public health problem instead of being treated retributively provokes unease for two reasons. Firstly, it is thought to foster impersonal treatment, which is “objectifying” or “dehumanizing.” I argue that practices are problematically impersonal when they bypass or undermine an agent’s ability to take responsibility. However, there is a difference between taken responsibility and retributive responsibility. Skepticism about the latter does not entail skepticism about the former. Skeptics about retributive desert still have strong (...) moral reasons to condemn practices that undermine taken responsibility, so it need not have these dehumanizing implications. Secondly, the association of medicine and crime has a dark history. While this is true, this is largely because medicine has a dark history. Instead of striving to limit things that fall within the boundaries of public health, I argue that the solution is to take a more ethical approach to public health. (shrink)

Kevin J. Elliott has recently defended an institutional duty to vote. This duty is based on (i) the role obligation of citizens to do what is necessary for well-functioning representative institutions and (ii) the claim that universal voting is ordinarily necessary for fair representation. This critical response takes issue with the second of these claims. I argue that neither the informational nor motivational problems that Elliott identifies require universal voting. Representatives have other ways of identifying citizens’ wants and interests and (...) other incentives to respond to them. Indeed, some of Elliott’s own suggestions, for instance that representatives will respond to uncertain threats, seem to presuppose that these difficulties can be overcome. Thus, I argue that universal voting is not necessary for effective representation. (shrink)

Inspired by the philosophical ideas in the “Innovation” story of Wild Wise Weird, this commentary aims to examine the innovation curse-a cycle of wasteful technological innovations in the environmental sector. Through the lens of informational entropy and value formation, it also advocates for a shift toward nature-based solutions and integrating Indigenous knowledge in addressing climate change impacts.

Some pejoratives are slurs—they target people on the basis of protected characteristics. Other pejoratives are what we can call “cognitive-behavioural pejoratives”: they target contemptible conduct or character, not protected characteristics. These two classes of pejoratives are semantically similar, yet the ethical profiles of their use are radically different. There is an Estonian pejorative that targets people on the basis of a mixture of ethnicity (approximately: Russian) and a cognitive-behavioural trait (approximately: chauvinism). What is the ethical status of the use of (...) such a word: a word that combines properties of ethically very different pejoratives? This paper draws upon interviews with members of the ethnic group that the word’s usage is associated with, and members of the ethnic group targeted by the word, to better understand the laudability and criticizability of various some uses of the pejorative. We defend the view that the pejorative had some plausibly laudable uses during the period when Estonia was annexed by Soviet Russia, and that (even these) uses of the pejorative are in principle susceptible to faults that, when they arise, make use of the word criticizable. (shrink)

The concept of harm plays a central role in many philosophical discussions. There are numerous ethical theories, claims, and arguments that appeal to the concept of harm. However, some philosophers think that the concept of harm is not fit to play this role in philosophical theorizing. Bradley (2012) argues that the concept is problematic to such an extent that we should do away with it. Bradley is not the only philosopher who doubts this concept’s usefulness, although others make more modest (...) and suggestive skeptical claims. In this paper, I examine several claims in support of skepticism, which are explicitly embraced or hinted to in the literature. Some examples are the claims that the harm concept is defective and that harm is morally insignificant. Neither those claims nor others, I argue, yield a good case for skepticism about harm. (shrink)

Since its official launch on June 22, 2022, the SM3D Portal has been committed to initiating and completing over a hundred Bayesian Mindsponge Framework Collaborative Projects (BMF CP). Based on the principles of the successful BMF CP series, I, Minh-Hoang Nguyen, would like to propose a new type of collaboration in a parallel series: BEE JP. -/- BEE is an acronym for the book “Better Economics for the Earth,” while JP stands for Joint Paper.

.....الصديق الصادقي العماري، دور وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي في تعزيز قيم المواطنة الإنسانية لدى الشباب، ضمن مؤتمر أسبوع التقارب والوئام الإنساني-الرابع-، منشورات مركز السلطان قابوس العالي للثقافة والعلوم، سلطنة عمان، فبراير 2015....... ساعدت تكنولوجيا المعلومات والاتصال الرقمية على ربط التواصل بين الشعوب بمختلف توجهاتها الحضارية متجاوزة بذلك الحدود السياسية والجغرافية، وفك العزلة الحضارية التي كانت تعيشها معظم المجتمعات البشرية، إذ يشهد عالمنا المعاصر تحولات كبيرة في تكنولوجيا الاتصال، تؤثر في العلاقات السياسية والاقتصادية، وفي أنماط التفكير وأنماط العيش في المجتمعات المختلفة، وقد (...) قامت وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي الرقمية ولازالت تقوم بدور فعال في إمداد الإنسان بكثير من المعلومات والمواقف والاتجاهات، مساهمة بذلك في تشكيل وعيه وبإعداده ليكون أكثر قدرة على التأثير في الآخرين واستمالتهم، فهي تقدم تعلم اللغات وتسهم في ترجمة المعلومات من أجل تسهيل عملية التواصل بين الشباب و إزالة الفوارق الحضارية، فضلا عن تميز هذه الوسائل بعدة مميزات منها التشاركية والتفاعلية والحضور الدائم غير المادي. فقد وفر ظهور وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي فتحا ثوريا، نقل الإعلام إلى آفاق غير مسبوقة، وأعطى مستخدميه فرصا كبرى للتأثير والانتقال عبر الحدود بلا قيود ولا رقابة بشكل نسبي محدود. إذ أوجد ظهور وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي قنوات للبث المباشر من جمهورها في تطور يغير من جوهر النظريات الاتصالية المعروفة، ويوقف احتكار صناعة الرسالة الإعلامية لينقلها إلى مدى أوسع وأكثر شمولية، وبقدرة تأثيرية وتفاعلية لم يتصورها خبراء الاتصال. وأبرز حراك الشباب العربي الذي تمثل في الثورات التي شهدتها بعض الدول العربية قدرة هذا النوع من الإعلام على التأثير في تغيير ملامح المجتمعات، وإعطاء قيمة مضافة في الحياة السياسية، والتأكيد على منافسة الإعلام التقليدي. أما المواطنة فقد أصبحت، بما يترتب عليها من واجبات وحقوق للمواطنين، مقولة مركزية للديمقراطية ومقوما أساسيا من مقومات الحداثة السياسية والاجتماعية، بل إن خلو دستور أية دولة دون الإشارة إلى هذه الحقوق وضرورة صيانتها والمحافظة عليها يعد من منظور الأخلاق الديمقراطية مخالفة قانونية وسياسية وانتقاصا من مشروعية السلطة ذاتها . كما أخذت المواطنة في العصر الحديث معنى جديدا تعكسه المنزلة التي أصبح يحتلها المواطن في المجتمعات الديمقراطية الحديثة، وتحددت تحت تأثير مجموعة من التحولات طبعت المجتمعات المعاصرة خلال منتصف القرن العشرين، هذه التحولات بعضها اقتصادي أو سياسي و البعض الأخر منها أيديولوجي إلا أن أهمها هو انتصار التوجهات التي أكدت على أولوية الفرد وشرعية استقلاله تجاه المجتمع، وحقه في رعاية مطالبه ومتابعة أهدافه بكل حرية في حدود احترام القوانين وقد شهدت العقود الأخيرة تعمقا قويا لهذا المبدأ. لقد غيرت المواطنة الحديثة بعمق الصورة الكلاسيكية للمواطن؛ حيث تعد حرية التعبير والمعتقد من الأصول الأساسية التي يقوم عليها نظام الدولة القانونية الديمقراطية، كما تعتبر وسائل الإعلام بمختلف صورها من أهم وسائل التعبير عن حرية الرأي في العالم المعاصر، لكن التطورات الحاصلة في مختلف مجالات الحياة الإنسانية جعلت الأحداث والظواهر والتطورات تفقد بساطتها الأولى، باعتبار التكنولوجيا الحديثة متغير أساسي في هذا المقياس، الأمر الذي دفع باتجاه ظهور إعلام متخصص يستطيع أن يقدم معالجة نوعية تتميز بمستوى من الجدية والعمق والشمولية، وتنوع وظائف وسائل الإعلام وانتقالها من اهتماماتها الكلاسيكية من نقل الأخبار إلى معالجة الأوضاع فأصبحت من ضروريات الحياة، فهي بمثابة حلقة وصل بين كل مؤسسات ومقومات ومكونات البناء الاجتماعي، وعلى عاتقها تقوم بشرح وتقديم ما لدى كل مؤسسة اجتماعية لأخرى؛ إذ تؤدي وسائل الإعلام دور بالغ الأهمية والخطورة في تكوين الرأي العام وفي تشكيله، وفي تعبئة الجماعات وحشدها حول أفكار وأراء واتجاهات معينة. (shrink)

An athlete has faith in her unathletic partner to run a marathon, a teacher has faith in her currently poor-performing students to improve in the future, and your friend has faith in you to succeed in the difficult project that you have been pursuing, even, and especially, when your chance of failing is non-trivial. This paper develops and defends a relational view of interpersonal faith by considering four interesting phenomena: first, in virtue of placing faith in someone, we stand in (...) solidarity with that person; second, interpersonal faith is called for during moments of difficulty, but it can seem inappropriate during moments of ease; third, one’s faith in others can feel unwelcomed, and can be rejected; and fourth, when interpersonal faith is frustrated, disappointment, rather than resentment, is warranted. I propose that when the faithor (e.g., your friend) places faith in the faithee (e.g., you) to φ, the faithor does something close to inviting the faithee to (re)commit to φ-ing. This invitation-like move, once properly taken up by the faithee, puts both sides of the faith in a new kind of normative relationship that is in the same broad family as a promissory relationship, albeit with a different normative profile. (shrink)

This paper aims to offer a critique of a rigidly moralistic temperament in public discourse from the perspective of political realism. It unpacks three types of moralism in public discourse, and for each, it explains why it is normatively problematic from a realist perspective: ‘Moralist Causalism’ is the belief that moral preaching is an apt way to affect the world for the better; ‘Moralist Manicheism’ is a dichotomous division of the world between good and evil; ‘Moralist Absolutism’ is the conviction (...) that only morality matters when we answer the question, ‘What should we do?’. The paper then turns these negative criticisms into a positive recipe for how to look realistically at what is valuable in the world. First, there are not only multiple values in the world but also different sources of values (epistemic, instrumental, aesthetic…) which may conflict with one another. We call this requirement ‘Meta-Normative Pluralism’. Second, politics is pivotal because it is the sphere where the clashes among all other spheres of value are authoritatively resolved—a role which moralists usurp for morality. (shrink)

This study maps the evolution of research themes on datafication, analyzing trends, key authors, interdisciplinary collaborations, and emerging topics from 1994 to 2023. The analysis reveals a notable increase in publication volume, particularly from 2014 onwards, reflecting advancements in digital technologies and heightened interest in data-driven research. A significant surge occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, with 26.10% of total publications in 2022 and 30.52% in 2023 alone. Thematic clusters identified through keyword mapping include Social Media and Privacy, Artificial Intelligence and (...) Machine Learning, Human Dimensions, and Infrastructure and Trust, highlighting diverse research foci. Emerging discussions on data justice and inequality reflect growing attention to the ethical and socio-political implications of datafication. The study also examines the types of documents and subject areas, revealing the dominance of peer-reviewed journal articles (71.41%) and a strong representation of social sciences (46.93%), computer science (14.75%), and arts and humanities (11.57%). Interdisciplinary connections underscore the broad impact of datafication across technology, healthcare, education, and media studies. This research offers insights into the dynamic nature of datafication, pointing to the need for further interdisciplinary collaboration, especially in addressing societal and ethical concerns such as data governance and digital inequality. Future research directions should focus on the human dimensions of datafication, data literacy, and the development of robust data governance frameworks to mitigate potential inequalities and power imbalances in a rapidly data-driven world. (shrink)

The end of a long-term romantic relationship ranks among the most stressful and momentous events in life. Thus, the decision of whether to break up with someone whom one has been with for many years should generally be made very carefully. Unfortunately, decision theory is often thought to be unable to provide rational guidance in such high-stake life choices due to the outcomes’ presumed transformative character. The present paper shows how agents can rationally decide whether to leave their romantic partner (...) even if the decision is transformative. It does so by using a novel five-level account of transformative decision-making, which can also be used for other key life choices, and which is the first to integrate in a systematic way several approaches for making (certain types of) transformative decisions that have been proposed in recent years. (shrink)

Several authors have argued that we ought to have fewer children in order to reduce our contribution to climate change. Proponents of this view generally hold a moderate version of the view, according to which it is still permissible to have one or two children per couple. One recent exception is Chad Vance’s paper “Procreation is Immoral on Environmental Grounds” in this journal, in which he argues that procreation is always, or almost always, morally impermissible. I argue, first, that Vance (...) is mistaken in conceding that his radical position holds only if individual acts of procreation can make a difference, rather than being only a causally insignificantly contribution to collective harm. Instead, given his assumptions, he should hold on to the radical view that we ought to have no children at all. Second, I argue against Vance’s strongest argument for his radical view. Vance argues that procreation harms others, and that obligations to avoid harming rule out the demandingness considerations that are used to support a permission to have one or two children. However, contrary to paradigmatic cases of harming, any procreation-related harms result not only from procreators’ actions, but also from our collective failures to rapidly reduce emissions. This complex causal structure undermines Vance’s rejection of demandingness considerations. I conclude that the moderate view that we may have one or two children per couple survives Vance’s criticism. (shrink)

Việc bài nghiên cứu bị từ chối là một thực tế mà tất cả các học giả phải đối mặt trên con đường học thuật. Mặc dù việc này có thể ảnh hưởng tiêu cực đến sự tự tin, sức khỏe tinh thần và khả năng bền bỉ theo đuổi nghề của các nhà nghiên cứu, nó vẫn được xem là cơ chế “lọc” quan trọng nhằm phân biệt giữa những nghiên cứu đạt và không đạt tiêu chuẩn. Tuy nhiên, (...) gia tăng sự khắt khe trong quá trình đánh giá và phản biện chưa hẳn chỉ mang lại toàn kết quả tích cực. -/- . (shrink)

(English, singlish=siterrian/cosmoterrian/terrian english and alike) Look out! Plan C follows. C as Cosmoterra, Conception, Coprotection etc. No art without heart! Even stars learn to be the first and last. Total learning! Error tolerance 20%. (The hyperbolic Doubts, the Ellipse of the clouds, Makes us to think and to preview Sword, Pen, Lens, Chant and Stew. Imperative, necessary lesson: Support letter G=Greatness, Gratitude, Gratuity! fantastic scale economies. Also m=micronity, moderation, maspions/matter spiritualized. Total learning! To-le-rate Si-territy!) Global leaders should support a gradual (...) general quasi-gratuity. Alfabetul, de la A la Z trece prin G=Grandiție, Gratitudine. Gratuitate. Viitorul e (quasi)gratuit! AI confirmă! (shrink)

For Karl Marx, ideological forms of consciousness are false, but how and in what respects? Ideologies must include some beliefs in order to be false, even if not all the beliefs that are inferentially related in the ideology are false, and even if there are (causally) related attitudes in the ideology that are neither true nor false. “Ideological” beliefs, however, are not simply false; their falsity has the specific property of not being in the interests of the agents who accept (...) the ideology. One can make two kinds of mistakes about interests. One can mistake what is in one’s intrinsic interest or one can mistake what is in one’s extrinsic interest (that is, the means required to realize one’s intrinsic interests). Marx is mostly, but not exclusively, focused on mistakes about extrinsic interests; this is important in understanding how “morality” (which is not a matter of beliefs, but attitudes) can be ideological for Marx. I illustrate this analysis with some of Marx’s paradigmatic examples of ideological mistakes and offer an account of Marx’s conception of “interests.”. (shrink)

Why do oppressive social and political systems persist for as long as they do? Critical theorists posit that the oppressed are in the grip of ideology or false consciousness, leading them voluntarily to accept their servitude. An objection to this explanation points out that we have no account of how the ruling class’s ideology comes to dominate. One common reply says that the ruling class’s ideology comes to dominate because they control major organizations such as schools, churches, and news agencies. (...) This response is seriously flawed, I argue. I then explore an alternative, neglected answer: The ruling class’s ideology dominates because believing it is good for the oppressed. After sketching some details, I explore the implications of this account for critical theory as a research program. (shrink)

What is the difference between a philosophy and an ideology? Would simply observing some aspect of human experience count as ideology? No. But suppose we try to explain and interpret what we have seen. Now, we enter the neighborhood of what gets called ideology. What else does it take to sort out what should be called ideological? And why would a worldview sometimes turn into an echo chamber, a cocoon of confirmation bias that fosters false consciousness?

Judith Shklar once remarked that the mere presence of ideology is not objectionable but that pretended immunity to ideology is. I scrutinize this suggestion and Shklar’s subsequent view that social theorists should acknowledge that their ideological impulses influence both their methods of study and the questions they pursue. I begin by focusing on the different ways that Shklar characterizes ideology before turning to her critique of legalism. I then chart various ways that Shklar’s call for ideologically self-aware political theorizing feeds (...) into her later work. I conclude by examining what ideological self-consciousness implies for our understanding of the purpose and limits of political theory. (shrink)

One reason why the recently influential “realist” turn in political theory rejects mainstream theoretical approaches is that it views their moralistic orientation as a source of ideological credulity. Like Karl Marx before them, realists complain that “moralizing” social criticism is bound to be imprisoned in the illusions of the epoch. This essay suggests that contemporary political realism may itself invite comparable accusations of ideological complicity insofar as it equates politics and agonistic contestation, as many realists in fact do. The assumption (...) that political interaction is essentially contestatory strikes many as plain common sense, undeniable in the face of any sober and realistic observation of actual politics. This essay suggests, to the contrary, that the seeming self-evidence of this assumption may precisely be a symptom of ideological illusion. To develop this suggestion, this essay contends that contemporary realism is vulnerable to charges of “contest-fetishism” that parallel Marx’s argument that the classical political economists he criticizes in Capital were blind to the “commodity-fetishism” of modern capitalism. (shrink)

Given the prevalence of hate ideology, a concerted, multipronged effort to combat it clearly seems in order. In this essay, I explore whether hate crime legislation is a permissible and advisable component of this effort. In particular, I consider whether it is morally permissible to impose enhanced punishments upon criminals who select their victims at least in part because of an animus toward members of the group to which the victim belongs. Would it be permissible to punish more severely a (...) White supremacist who attacks a person only because she is Black, for instance, or an anti-Semitic thief who selects her victims at least in part because they are Jewish? After sketching a preliminary defense of this type of hate crime legislation, I note some potential concerns, including vexing questions about the likely effects of imposing such laws under the present, nonideal circumstances in the United States. (shrink)