Theories of Laws of Nature

Alles entwickelt sich: der Kosmos mit seinen Strukturen, das Leben auf der Erde und die atemberaubend kreative Intelligenz (auch die künstliche) sowie unser Verständnis von alledem. Dieses Buch ist der menschlichen und nichtmenschlichen Natur auf der Spur. Es handelt von Grundsatzfragen der Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie, von Präzisierungen der modernen Naturphilosophie und von vielen weiteren Facetten humanistischer Kultur. Leitidee ist die Einheit des Wissens im Lichte der Evolution. -/- Gerhard Vollmer zählt mit seinen Publikationen (die meisten im Hirzel-Verlag!) zur Erkenntnis- und (...) Wissenschaftstheorie, Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik und über ein evolutionäres, naturalistisches Weltbild zu den bedeutendsten Philosophen der letzten 50 Jahre im deutschsprachigen Raum. Viel beigetragen hat er auch zum interdisziplinären Diskurs und zur Wissenschaftskommunikation – von seinem akademischen Wirken ganz zu schweigen. -/- Autoren und Themen: -/- "Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie bei Schopenhauer - eine Spurensuche" - Prof. Dr. Dieter Birnbacher ist emeritierter Professor für Philosophie an der Universität Düsseldorf. Vizepräsident der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Humanes Sterben sowie der Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft, Mitglied der Leopoldina. -/- "Das Realismusproblem in der Evolutionären Erkenntinstheorie" - Florian Chefai ist Direktoriumsmitglied und wissenschaftlicher Koordinator des Hans-Albert-Instituts. Studium der Philosophie und Soziologie in Trier. Seit 2020 Referent für Presse- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit bei der Giordano-Bruno-Stiftung. -/- "Evolution und Politik - oder: Wie man Türen öffnet" - Dr. Gerhard Engel ist Philosoph und Evolutionärer Humanist. 1988 Promotion im Fach Wissenschaftslehre bei Hans Albert, danach Lehrtätigkeit in Braunschweig, Mainz und Nordhausen. 2009 bis 2017 war er Präsident der Humanistischen Akademie Bayern. -/- "Auf der Suche nach der Objektivität" - Helmut Fink ist Theoretischer Physiker und Referent für Wissenschaft und Philosophie bei Kortizes – Institut für populärwissenschaftlichen Diskurs in Nürnberg. Seit 2013 Vorstandsmitglied der Heisenberg-Gesellschaft, seit 2017 Vorsitzender der Ludwig-Feuerbach-Gesellschaft. -/- "Materie und Emergenz - ein wirkungsvolles Duo" - Prof. Dr. Ernst Peter Fischer ist Wissenschaftshistoriker und -publizist. 1977 Promotion in Biologie bei Max Delbrück, 1987 Habilitation in Wissenschaftsgeschichte, danach Lehrtätigkeit in Konstanz und Heidelberg. -/- "Die Evolution als Ideengeber für eine Systematische Kreativität" - PD Dr. Dr. Ulrich Frey ist Philosoph und Ökologe. 2006 Promotion in Philosophie bei Gerhard Vollmer, 2016 Promotion zum Dr. rer. nat. bei Eckart Voland, 2017 Habilitation in Ökologie in Gießen. Forscher am Deutschen Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt in Stuttgart. -/- "Die Dynamik der Ignoranz in den Wissenschaften" - Prof. Dr. Paul Hoyningen-Huene ist promovierter Theoretischer Physiker, pensionierter Professor für Theoretische Philosophie an der Leibniz Universität Hannover und Lehrbeauftragter für Wirtschaftsphilosophie an der Universität Zürich. Mitglied der Leopoldina. "KI: Neues Denkzeug oder Evolutionssprung?" - Prof. Dr. Hartmut Kliemt ist emeritierter Professor für Philosophie und Ökonomik an der Frankfurt School of Finance and Management und Gastprofessor für Verhaltens- und Institutionenökonomik an der Universität Gießen. -/- "Warum manche Warum-Fragen immer wieder neu beantwortet werden" - Prof. Dr. Meinard Kuhlmann ist Wissenschaftsphilosoph im Philosophischen Seminar und im Studium Generale der Universität Mainz. 2012 bis 2021 Sprecher der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Philosophie der Physik der Deutschen Physikalischen Gesellschaft. -/- "Sind die sogenannten 'Critical Studies' Kandidaten für Pseudowissenschaften?" - Dr. Martin Mahner ist Biologe und Wissenschaftstheoretiker. Von 1999 bis 2024 leitete er das Zentrum für Wissenschaft und kritisches Denken der Gesellschaft zur wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung von Parawissenschaften (GWUP) in Roßdorf bei Darmstadt. -/- "Das Realismusproblem in der Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie" - Dr. Jonas Pöld ist Direktoriumsmitglied des Hans-Albert-Instituts. Studium der Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Literaturwissenschaft in Berlin und Münster. 2024 Promotion in Philosophie in Münster. -/- "Im Lichte der Evolution: Kultur" - Dr. Dr. Hannes Rusch ist Verhaltensökonom. Promotionen 2014 in Biologie in Gießen und 2020 in Ökonomik in München. Seit 2023 Forschungsgruppenleiter am Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Kriminalität, Sicherheit und Recht in Freiburg. -/- "Nietzsche und die Wissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts" - Prof. Dr. Claus-Artur Scheier ist emeritierter Professor für Philosophie an der Technischen Universität Braunschweig. Arbeitsgebiete vor allem Metaphysik, Ästhetik und Deutscher Idealismus. Mitglied der Braunschweigischen Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft. -/- "Auf Epikurus Schultern - eine kurze Geschichte des Naturalismus" - Dr. Dr. h.c. Michael Schmidt-Salomon ist Philosoph, Schriftsteller und Vorstandssprecher der Giordano-Bruno-Stiftung für Humanismus und Aufklärung. 1997 Promotion zum Dr. phil. in Trier, 2019 Dr. h.c. der TU Liberec (Reichenberg). -/- "»Spiegel«-Leser wissen mehr – Reflexionen über Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie" - Prof. Dr. Volker Sommer ist Primatologe und Anthropologe. Seit 1996 Professor für Evolutionäre Anthropologie am University College London. Er erforscht Ökologie und Verhalten wild lebender Primaten in Afrika und Asien. -/- "Warum manche Warum-Fragen immer wieder neu beantwortet werden" - Prof. Dr. Manfred Stöckler ist Theoretischer Physiker und Philosoph. 1981 Promotion zum Dr. phil. in Gießen. 1991 bis 2017 Professor für Theoretische Philosophie mit dem Schwerpunkt Naturphilosophie und Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften an der Universität Bremen. -/- "Gerhard Vollmer als Philosophiedidaktiker – vom Lernen auf Vorrat, einer immer noch nötigen Fragekultur und dem Wert guter Beispiele" - Dr. Thomas Sukopp ist Akademischer Rat am Philosophischen Seminar, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Philosophiedidaktik, der Universität Siegen. 2006 Promotion in Philosophie bei Gerhard Vollmer, danach Lehrtätigkeit unter anderem in Braunschweig, Bamberg und Augsburg, seit 2012 in Siegen. -/- "Die Evolution des Kosmos - Zufall und Notwendigkeit im Multiversum" - Rüdiger Vaas ist Philosoph, Publizist, Astronomie- und Physikredakteur des Monatsmagazins bild der wissenschaft. Mitherausgeber mehrerer Buchreihen. Arbeitsgebiete vorwiegend Naturphilosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie der Grundlagenphysik und Kosmologie. -/- "Im Lichte der Evolution: Kultur" - Prof. Dr. Eckart Voland ist emeritierter Professor für Philosophie der Biowissenschaften an der Universität Gießen. Forschungen und Publikationen über Soziobiologie, zur historischen Demographie und evolutionären Anthropologie. -/- "Nikolaus Kopernikus - der missverstandene Astronom" - Prof. Dr. Franz Josef Wetz ist Philosoph und lehrte 1994 bis 2024 an der Pädagogischen Hochschule Schwäbisch Gmünd. 1981 bis 1993 wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Zentrum für Philosophie und Grundlagen der Wissenschaft der Universität Gießen. (shrink)

Physicists and philosophers today have formulated three opposing models that explain how laws work. Which is the best?

The article discusses the position of the Australian philosopher David Armstrong on the problem of the ontological status of the laws of nature. Through a clarification of Armstrong’s understanding of naturalism, physicalism, and factualism, the general essence of his metaphysical project is summarized. Then article presents his theory of the laws of nature, which is a kind of nomological realism: his version of the nomolog­ical argument is examined; his general grounds for rejecting the regularity theories, which is classical for the (...) naturalistic approach, are clarified; and the role of abduction in Arm­strong’s theory is demonstrated. The relation of nomic necessity, which is the key concept of his theory, is discussed in detail: its status as a second-order universal is explained; the terms of this relation, namely the types of states of affairs that constitute some special kind of universals, are distinguished; the essence of the nomic connection assumed by this relation is clarified through Armstrong’s theory of causality. Armstrong’s critique of regularity theories of laws of nature and the advantages of his nomological realism over them are discussed: cases where regularity is not law are considered; cases where there are laws that are not related to regularities, and cases where law and regularity seem to coincide, but there is reason to believe that they are different, these are the cases that appear to be most important. Finally, drawing on his own argumentation, the advan­tages of Armstrong’s theory over the best systems approach are justified: the problem of subjectivism and the threat of anti-realism inherent in coherentist approaches are ex­amined; the highly counterintuitive dependence of the existence of some laws on the ex­istence of others is pointed out; and the danger of actual contradictions within our ontol­ogy is demonstrated. (shrink)

In his Zur Einstein’schen Relativitätstheorie, Ernst Cassirer presents relativity theory as the last manifestation of the tradition of the “physics of principles” that, starting from the nineteenth century, has progressively prevailed over that of the “physics of models.” In particular, according to Cassirer, the relativity principle plays a role similar to the energy principle in previous physics. In this article, I argue that this comparison represents the core of Cassirer’s neo-Kantian interpretation of relativity. Cassirer pointed out that before and after (...) Kant, the history of physics presents significant instances in which the search for formal conditions that the laws of nature must satisfy preceded and made possible the direct search for such laws. In his earlier years, Cassirer seems to have regarded principles like the energy principle, the relativity principle, and the principle of least action as a constitutive but provisional form of a priori, imposing specific limitations on the form of the allowable laws of nature. Only in his later years, by attributing an autonomous status to these statements of principle, did Cassirer attribute a definitive but merely regulative meaning to the a priori. This does not impose specific requirements on natural laws but only a motivation to search for them. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Foundations of mathematics Belief and truth Reasonable belief, probability, and knowledge Laws, causality, and theories Notes Bibliography.

Tres conceptos metacientíficos objeto de análisis filosófico son los de ley, modelo y teoría. El objetivo de este artículo es presentar la elucidación de estos conceptos, y de sus relaciones, hecha dentro del marco del Estructuralismo Metateórico o Sneediano (BALZER; MOULINES & SNEED, 1987), y de su aplicación a un caso del ámbito de la Biología: la Genética Clásica. El análisis realizado posibilitará fundamentar, en contra de lo que sostienen algunos filósofos de la ciencia en general y de la biología (...) en particular, las siguientes afirmaciones: a) que hay “leyes” en las ciencias biológicas, b) que muchos de los heterogéneos y distintos “modelos” de la Biología pueden ser acomodados bajo alguna “teoría”, y c) que justamente esto es lo que les confiere a las teorías biológicas su gran poder unificador. (shrink)

Explanations in genetics have intriguing aspects to both biologists and philosophers, and there is no account that satisfactorily elucidates such explanations. The aim of this article is to analyze the kind of explanations usually given in Classical (Transmission) Genetics (CG) and to present in detail the application of an account of explanation as ampliative, specialized nomological embedding to elucidate the such explanations. First, we present explanations in CG in the classical format of inferences with the explanans as the premises and (...) the explanandum as the conclusion and compare them with explanations in other paradigmatic explanatory fields such as Classical Mechanics. Second, we summarize the main aspects discussed in the literature with regard the peculiarities of genetic explanations. Third, we introduce the account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized nomological embedding making use of Sneedian structuralism, in particular the notions of theory-net, fundamental law or guiding principle, specialization, and special laws. Finally, we apply this account to the case of CG and show that this analysis sheds light to the intriguing aspects of genetic explanations and remove most of their alleged oddities. (shrink)

This book presents a thoroughly empiricist account of physics. By providing an overview of the development of empiricism from Ockham to van Fraassen the book lays the foundation for its own version of empiricism. Empiricism for the author consists of three ideas: nominalism, i.e. dismissing second order quantification as unnecessary, epistemological naturalism, and viewing classification of things in natural kinds as a human habit not in need for any justification. The book offers views on the realism-antirealism debate as well as (...) on the individuation of theories as a thoroughly neglected aspect of underdetermination. The book next discusses a broad range of topics, including the predicates body, spatial distance and time interval, the ontology of electromagnetism, propensities, the measurement problem and other philosophical issues in quantum theory. Discussions about the direction of time and about string theory make up the final part of the book. (shrink)

The status of laws of nature has been the locus of a lively debate in recent philosophy. Most participants have assumed laws play an important role in science and metaphysics while seeking their objective ground in the natural world, though some skeptics have questioned this assumption. So-called Humeans look to base laws on actual, particular facts such as those specified in David Lewis’s Humean mosaic. Their opponents argue that such a basis is neither necessary nor sufficient to support the independent (...) existence of scientific laws. This essentially metaphysical debate has paid scant attention to the details of scientific practice. It has mostly focused on so-called fundamental laws, assumed to take a particular form. I propose a pragmatist alternative—not as another position in the debate but as an alternative to the debate itself. This pragmatist alternative offers a view that questions the representational conception of truth presupposed by participants to the debate as well as the metaphysical import of fundamental laws. Statements of law serve many different purposes in science: I’ll look at some. But their central role is in inference, primarily to improve the epistemic state of a scientist with limited access to information. To play this role, a scientific law statement need be neither necessary, unconditionally universal nor even true. It must merely be sufficiently reliable within its domain of application. The use of laws in astrophysics and metrology will help to illustrate these points. (shrink)

Este trabajo consiste en un análisis de la tesis expuesta en el artículo de 1980 “Do the laws of physics state the facts?” de Nancy Cartwright, según la cual las leyes fundamentales de la física no “describen los hechos” porque, respecto de ellas, verdad y explicatividad se excluyen mutuamente. El texto fue luego republicado como tercer ensayo de su libro How the Laws of Physics Lie (1981), del que Mauricio Suárez afirma que el “trade-off” entre verdad y explicación es su (...) “tesis central”. El problema abordado es propio de la filosofía de la ciencia: cómo deben interpretarse o entenderse las leyes teóricas. Específicamente, si deben considerarse descripciones de hechos (es decir, literalmente, en el sentido de que existe una realidad con independencia de las leyes mismas y que las características de la realidad pueden ser representadas mediante el lenguaje: que tienen valor de verdad) o cumplen otra función dentro del conocimiento científico. El artículo de Cartwright estudia el caso del papel que cumplen las leyes fundamentales de la física cuando forman parte de las explicaciones por cobertura legal del tipo denominado por John Stuart Mill “por composición de causas”. Analiza la explicación de la atracción gravitatoria que hay entre dos objetos en un sistema físico en el que están presentes, además de las fuerzas gravitatorias, fuerzas eléctricas. Afirma que en ella la ley de la teoría de Newton tomada individualmente no describe lo que ocurre, no es verdadera. Pero no porque sea falsa sino porque su función o “rol” no consiste en “describir hechos” sino en ser parte de explicaciones científicas. Pero este argumento de la filósofa de la escuela de Stanford presenta dificultades semánticas, como el uso con dos sentidos diferentes del término teórico “fuerza”. Asimismo, es problemático que asuma que los hechos físicos son observables. Y no es correcta la afirmación de que una ley científica “se hace verdadera”, ni que “explica” hechos singulares, ni que “describe” en una explicación. (shrink)

One common feature of debates about the best metaphysical analysis of putatively lawful phenomena is the suspicion that nomic realists who locate the modal force of such phenomena in quasi-causal necessitation relations between universals are working with a model of law that cannot convincingly erase its theological pedigree. Nancy Cartwright distills this criticism into slogan form: no God, no laws. Some have argued that a more plausible alternative for nomic realists who reject theism is to ground laws of nature in (...) the fundamental dispositional properties or “pure powers” of physical objects. This article argues that for all its advantages over deflationary and rival realist accounts, a pandispositionalist account of law cuts against the commitment to metaphysical naturalism that its supporters almost always presuppose. It then examines and rejects a Platonic version of this account before elaborating and advancing a theistic alternative that is more theoretically powerful and more metatheoretically parsimonious. In slogan form: no God, no powers. (shrink)

A highly influential position in the debate between nomological realists and antirealists (i.e., the debate about the metaphysical status of natural laws) is the regularist theory of laws. Its main feature is the defense of a humean metaphysics which denies the existence of real causal powers and necessary connections in nature. Regularism, however, rely on a traditional reading of Hume’s philosophy. In this paper we aim to revisit the discussion around laws of nature in light of nontraditional interpretations of his (...) work, often labeled as the ‘New Hume’. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes based his natural philosophy on definitions and general principles of matter in motion, which he refrained from calling “laws of nature.” Across the channel, René Descartes had presented his own account of matter in motion in such a way that laws of nature play a central causal-explanatory role. Despite some notable differences in the two systems of natural philosophy, the content of the three Cartesian laws of nature is shared by Hobbesian principles of motion. Why is it the (...) case that Hobbes never ‘transferred’ the concept of law of nature from the sphere of civil society to the realm of nature? What is the status of the Hobbesian principles of motion if they are not laws? Answering these questions is the main aim of this article. It is shown that Hobbes made available an importantly different and genuinely original way to do natural philosophy, which renders it free of metaphysics and eschews the need to ground it in anything other than ‘natural reason’. Briefly put, Hobbes took the category of ‘laws of nature’ to involve commitments that cannot be met in the natural world, unless natural philosophy loses its autonomy from theology and metaphysics. (shrink)

One might view the literature on laws of nature as dividing into two camps: the “metaphysical” advocates of laws as objective realities beyond any actual regularities, and the “antimetaphysical” skeptics. Hard-liners in both camps will find much to disagree with in Marc Lange’s Natural Laws in Scientific Practice. I mean that as a compliment to Lange’s work.

This book presents a radical new picture of natural order. The Newtonian idea of a cosmos ruled by universal and exceptionless laws has been superseded; replaced by a conception of nature as a realm of diverse powers, potencies, and dispositions, a 'dappled world'. There is order in nature, but it is more local, diverse, piecemeal, open, and emergent than Newton imagined. In each chapter expert authors expound the historical context of the idea of laws of nature, and explore the diverse (...) sorts of order actually presupposed by work in physics, biology, and the social sciences. They consider how human freedom might be understood, and explore how Newton's idea of a 'universal designer' might be revised, in this new context. They argue that there is not one unified totalizing program of science, aiming at the completion of one closed causal system. We live in an ordered universe, but we need to rethink the classical idea of the 'laws of nature' in a more dynamic and creatively diverse way. (shrink)

Nancy Cartwright has drawn attention to how explanations are actually given in mathematical sciences. She argues that these procedures support an antirealist thesis that fundamental explanatory laws are not true. Moreover, she claims to be be essentially following Duhem's line of thought in developing this thesis. Without wishing to detract from the importance of her observations, it is suggested that they do not necessarily require the antirealist thesis. The antirealist interpretation of Duhem is also disputed. It is argued that Duhemian (...) points, often understood antirealistically, bear a realist construal, and that antirealist interpretations of Duhem typically run into problems of consistency or of reducing his position to absurdity. (shrink)

This book on the philosophy of science argues for an empiricism, opposed to the tradition of David Hume, in which singular rather than general causal claims are primary; causal laws express facts about singular causes whereas the general causal claims of science are ascriptions of capacities or causal powers, capacities to make things happen. Taking science as measurement, Cartwright argues that capacities are necessary for science and that these can be measured, provided suitable conditions are met. There are case studies (...) from both econometrics and quantum mechanics. (shrink)

This book on the philosophy of science argues for an empiricism, opposed to the tradition of David Hume, in which singular rather than general causal claims are primary; causal laws express facts about singular causes whereas the general causal claims of science are ascriptions of capacities or causal powers, capacities to make things happen. Taking science as measurement, Cartwright argues that capacities are necessary for science and that these can be measured, provided suitable conditions are met. There are case studies (...) from both econometrics and quantum mechanics. (shrink)

1Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1TB, UKScience Without Laws Ronald Giere Chicago, IL University of Chicago Press 1999 x + 285 Hardback£17.50.

The topic of laws of nature provides a kind of Rorschach test for philosophy. Some philosophers see in laws only Humean regularities; others see a kind of physical necessity; others see a necessity closer to logical necessity; others see expressions of causal powers; others see inference tickets; still others see relations between universals; ... ; and some see only a messy inkblot. We can also perform a meta-Rorschach test on the results of the first test. When van Fraassen and I (...) submit ourselves to this meta-test we both recoil with shock and horror. Where we differ is in drawing morals from this un- pleasant experience. For me the opprobrium falls mainly on the way philos- ophy is practiced. For van Fraassen, the disgrace also touches the practice, but for him the source is the rottenness of the concept of laws. (shrink)

The view that takes laws of nature to be essentially nothing more than descriptions of facts is still rather popular. The present article, on the contrary, defends the claim that the only real motivation for defending a descriptive view of laws—the quest for ontological parsimony—entails too high a price to pay in philosophical terms. It is argued that nomic primitivism, namely the alternative option that takes laws to be primitive fundamental entities in our ontology, is decisively more appealing, since it (...) is the crucial role assigned to laws that makes a scientific theory of natural phenomena a system rather than a list. Finally, the implications that nomic primitivism might have for the issue of the status of the wave function in that particular formulation of quantum mechanics known as Bohmian mechanics are considered. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against Nancy Cartwright's claim that we ought to abandon what she calls "fundamentalism" about the laws of nature and adopt instead her "dappled world" hypothesis. According to Cartwright we ought to abandon the notion that fundamental laws apply universally, instead we should consider the law-like statements of science to apply in highly qualified ways within narrow, non-overlapping and ontologically diverse domains, including the laws of fundamental physics. For Cartwright, "laws" are just locally applicable refinements of (...) a more open-ended concept of capacities. By providing a critique of the dappled world approach's central notion of open ended capacities and substituting this concept with an account of properties drawn from recent writing on the subject of structural realism I show that a form of fundamentalism is viable. I proceed from this conclusion to show that this form of fundamentalism provides a superior reading of case studies, such as the effective field theory program in quantum field theory, than the "dappled world" view. The case study of the EFT program demonstrates that ontological variability between theoretical domains can be accounted for without altogether abandoning fundamentalism or adopting Cartwright's more implausible theses. (shrink)

I develop a metaphysical position that is both lawless and anti-Humean. The position is called realist lawlessness and contrasts with both Humean lawlessness and nomological realism – the claim that there are laws in nature. While the Humean view also allows no laws, realist lawlessness is not Humean because it accepts some necessary connections in nature between distinct properties. Realism about laws, on the other hand, faces a central dilemma. Either laws govern the behaviour of properties from the outside or (...) from the inside. If the former, an unacceptable quidditist view of properties follows. But no plausible account of laws within properties can be developed that permits a governing role specifically for laws. I conclude in favour of eliminativism about laws. At the conceptual core, the notion of a law in nature is misleading. It is suggestive of an otherwise static world in need of animation. (shrink)

It is often supposed that the spectacular successes of our modern mathematical sciences support a lofty vision of a world completely ordered by one single elegant theory. In this book Nancy Cartwright argues to the contrary. When we draw our image of the world from the way modern science works - as empiricism teaches us we should - we end up with a world where some features are precisely ordered, others are given to rough regularity and still others behave in (...) their own diverse ways. This patchwork makes sense when we realise that laws are very special productions of nature, requiring very special arrangements for their generation. Combining classic and newly written essays on physics and economics, The Dappled World carries important philosophical consequences and offers serious lessons for both the natural and the social sciences. (shrink)

The goal of this thesis to defend the philosophical view of the new ante rem substantivism against its supposed alternatives. To achieve such goal, we will present four views about the nature of laws, two kinds of realism and two kinds of anti-realism, and evaluate them critically. The disadvantages from those theories are going to be presented for us to show that they are insufficient to provide a metaphysics that is able to explain the world's counterfactuality, universality, and regularity, and (...) that just one form of realism, the new ante rem substantivism, can. This goal is important because the concept of laws of nature is widely used in many areas of science and philosophy, and because according to the view we accept, the laws may fulfill some theoretical roles, and not others. We intent to show that the new ante rem substantivism's laws are able to fulfill the roles that scientists would hope the natural laws to fulfill. (shrink)

Dispositionalist accounts of scientific laws are currently at the forefront of discussions in the metaphysics of science. However, Mumford has presented such accounts with the following dilemma: if laws are to have a governing role, then they cannot be grounded in the relevant dispositions; if on the other hand, they are so grounded, then they cannot perform such a role. Mumford’s solution is drastic: to do away with laws as metaphysically substantive entities altogether. Dispositionalist accounts are also deficient in that (...) they either make no mention of the significant role of symmetries in science, or attempt to inappropriately eliminate this role. Here we shall attempt to motivate a structuralist view of laws by showing how it evades Mumford’s dilemma and accommodates the role of symmetry principles. In addition we shall consider how this view deals with a number of issues that dispositionalism finds problematic and indicate how the supposed necessity of laws and the explanation of relevant counterfactuals look from this structuralist perspective. (shrink)

Nancy Cartwright’s arguments in favor of the phenomenological laws and against the fundamental ones are discussed. I support and strengthen her criticism of the standard covering-law account but I am skeptical in respect to her radical conclusion that the laws of physics lie. Arguments in favor of the opposite stance are based on V.S. Stepin’s analysis of mature theory structure. A mature theory-change model presented here demonstrates how the fundamental laws of physics can be confronted with experience. Its case studies (...) include the Lorentz-Einstein-Bohr transition and modern General Relativity and Quantum Field Theory unification. (shrink)

This doctoral dissertation investigates the notion of physical necessity. Specifically, it studies whether it is possible to account for non-accidental regularities without the standard assumption of a pre-existent set of governing laws. Thus, it takes side with the so called deflationist accounts of laws of nature, like the humean or the antirealist. The specific aim is to complement such accounts by providing a missing explanation of the appearance of physical necessity. In order to provide an explanation, I recur to fields (...) that have not been appealed to so far in discussions about the metaphysics of laws. Namely, I recur to complex systems’ theory, and to the foundations of statistical mechanics. The explanation proposed is inspired by how complex systems’ theory has elucidated the way patterns emerge, and by the probabilistic explanations of the 2nd law of thermodynamics. More specifically, this thesis studies how some constraints that make no direct reference to the dynamics can be a sufficient condition for obtaining in the long run, with high probability, stable regular behavior. I hope to show how certain metaphysical accounts of laws might benefit from the insights achieved in these other fields. According to the proposal studied in this thesis, some regularities are not accidental not in virtue of an underlying physical necessity. The non-accidental character of certain regular behavior is only due to its overwhelming stability. Thus, from this point of view the goal becomes to explain the stability of temporal patterns without assuming a set of pre-existent guiding laws. It is argued that the stability can be the result of a process of convergence to simpler and stable regularities from a more complex lower level. According to this project, if successful, there would be no need to postulate a (mysterious) intermediate category between logical necessity and pure contingency. Similarly, there would be no need to postulate a (mysterious) set of pre-existent governing laws. Part I of the thesis motivates part II, mostly by arguing why further explanation of the notions of physical necessity and governing laws should be welcomed (chapter 1), and by studying the plausibility of a lawless fundamental level (chapters 2 and 3). Given so, part II develops the explanation of formation of simpler and stable behavior from a more complex underlying level. (shrink)

Nancy Cartwright has been a dominant figure in the philosophy of science for more than twenty years. In the early eighties she wrote her influential book "How the Laws of Physics Lie" which was generally perceived to be a challenge to a realistic conception of scientific theories. Over the last decade her focus has shifted to issues concerning what she calls "fundamentalism". This is the position that laws of nature are basic and that other things come from them. Cartwright rejects (...) this story and replaces it by the view that capacities are basic and that laws obtain "on account of the repeated Operation of a system of components with stable capacities in particularly fortunate circumstances". This book focuses mainly on Cartwright's recent work on laws and capacities. It is the outcome of the second series of the Munster lectures in philosophy which took place on May 5-6, 1998. This volume comprises a revised version of Cartwright's evening talk, 12 colloquium papers which Cartwright considered to be "extremely thought provoking", followed by replies Cartwright makes to each of them. (shrink)

Reductive Humeanism with regard to laws and chances, the view that law and chance claims are reducible to claims about Humean states of affairs, is a highly problematic doctrine. Even its most sophisticated contemporary version, espoused by David Lewis, leads to a litany of inadequately explained conflicts with our intuitions regarding laws, chances, and counterfactuals. The non-Humean alternative permits analyses that are adequate to the intuitive data. However, such analyses are insufficiently explanatory to be satisfactory. ;This dissertation motivates, elaborates, and (...) defends a third type of view, a non-reductive Humean projectivism on which law and chance claims are analysed in terms of an expressivist semantics. The benefit of this strategy is that it provides detailed explanations of the intuitions that are problematic for reductive Humeanism without relying on murky non-Humean explanations. However, there are numerous prima facie worries. Many philosophers surmise that the non-factual character of such an analysis must render law claims subjective or mind-dependent, or indeed, must lead to the denial of all law claims and, plausibly, all claims with nomic commitments of any kind. Further, there are technical worries, as represented by the Frege-Geach problem. The dissertation is responsive to such concerns, including the following features: A novel motivation of Humean projectivism is provided with reference to the explanatory goals of science. Detailed explanations of the intuitions that confound reductive Humeanism are provided. Notably, the analysis of chance laws is not susceptible to the problem of undermining futures, and further, the Principal Principle is both vindicated and justified. The Frege-Geach problem is solved using semantical tools of the kind developed by Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn. (shrink)

Laws of nature have, since Descartes, been seen as a central feature of scientific inquiry and philosophical analysis. The standard empiricist analysis of laws has come under challenge by realists, like Armstrong, who believe the analysis leaves out important features we intuitively ascribe to laws , and by antirealists like van Fraassen who believe the very notion ensnares us in metaphysics. In my dissertation, I defend the view against both the realists and van Fraassen that an empirically respectable notion of (...) scientific law is available within the framework of pragmatism, which relativizes lawhood to the choice of a language and a set of experimental manipulations. ;In chapter one, I argue that the philosophical problem of scientific laws has a long history, and that van Fraassen has picked out some tensions between views in that history. In chapter two, I analyze and criticize three realists' views and show that they have a flawed common strategy based on incompatible presuppositions. In chapter three, I argue for my own view, a pragmatist view that builds on the work of Dewey, Nagel, Goodman and Skyrms. I argue that replicability is the source of our confidence that regularities are projectible and resilient , and that this is the source of our confident assertion of counterfactuals, our belief in the necessary connection between events, and our belief that laws are empirically accessible. In chapter four, I answer objections from the realists, from van Fraassen and from those constructivists who find too much residual realism in my view. I there defend the view that one can have objectivity without being a realist, and relativity without being a relativist. (shrink)

Whether nature is or is not systematic sounds at first like an idle metaphysical question, but considered in relation to the aims of science and the methods of appraisal of scientific theories, it can be given clear content. It is also necessary to ask the question in order to study the relation of causation, laws of nature, and theoretical structure. ; Aims. The doctrines that science aims to provide explanations, that science achieves success in this aim, that explanation involves unification, (...) and that the principles on which explanations, properly so-called, are based, must be true, together imply that nature is a system. For a kind of explanation she calls "causal", Nancy Cartwright affirms , and but denies ; for a kind of explanation she calls "theoretical", Cartwright affirms , and but denies . I show by historical examples that Cartwright's distinction between "theoretical" and "causal" explanation is often impossible to make out. I show, largely through discussions of Galileo and Newton, that Cartwright has a misleading view of the role of idealization in physical science, a view apt perhaps for physics before Newton, but not for Newtonian physics. I use my historical case studies to undermine numerous specific sceptical arguments by which Cartwright supports her novel conception of "theoretical" explanation. ; Methods. I argue that the Newtonian, "bootstrap" method in terms of which Cartwright reconstructs low-level experiment- and measurement-based inferences to specific causal conclusions has its clearest and most cogent applications in inferences to high-level theoretical conclusions. Newton's method, however, presupposes that nature is a system. Nature must be systematic in order to be well suited to study by the bootstrap method. I argue that the method has been notably successful, and that it consequently is appropriate to assimilate the method's substantive presupposition concerning natural systematicity to what has been learned from the experience of the method's successful application, and to say that we have evidence that this presupposition is true, that is, evidence that nature is systematic. ; Causation, Laws, and Theory. Against Cartwright I defend a top-down, anti-metaphysical conception of this relation, and an "internal realist" conception of theoretical structure. By highlighting some facets of the mathematics appertaining to fundamental physical laws presumed true, I argue that certain phenomena concerning scientific practice from which Cartwright's metaphysical view of causes gains apparent strength in fact are conformable to my own account. (shrink)

The central current of ideas in modern philosophy - through Hume, Kant and Hegel, to the present - can be understood as a reaction to the percieved threat of disorder. Against this background, the author argues for acceptance of a metaphysics of disorder, and outlines a number of important philosophical consequences of such an acceptance. When appropriately constrained by empiricist concern, such a metaphysics allows us to make sense of ourselves as as knowers who must make do in a world (...) of complexity and uncertainty. We make do by learning to export knowledge, gained where we can get it, to the many situations where knowledge eludes us. An account of causal and idealizational reasoning in science, which has much in common with the recent work of Nancy Cartwright, is developed to exemplify the main argument. The author's philosophical position is contrasted with that of recent post modernists, notably Richard Rorty. (shrink)