Understanding and measuring a socially relevant and complex phenomenon like the gender wage gap requires a thorough understanding of the causal factors arising in the real world. This thesis investigates the Marxist and neoclassical theoretical models of the gender wage gap and considers the nature of pluralism within different approaches to measuring this phenomenon. I analyze the Oaxaca and the Karamessini & Ioakimoglou decomposition methods, where various algorithms and regressions are used to decompose the problem of the gender wage gap (...) into sub-problems. I further consider how monism and pluralism have been coming in and out of fashion in economics over the course of the 20th century and well into the 21st century – where pluralism seems to be on the rise and is a contentious topic of discussion in mainstream economics. The analysis in this thesis illuminates two kinds of pluralism arising with respect to methodological approaches that different theoretical traditions use to understand the wage gap. I conclude that both kinds of pluralism, modest and empirical pluralism, are necessary for furthering our understanding of this complex phenomenon and benefit the insight we gain from the various decomposition analyses of the wage gap in the real world. (shrink)

Hilbert’s choice operators τ and ε, when added to intuitionistic logic, strengthen it. In the presence of certain extensionality axioms they produce classical logic, while in the presence of weaker decidability conditions for terms they produce various superintuitionistic intermediate logics. In this thesis, I argue that there are important philosophical lessons to be learned from these results. To make the case, I begin with a historical discussion situating the development of Hilbert’s operators in relation to his evolving program in the (...) foundations of mathematics and in relation to philosophical motivations leading to the development of intuitionistic logic. This sets the stage for a brief description of the relevant part of Dummett’s program to recast debates in metaphysics, and in particular disputes about realism and anti-realism, as closely intertwined with issues in philosophical logic, with the acceptance of classical logic for a domain reflecting a commitment to realism for that domain. Then I review extant results about what is provable and what is not when one adds epsilon to intuitionistic logic, largely due to Bell and DeVidi, and I give several new proofs of intermediate logics from intuitionistic logic+ε without identity. With all this in hand, I turn to a discussion of the philosophical significance of choice operators. Among the conclusions I defend are that these results provide a finer-grained basis for Dummett’s contention that commitment to classically valid but intuitionistically invalid principles reflect metaphysical commitments by showing those principles to be derivable from certain existence assumptions; that Dummett’s framework is improved by these results as they show that questions of realism and anti-realism are not an “all or nothing” matter, but that there are plausibly metaphysical stances between the poles of anti-realism and realism, because different sorts of ontological assumptions yield intermediate rather than classical logic; and that these intermediate positions between classical and intuitionistic logic link up in interesting ways with our intuitions about issues of objectivity and reality, and do so usefully by linking to questions around intriguing everyday concepts such as “is smart,” which I suggest involve a number of distinct dimensions which might themselves be objective, but because of their multivalent structure are themselves intermediate between being objective and not. Finally, I discuss the implications of these results for ongoing debates about the status of arbitrary and ideal objects in the foundations of logic, showing among other things that much of the discussion is flawed because it does not recognize the degree to which the claims being made depend on the presumption that one is working with a very strong logic. (shrink)

In this thesis I will examine the role values play in the co-production of knowledge between traditional knowledge and science. In order to understand the role values play, I will first develop clearer definitions of traditional knowledge, science, and co-production than the problematic definitions currently employed in the literature. I will also create new terms to replace the inadequate terms currently in use. “Traditional knowledge” will become “Indigenous peoples’ understandings”, and science will become “scientific understandings”. I will show that values (...) that underlie the concepts of IPUs and SUs are compatible, allowing co-production between the two groups to occur. The definitions of IPUs and SUs will then be held as a standard by which co-production projects can be measured. I will examine several benefits co-production projects offer, and deal with problems posed by co-production. Finally, I will briefly outline problems with current policy governing co-production in Canada. (shrink)

The following study examines the history of the seventeenth century Collegiant group in the Dutch Republic, focusing on their blending of Spiritualist and Rationalist influences. By reading Collegiant Rational Religion through the lenses of social history and the history of ideas, the following study makes explicit the ways in which the Collegiants were simultaneously a religious and secular movement. Being both religious and secular, the historical example of the Collegiant group challenges contemporary distinctions between religion and the secular. Chapter 1 (...) outlines the history of the Collegiants in the context of the seventeenth century Dutch Republic, from their first meetings in Rijnsburg in 1619 up to their period of Rational Religion. Through an examination of Collegiant ideas and practices, the first chapter describes the genesis of the movement after the Synod of Dordrecht, the early millenarian influence, and the Spiritualist period of the Collegiant group. Chapter 2 then widens the scope of inquiry by situating the Collegiant group in the Early Enlightenment, focusing in particular on the Radical Enlightenment. The second chapter advances two concurrent arguments against a teleological reading of the Collegiant transition from Spiritualism to Rationalism, each concerned with preserving the dignity of the Collegiant blending of Rational Religion, rather than reducing it to a transitory phase on the way to Rationalism. The two concurrent arguments against the teleological reading of the Enlightenment include the critique of the concept of Enlightenment as a normative ideal as provided by critical theory, and the recovery of the role of religion during the Enlightenment period as provided by recent revisions to historical scholarship. Chapter 3 narrows the scope of inquiry to the Collegiant transition to Rationalism, focusing on the ways in which the Collegiants blended together Spiritualism and Rationalism to form a Rational Religion that emphasized the compatibility of faith and reason. Through an examination of Collegiants who belonged to the Spinoza Circle and Collegiants who were also Mennonites, Chapter 3 concludes by describing the schismatic effect of the Bredenburg dispute and the collapse of the blended approach in the late Collegiant Rationalist period. Chapter 4 concludes the study by rethinking the contemporary divide between the categories of religion and the secular by drawing parallels between Collegiant Rational Religion and the contemporary Continental Philosophy of Religion, the latter of which is represented by theologian and philosopher Daniel Colucciello Barber. (shrink)

This thesis investigates the nature of consumer brands in the context of the contemporary realism debate. It comprises three chapters. The first chapter introduces the what, the why and the how of brands, to wit: I describe what brands are and why brands exist, as well as how they are designed. In the second chapter, motivated by my pursuit to answer the question: Are Brands Real? I review three influential proposals by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright about how (...) to distinguish realist from anti-realist views about disputed entities within particular domains, in order to develop a toolkit, which I will employ in the third Chapter to answer that key question. The result of this investigation shows that the answer, which prior to the inquiry might have struck some as obvious, is somewhat more nuanced and complex. (shrink)

The dissertation is composed of two related parts, each applying aspects of Michel Foucault's thought to contemporary American avant-garde writing. Part One brings together Foucault's neglected early essays on literature, reading them against the backdrop of the major works published during this period and deducing from them a method and framework of interpretation, which I call feigning. Feigning, in turn, reveals the themes common to Foucault's early work: finitude as a strict limit, the sovereignty of language as proof of this (...) limit, and repetition as 1) the proof of sovereignty, but also 2) the form of an incredible experience that disrupts the origin, calls being into question, and requires a complete openness to the "irreducible enigma the world conceals". Feigning as such is applied to contemporary works of American "fabulation" by Robert Coover, John Barth, and Donald Barthelme. My reading of these authors demonstrates the reach and relevance of feigning as a rich, complex method of interpretation that is not limited to the French avant-garde of the mid-twentieth century. Part Two of the dissertation reevaluates the method of feigning according to Foucault's return to art and writing in his final work. Here, literature functions not simply as an "experience of the outside" that casts everything in doubt, but serves instead as equipment and aid in the critical, careful assessment of the formation of self. Renewing the themes of Part One and drawing on the pure research of Foucault's final lectures, I argue for the potential of feigning as an "art of life" that bears upon the cultivation of attitude and ēthos. (shrink)

This thesis discusses epistemological and ethical issues in classifi cation and diagnosisof psychiatric conditions, and briefly discusses realism about psychiatric conditions. I use autism spectrum disorder as a case study to examine whether the explanatory and predictive power of classi fication and diagnosis could be improved if psychiatry adopts a cause-based framework in place of a symptom-based framework. However, there is signifi cant debate regarding the sort of explanatory pattern that will adequately represent the complex causation involved in psychiatric conditions. (...) I develop a preliminary list of criteria for adequate explanatory patterns in psychiatry, and use these criteria to analyze explanations of ASD. I show that explanatory patterns unable to meet these criteria limit the validity and reliability of diagnosis. However, I argue that an integrated pattern that includes biological, cognitive and social levels of explanation may meet the criteria. Thus, diagnosis of ASD could improve if psychiatry adopted a cause-based framework informed by an intergrated explanation pattern. More accurate diagnosis of ASD may allow earlier access to Intensive Behaviourial Intervention/Applied Behavioural Analysis treatment programs, which may increase the effectiveness of this treatment and reduce the amount of resources individuals with ASD require from governments over their lifespans. Explaining these conditions using an integrated pattern of explanation can further challenge myths regarding the causes of ASD, and may provide support for Canadian lawsuits petitioning for expanded public funding of IBI/ABA programs. (shrink)

In the literature on doxastic evidence, the phenomenon is regarded as either internal or external. Though the specifics of these views tend to vary, the two main categories are prominent. However, these views face various criticisms. Internalists claim that external evidence ignores relevant mental processes. Externalists claim that internal evidence is weak given its subjective nature. I will propose a remedy for both of these criticisms. I will argue that evidence is internal, external, and social. That is to say, that (...) there are three types of evidence: mental states, states of affairs, and that which has been produced by a rigorous social process. I will extract Helen Longino’s method for establishing social knowledge and apply it to evidence; I will argue that her method produces social evidence as well. The social component of evidence is aimed towards strengthening internal and external theories of evidence by responding to the worries raised by the internalists and externalists. First, I will argue that a theory that accommodates both internal and external evidence can absolves the worries raised to either theory alone. Moreover, a theory that can accommodate social evidence will be stronger insofar as a rigorous social process will add a further qualification which can only strengthen our evidence. Second, I will argue that social evidence is not reducible to either external or internal evidence. The external view cannot account for the mental processes that are evidently a part of the justification process and is therefore weak. Finally, though the internal view is compelling, it does not account for evidence which supports our usage of automatic, non-conscious mental processes. (shrink)

This thesis aims to contribute to an answer to the question, “What would a philosophy, and more specifically, an ethics, based on Christ, look like?” My first contention is that we find, in the ethical thinking of Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, two particularly radical and complementary attempts to point toward Christ as the basis or foundation of any genuine ethics. What sets the views of Barth and Bonhoeffer apart from many of the other philosophical and theological approaches to ethics, (...) is the extent to which they seek to take seriously the ethical implications of the gospel – the revelation of God's grace in the Word and work of Jesus Christ – for ethics. My second contention is that, even if we follow neither Barth nor Bonhoeffer in the detailed outworking of the character of a Christologically grounded ethics, we nevertheless cannot avoid facing the radical challenge each of these men poses, in their own related but distinct ways, that in thinking about ethics we must take Christ as our standard and foundation. In the first two chapters, on Barth and Bonhoeffer respectively, I identify the structure and content of their arguments and display their textual basis in the texts most relevant to the topic, namely Barth’s Church Dogmatics and Bonhoeffer’s Ethics. I also present an outline of the character of a Christologically-grounded ethics as each of these theologians derives it from its Christological basis. In the third chapter I examine the cogency of their arguments. (shrink)

Axiomatic quantum field theory is one approach to the project of merging the special theory of relativity with that of ordinary quantum mechanics. The project begins with the postulation of a set of axioms. Axioms should be motivated by reasonable physical principles in a way that illustrates how a given axiom is true. Motivations are often grounded in the principles of the parent theories: ordinary quantum mechanics or the theory of special relativity. Amongst the set of axioms first proposed by (...) Haag and Kastler in 1963 is the axiom of microcausality. Microcausality requires the observables of regions at space-like separation to commute. This thesis seeks to answer the question ‘What principles from the special theory of relativity or ordinary quantum mechanics motivate, or justify, accepting microcausality as an axiom?’ The first chapter will provide the necessary background to investigate this question and the second chapter will undertake that investigation. In conclusion, microcausality cannot be well-motivated by individual principles rooted in the special theory of relativity or ordinary quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The modern city is the cradle of human activity, and through it humankind has both the ability to strip the planet of life and the ability to create thriving social and ecological systems. Strategic and interactive urbanisms that nurture multifarious ways of being in the world need to be formulated to save the natural world from ecological disaster. This paper traces the genealogy of the city from the unexplored wilderness to the to the conflux of technology and nature on city (...) streets. Following the work of Neil Smith and William Cronon, this paper finds the roots of the urban system in the social construction of nature. Considering Martin Heidegger’s thoughts on technology along with David Harvey’s analysis of the urban system, it argues that city-building is a technē, an art which allows humankind to be at home with the world. As a part of this project, an interactive web application for gathering images and stories about urban spaces was created to provide a tool for citizen urbanism. The application, The Department of Civic Images, engages people in a dialogical urbanism that encourages citizens to see their environment as an intricate and valuable life network. (shrink)

There’s a widespread conviction in the norms of assertion literature that an agent’s asserting something false merits criticism. As Williamson puts it, asserting something false is likened to cheating at the game of assertion. Most writers on the topic have consequently proposed factive norms of assertion – ones on which truth is a necessary condition for the proper performance of an assertion. However, I argue that this view is mistaken. I suggest that we can illuminate the error by introducing a (...) theoretical distinction between the norm of a practice and its goal. In light of this distinction, we can see that proponents of factive norms tend to mistake the goal of a practice for the norm. In making my case, I present an analogy between the norms and goals of placing wagers and the norms and goals of assertion. One may place a bet and lose without being subject to criticism, while one may win and be worthy of criticism. Whether one wins or loses is irrelevant to the normative evaluation of a bet. What is relevant is whether the bet maximizes the bettor's expected value, which is a function of what might be lost, what might be gained, and how likely those prospects are, given the bettor's evidence. Similarly, I argue, whether one's assertion is true or false is not strictly relevant to the normative evaluation of an assertion. What is relevant is whether the speaker has adequate supporting reasons for the assertion, and that the necessary conventional and pragmatic features are present. However, context will determine what count as supportive reasons for a given proposition, what counts as relevant, and what count as conventional and pragmatic elements possessing that relevance. My proposed norm, the Supportive Reasons Norm, is thus sensitive to the context of assertion and shifts from context to context. (shrink)

This dissertation is about biological sex and how we ought to make sense of it. By biological sex I mean those elements of an individual’s body that are involved in reproduction of the individual’s species; by make sense of it I mean the way in which the occurrence of these elements and their interactions are conceptualized in our minds. Given certain things that are known about sex and reproduction, I argue in this dissertation that sex, maleness, and femaleness ought to (...) be conceptualized in a specific way: this specific way is what I call the multidimensional model of sex. My argument challenges what I call the folk understanding of biological sex, which is the understanding that most people in most places have about what makes a person male or female. This understanding, I argue, takes the concepts MALE and FEMALE to be logically opposed and atomistic, and constitutive of categories with homogeneous members. I explore three important facts that challenge this understanding: 1) the emphasis on continuity within biological thought, 2) the understanding of sex differences within biology, and 3) the occurrence of intersexuality in human beings. Some authors have already proposed continuum-based understandings of SEX as a replacement for the folk understanding. I identify and discuss three of these: 1) the basic continuum model, 2) the multiple continua model, and 3) the hybrid model. Inherent to different degrees within each of these models is the belief that maleness and femaleness are somehow conceptually opposite. This belief, I argue, is not borne out in nature, as demonstrated in part by the occurrence of intersexuality in the species Homo sapiens, and the occurrence of hermaphroditism in other species. These occurrences, I argue, suggest another way to make sense of sex. The model of sex that I present is inspired by the occurrence of intersexuality and hermaphroditism, and also by Sandra Bem’s work on the concept ANDROGYNY. Bem reconceptualized masculinity and femininity as dimensions of psychological androgyny. I argue that the concepts MALE and FEMALE, and thus BIOLOGICAL SEX, can be understood in a similar way. I propose a multidimensional model of SEX that includes the concepts MALE and FEMALE as intersecting continua that create a space in which the separate features of an individual’s sex are each individually located. The dissertation concludes by discussing the moral implications of the multidimensional model, as some of our judgments about the rightness or wrongness of a person’s actions are related to our understanding of that person’s sex. But if the words male and female come to refer to individual parts of the body and not whole people, how would our ideas about the moral acceptability of certain actions and practices change? By examining this general question, I show that adoption of the multidimensional model of sex is important not just because it offers a more biologically accurate representation of sex: it is also important, I conclude, because there is good reason to think that adopting it could improve the quality of life for many. (shrink)

When we develop accounts of the good life we inevitably need to work with simplified images of human beings so as to limit the ideas our account must grapple with. Yet, in the process of this simplification we often exclude certain types of agents from having moral status because our image of humanity does not take their key features into account. The problems created by this type of simplification are very apparent when we consider how virtue ethics deals with the (...) lives of people with Intellectual Disabilities. Since virtue ethics focuses on reason it very quickly excludes people with limited intellectual functioning from being moral agents who have access to the happy life. In this thesis I explore this problem of exclusion further and present a revised set of virtues based on the Capabilities Approach by Martha Nussbaum. By developing this new focus for virtue ethics I create a virtue-based approach to the good life that is not only more inclusive of agents with limited intellectual functioning but also represents a richer path to the good life for all agents. (shrink)

Marsilio Ficino was the first Renaissance philosopher to have access to the full Platonic corpus. He desired to use these ancient writings, plus faith, scripture, and reason to reunite religion and philosophy into one mutually supportive system, and was perhaps motivated to do so by circumstances arising from the era in which he worked, his life, context and writing style. His background and motivations are reviewed, followed by an examination of his philosophical arguments about God's five main attributes: existence, simplicity, (...) goodness, omniscience, and omnipotence. Finally the divine/human relationship is examined using the uniqueness of the divine's relationship with humans, divine illumination, hierarchies and love. This assessment of the Godly attributes and the divine/human relationship finds that, although Ficino did use Platonic ideas that were new to the Renaissance period, his failure to construct strong philosophical arguments made his work ultimately less enduring than that of his contemporaries. My transcription of the 1495 edition of Ficino's 'De raptu Pauli' is included an as appendix. (shrink)

Contemporary architecture suffers from an acute malaise: it has lost its sense of meaning, and in turn, its sense of significance. In our world of economy and utility—the liquid world—architecture can only allude to a higher purpose, a feigned declaration of its inability to contend with the current state. Yet this was not always the case. For thousands of years everything from the minutest of details to the greatest of narratives found their expression in architecture, and specifically, in a culture’s (...) understanding and application of monumentality. The monument embodied the spirit of its times, and in its near-immortality provided a refuge for the loftiest of hopes and dreams. While it may appear that words like immortality and spirit are at odds with the ceaseless and constant change of the globalized world, change is not a new concept of our era. Since the beginning of history monumental architecture tempered its solidity with an implicit appreciation for the transience it sought to overcome. Liquid Monumentality reconstructs this dialectic of permanence and change in an attempt to answer one question: is the monumental still relevant in our liquid age? (shrink)

The Nuclear Waste Management Organization --- the crown corporation responsible for the long-term storage of nuclear fuel waste in Canada --- seeks to bury our nuclear fuel waste deep in the Canadian Shield, with the provisions that the waste is monitored and remains retrievable for possible future use. To ensure that its solution is ethically acceptable, the NWMO established a set of requirements which, if satisfied, would successfully discharge its ethical obligations to both present and future generations. Those requirements include (...) the obligation to justify its practice, minimize risk, clearly identify all of the relevant costs and risks of harm, abide by the precautionary principle, obtain fully informed consent from potentially affected individuals, and distribute the risk fairly across multiple generations. In this document I show that the ethical principles, as formulated by the NWMO, are either seriously vague and unhelpful; or, where substantial and helpful, the nature of the practice show that many of the principles cannot be satisfied. As a final result, it is deeply questionable whether nuclear power in general, and especially the current solution to nuclear waste in particular, can ever be deemed ethical in Canada. (shrink)

In this thesis I discuss the problems associated with the epistemological task of arriving at basic logical knowledge. This is knowledge that the primitive rules of inference we use in deductive reasoning are correct. Knowledge of correctness, like all knowledge, is available to us either as the product of inference, or it is available non-inferentially. Success in the campaign to justify the correctness of these rules is mired by opposing views on how to do this properly. Inferential justifications of rules (...) of inference, which are based on reasons, lead to regressive or circular results. Non-inferential justifications, based on something other than reasons, at first do not seem to fare any better: without a basis for these justifications, they appear arbitrary and unfounded. The works of Boghossian and Dummett who argue for an inferentialist approach, and Hale who supports non-inferentialism are carefully examined in this thesis. I conclude by finding superiority in Hale's suggestion that a particular set of basic logical constants are indispensable to deductive reasoning. I suggest that we endorse a principle which states that rules are not premises, and are therefore to be excluded from expression as statements in a deductive argument. I argue that the quality of being indispensable is sufficient for a basic rule of deduction to be countenanced as default-justified, and therefore need not be expressed in argument. By a rule's evading expression in argument, it avoids circular reasoning in deductive arguments about its own correctness. Another important outcome that emerges from my research is the finding that non-inferential knowledge is ontologically prior to the inferential sort. This is because plausible inferential knowledge of basic logical constants shall always be justified by circular reasoning that already assumes the correctness of the rule to be vindicated. This initial assumption is tantamount to non-inferential knowledge, and therefore this latter is more primitive-in fact the only primitive-species of basic logical knowledge. (shrink)

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk’s reputation as one of the pre-eminent philosopher-kings of the twentieth century in Europe has not been tarnished nor has it been much revised by historians. Masaryk’s philosophical opinions continue to be studied in current academic literature, especially in the Czech Republic where the issue of Masaryk’s legacy as both thinker and politician remains alive. The author of the following thesis recognizes that although other studies have noted the religious element in Masaryk’s philosophy, they have not analysed it (...) for its inherent theology and have therefore not made the important link between the philosophy of Thomas Garrigue Masaryk and the theology of Jan Amos Komenský. The following thesis examines Masaryk’s works for evidence demonstrating the fundamental place of theology in Masaryk’s political philosophy and argues that although Masaryk distanced himself from theology as ancillary to medieval theocracy, and from metaphysics as purely theoretical speculation, the fundamental assumptions upon which Masaryk constructed his political philosophy and philosophy of history were theological and metaphysical and borrowed from Komenský. (shrink)

Socrates teaches in the Meno that in order for a belief to be justified, an appropriate relation must ‘tie down’ the belief to its truth. Alvin Goldman’s position of externalism holds that for a belief to be justified, an appropriately reliable process must have obtained. One need not be aware of this reliable process. Conversely, Laurence BonJour’s brand of internalism holds that this relation between a belief and its truth is just what the cognizer needs to be aware of in (...) order for that belief to be justified. This work examines their debate, with particular interest paid to BonJour’s case of Norman: a clairvoyant who forms a belief via this ability but has no evidence for or against the belief or his own clairvoyance. Using this case, I propose an ‘epistemological spectrum’ wherein the insight of externalism is appreciated – what Robert Brandom deems the Founding Insight of Reliabilism – that a reliably produced belief bears some epistemic legitimacy, while retaining the insight of internalism: that objective reliability cannot offset subjective irrationality. This is done by classifying cases wherein only the obtainment of a reliable process occurs as epistemically rational, though not justified. Ultimately I reconcile the virtues of both positions, and propose that Goldman’s brand of full blooded externalism was generated by following an intuitional illusion by way of affirming the consequent. (shrink)

I defend Hobbes’ foundation for peace and property. His foundation for peace and property is his major argument for why society’s moral order should be based on the principles of non-interference and exclusive use of material objects. His foundation is that in the absence of both a recognised moral order and government, it would be rational, or felicity maximising, for individuals to agree to a moral order constituted by peace and property. The cogency of his foundation depends on the accuracy (...) of the second of the two steps of his state of nature thought experiment. In the first step, he formulates the state of nature by defining it as a social state of affairs with no government, by arguing that, as a consequence of there being no government, there would be no recognised moral order, and by assuming there would be relievable scarcity. In the second step, he theorises that interactions this anarchic state of affairs would be periodically violent. Also, the second step is informed by his theory of human nature, that is, his theory of the major characteristics common to all humans. Given that his foundation’s cogency is subject to the accuracy of the second step of his state of nature thought experiment and that the second step of his thought experiment is informed by his theory of human nature, my defence of his foundation involves arguments in favour of his theory of human nature, his state of nature, and his foundation. I first contend that the six characteristics that compose his theory of human nature are true. I next argue that the second step of his state of nature thought experiment – his theory that state of nature interactions would be periodically violent – is accurate. Lastly, I argue that his foundation is true, that it would be felicity maximising for individuals to agree to a moral order based on peace and property in the absence of government and a recognised moral order. To make my argument, I construct a hypothetical bargain between individuals in the state of nature where they choose between Hobbes moral order based on peace and property and the sort of moral order most contemporary political philosophers would propose as alternative as their improvement over the state of nature. I argue that individuals would choose the former over the latter as their improvement because the former is purely mutually beneficial while the latter is only partly mutually beneficial. (shrink)

This thesis looks at a relatively new line of research in Cognitive Science – embodied cognition. Its relation to the computational-representational paradigm, primarily symbolicism, is extensively discussed. It is argued that embodied cognition is compatible with the established paradigm but challenges its research focus and traditionally assumed segregation of cognition from bodily and worldly activities Subsequently the impact of embodied cognition on philosophy of Cognitive Science is considered. The second chapter defends the applicability of mechanistic explanation to cases of embodied (...) cognition. Further, it argues that a proposed alternative, dynamic systems theory, is not a substitute to the mechanistic approach. The last chapter critically examines the thesis that mind is extended beyond the bodily boundary and into the world. It is concluded that arguments in favour of the extended mind thesis are inadequate. Considerations in favour of the orthodox view that the does not “leak” out into the world are also presented. (shrink)

This dissertation has three goals. The first goal is to outline how twentieth century advocates qualify education as a human right. The second goal is to offer an integrative account which argues that, to defend a right to education both the provision of educational resources and the freedom to do something with those resources must be taken into account. This requires more than the rhetoric of a UN document like the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It also requires (...) more than the good intentions of duty-bound adults acting in the best interests of the child. To do this, it is necessary to consider how the institutional structure dedicated to education - in particular the structure dedicated to basic primary education to which the UN claims all children are entitled - integrates with the freedom each child has to do something with that basic primary education once he or she has obtained it. Finally, by identifying education as a human right within this integrative structure, this dissertation will demonstrate that, if policy documents related to education shift from a focus on the traditional relationship between an experienced adult and a dependent child to one based on the relationship between an individual and a capability set, the claim that education is a human right becomes a meaningful claim which can provide a justification for the social commitments required to recognize this claim. (shrink)

There exists a broad inclination among those who theorize about mental representation to assume that the meanings of linguistic units, like words, are going to be identical to, and work exactly like, mental representations, such as concepts. This has the effect of many theorists applying facts that seem to have been discovered about the meanings of linguistic units to mental representations. This is especially so for causal theories of content, which will be the primary exemplars here. It is the contention (...) of this essay that this approach is mistaken. The influence of thinking about language and mental representation in this way has resulted in the adoption of certain positions by a broad swathe of theorists to the effect that the content of a concept is identical to the property in the world that the concept represents, and that because of this a concept only applies to an object in the world or it does not. The consequences of such commitments are what appear to be insoluble problems that arise when trying to account for, or explain, misrepresentation in cognitive systems. This essay presents the position that in order to actually account for misrepresentation, conceptual content must be understood as being very much like measurements, in that the application of a content to an object in the world is akin to measuring said object, and that conceptual content ought be understood as being graded in the same way that measurements are. On this view, then, concepts are the kinds of things that can be applied more, or less, accurately to particular objects in the world, and so are not identical to whatever it is that they represent. (shrink)

I argue that there are two interpretations of the Marxist dialectic, both of which examine how human beings interact with objects around them conceptually and how society evolves over time, from different points of view. In the present paper, I undertake three tasks. First, I demonstrate that there is a clear difference between these two strains of Marxist thought which I here call humanist and determinist. Second, I show how Marxist thought has evolved from Hegel and Marx to the present (...) in light of these two different models. Last, I argue that the determinist model is flawed, and that the humanist model stands as a more solid logical and epistemological perspective for Marxist theory. (shrink)

The work in this exhibition is the result of philosophical contemplation and the concepts that followed from these moments. The moment that we find ourselves conscious, the moment in which we inhale or exhale is the focus of this work. Through the materiality and physicality of paint, I explore this moment. Paint thus acts as a metaphor for my body, having set parameters that dictate its cause and effect. The very nature of painting; its essence, is the moment of state (...) change from a fluid material to a solid state. I use the method of process and tools that I invent to help express these concerns of eternal recurrence. I make paintings that make space visible and invisible. (shrink)

Sentimentalism as an ethical view makes a particular claim about moral judgment: to judge that something is right/wrong is to have a sentiment/emotion of approbation/disapprobation, or some kind of positive/negative feeling, toward that thing. However, several sentimentalists have argued that moral judgments involve not only having a specific kind of feelings or emotional responses, but judging that one would be _justified_ in having that feeling or emotional response. In the literature, some authors have taken up the former position because the (...) empirical data on moral judgment seems to suggest that justification is not a necessary prerequisite for making a moral judgment. Even if this is true, however, I argue that justifying moral judgments is still an important philosophic endeavour, and that developing an empirically constrained account of how a person might go about justifying his feelings/emotional responses as reasons for rendering moral judgments by using a coherentist method of justification is both plausible and desirable. (shrink)

In this paper, a view of non-compliance in practical healthcare is provided that identifies certain non-compliant behaviours as rational. This view of rational non-compliance is used to update a current form of doctor patient relationships with the aim of reducing non-compliance. In addition to reforming one standard doctor patient relationship model, the normative implications of understanding non-compliance as a rational form of human behaviour are described.

The development of bioinformatics as an influential biological field should interest philosophers of biology and philosophers of science in general. Bioinformatics contributes significantly to the development of biological knowledge using a variety of scientific methods. Particular tools used by bioinformaticists, such as BLAST, phylogenetic tree creation software, and DNA microarrays, will be shown to utilize the scientific methods of extended cognition, analogical reasoning, and representations of mechanisms. Extended cognition is found in bioinformatics through the use of computer databases and algorithms (...) in the representation and development of scientific theories in bioinformatics. Analogical reasoning is found in bioinformatics through particular analogical comparisons that are made between biological sequences and operations. Lastly, scientific theories that are created using certain bioinformatics tools are often representations of mechanisms. These methods are found in other scientific fields, but it will be shown that these methods are expanded in bioinformatics research through the use of computers to make the methods of analogical reasoning and representation of mechanisms more powerful. (shrink)

In this thesis, I describe and evaluate two recent accounts of naming. These accounts are motivated by Kripke?s response to Russell?s Description Theory of Names. Particularly, I consider Kripke?s Modal Argument and various arguments that have been given against it, as well as Kripke?s responses to these arguments. Further, I outline a version of MA that has recently been presented by Scott Soames, and consider how he responds to the criticisms that the argument faces. In order to evaluate the claim (...) that MA is decisive against all description theories, I outline the Nominal Description Theory put forth by Kent Bach and consider whether it constitutes a principled response to MA. I do so by exploring how Bach both responds to Kripke?s arguments against descriptivism and highlights the problems with rigid designation as a purely semantic thesis. Finally, I consider the relative merits of the accounts put forth by Bach and Soames. Upon doing so, I argue that MA is not as decisive against description theories as it has long been thought to be. In fact, NDT seems to provide a better account of our uses of proper names than the rigid designation thesis as presented by Kripke and Soames. (shrink)

In this paper the concept of a?human right? is analysed and clarified. Some justifications for human rights? such as natural rights theory, contractarianism, utilitarianism and rights as vital interests? are explored with respect to their emphasis on rights as protected choices or protected interests. Finally, a vital interests view is defended in which the rights to subsistence, security, and liberty of movement and political participation form the set of our basic rights without which we cannot enjoy our other rights.

Although there are both common and specialised senses of the term variation, there seems to be no well defined use of this term in philosophy. The main task of my thesis is to demonstrate that variation can be defined as a cognitive technique. I suggest that variation has been frequently used by philosophers, although not always in an overt manner. Moreover, I attempt to show that it is reasonable to talk about the relative importance of variation by examining the role (...) of variation in Locke's Essay, Husserl's and Reinach's phenomenology, cognitive science, and thought experiments. (shrink)

Moral contractarianism, as demonstrated in the work of David Gauthier, is an attempt to derive moral principles from the non-moral premises of rational choice. However, this contractarian enterprise runs aground because it is unable to show that agents would commit to norms in a fairly realistic world where knowledge is limited in space and time, where random shocks are likely, and where agents can be arbitrarily differentiated from one another. In a world like this, agents will find that the most (...) "rational" strategy is to behave "non-rationally," imitating the behavior of others in their vicinity and preserving a limited sort of ignorance. (shrink)

This thesis explores the various forms of reasoning that are associated with diagrams. It does this by a logical analysis of diagrammatic symbols. The thesis is divided into three sections dealing with different aspects of diagrammatic logic. They are The relevance of diagrammatic symbols and their role in logic, Methods of formalizing diagrammatic symbols, such as subway maps and Peirce's Existential Graphs through the means of Graph theory, The conception of inference in diagrammatic logic systems.

There is a problem within contractarian ethics that I wish to resolve. It concerns individualpreferences. Contractarianism holds that morality, properly conceived, can satisfy individualpreferences and interests better than amorality or immorality. W hat is unclear, however, iswhether these preferences are those individuals actually hold or those that they should hold. The goal of my thesis is to investigate this question. I introduce a version of contractarian ethicsthat relies on ind ividual preferences in a manner more stringent than has been in (...) the literatureto date. (shrink)