In this clear and provocative account of the epistemology of religious experience, William P. Alston argues that the perception of God—his term for direct experiential awareness of God—makes a major contribution to the grounds of religious belief. Surveying the variety of reported direct experiences of God, Alston demonstrates that a person can be justified in holding certain beliefs about God on the basis of mystical experience.

Justification, or at least ‘justification’, bulks large in recent epistemology. The view that knowledge consists of true-justified-belief has been prominent in this century, and the justification of belief has attracted considerable attention in its own right. But it is usually not at all clear just what an epistemologist means by ‘justified’, just what concept the term is used to express. An enormous amount of energy has gone into the attempt to specify conditions under which beliefs of one or another sort (...) are justified; but relatively little has been done to explain what it is for a belief to be justified, what that is for which conditions are being sought. The most common procedure has been to proceed on the basis of a number of obvious cases of justified belief, without pausing to determine what property it is of which these cases are instances. Now even if there were some single determinate concept that all these theoriests have implicitly in mind, this procedure would be less than wholly satisfactory. For in the absence of an explicit account of the concept being applied, we lack the most fundamental basis for deciding between supposed intuitions and for evaluating proposed conditions of justification. And in any event, as philosophers we do not seek merely to speak the truth, but also to gain an explicit, reflective understanding of the matters with which we deal. We want to know not only when our beliefs are justified, but also what it is to enjoy that status. True, not every fundamental concept can be explicated, but we shall find that much can be done with this one. (shrink)

William P. Alston. difference in the scope of the rule reflects the fact that I-rules exist for the sake of making communication possible. Whereas their cousins are enacted and enforced for other reasons. We could distinguish I-rules just by this ...

Introduction As the title indicates, the chief focus of this book is epistemic justification. But just what is epistemic justification and what is its place ...

Receptivity to Christian or other religious proclamations is powerfully influenced by one’s value orientations. I distinguish five contrasts in such orientations that illustrate this point. 1. Finding “worldly” values most deeply satisfying vs. a sense that something that transcends those would be most fulfilling. 2. Extreme stress on human autonomy vs. a positive evaluation of deference to God, if such there be. 3. A sense of thorough sinfulness vs. a thoroughly positive self image. 4. A willingness to accept outside help (...) to transform oneself vs. a sense of the unworthiness of such dependence. 5. A readiness to treat others’ well being as important as one’s own vs. an exclusive focus on looking out for number one. The above reflects the deeper fact that value commihnents are an essential part of Christian belief, treatments of which must take account of this. (shrink)

[Alethic Realism] 1. The sense of ‘true’ and ‘false’ in which such items as beliefs, statements, and propositions can be evaluated as true or false. 2. It is important to determine the truth-value of such items in this sense.

" In a book that seeks to shift the ground of debate within theory of knowledge, William P. Alston finds that the century-lo.

Mit diesem klaren und provokativen erkenntnistheoretischen Ansatz im Bereich der Religionsphilosophie argumentiert William P. Alston, dass die Wahrnehmung Gottes eines der wichtigsten Beitrage zu den Grunden des religiosen Glaubens liefert. Dabei spielt sein Begriff des direkten erfahrungsmassigen Bewusstsein eine entscheidende Rolle. Nach einem Uberblick uber verschiedene berichtete direkte Gotteserfahrungen zeigt Alston, dass eine Person auf der Grundlage der mystischen Erfahrung berechtigt ist, an Gott zu glauben. "Dieses grossartige Buch ist die Frucht von Jahrzehnten des Reifens und der durchdringenden (...) Reflexion. Wie zu erwarten war, nimmt es die Diskussion des umgebenden Themas der Gotteserfahrung auf und fuhrt es zu einer neuen Ebene der Einsicht und der Durchdringung." Alvin Plantinga, Universitat von Notre Dame, USA "Die Erkenntnistheorie des religiosen Glaubens war vor einiger Zeit das heisseste Thema der Religionsphilosophie. Alstons Arbeit ist der beste und interessanteste Beitrag zu diesem Gebiet. Alston ist nicht nur mit der Verteidigung des religiosen Glaubens beschaftigt, sondern er eroffnet einen plausiblen Vorschlag zum verbesserten Verstandnisses der Frage nach der Entstehung des religiosen Glaubens. Gott wahrnehmen ist sicher der wichtigste Beitrag zur Religionsphilosophie in diesem Jahr." Robert Merrihew Adams, Universitat von Califonien, Los Angeles". (shrink)

William P. Alston was the founding editor of the Philosophy Research Archives and a president of the American Philosophical Association. This special volume was prepared in honor and recognition of Alston's many contributions to philosophy as author, editor, teacher, and mentor. Publication of this volume was made possible by his colleagues and the philosophy department at Syracuse University.

Internalism restricts justifiers to what is "within" the subject. two main forms of internalism are (1) perspectival internalism (pi), which restricts justifiers to what the subject knows or justifiably believes, and (2) access internalism (ai), which restricts justifiers to what is directly accessible to the subject. the two forms are analyzed and interrelated, and the grounds for each are examined. it is concluded that although pi is both unacceptable and without adequate support, a modest form of ai might be defended.

Professor JeeLoo Liu § Metaphysical Realism ___ The view that large stretches of reality do not depend on our conceptual and theoretical choices for existing and being what they are. Or: ___ The view that vast stretches of reality are what they are absolutely, not in any way relative to certain conceptual-theoretical choices that have equally viable alternatives. ___ It is sensible because it recognizes that some stretches of reality do conform to the account anti-realism gives of the whole of (...) reality. (shrink)

I like Bill Maher . He takes sides. One of his best recent lines was, "the last time the Republicans had that many black folks on stage they were selling them!" (That was in response to the reportedly large number of black folks carrying the Republican banner at the 2004 RNC.) The historical irony is that the folks who did the bulk of the selling of black folk would have been predecessors of today’s Democrat party. (So, Maher is evidently no (...) history buff.) I still like him though. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes and interrelates a number of respects in which persons have been thought to be in a specially favorable epistemic position vis-A-Vis their own mental states. The most important distinction is a six-Fold one between infallibility, Omniscience, Indubitability, Incorrigibility, Truth-Sufficiency, And self-Warrant. Each of these varieties can then be sub-Divided as the kind of modality, If any, Involved. It is also argued that discussions of self-Knowledge have been hampered by a failure to recognize these distinctions.

This essay deals with epistemological issues concerning perception. These can be briefly indicated by the question: “How, if at all, is perception a source of knowledge or justified belief?” To keep a discussion of a very complex subject matter within prescribed bounds, I will mostly focus on the “justified belief” side of the above disjunction, bringing in questions about perceptual knowledge only when dealing with a position that is specially concerned with knowledge. There are some other housekeeping moves to be (...) made before we can get under way. (shrink)