Law is perceived as a stabilising mechanism in an everchanging world and, as such, is founded on the quest for the one “true” meaning of legal norms as a basis for the rule of law. But I shall suggest that it is futile to seek a fixed meaning of legal norms or the one “true” method for interpreting them. The argument will be built by first considering the “trialectics” between hermeneutics, linguistics, and jurisprudence, and then taking a systematic approach (...) to law itself, to this end drawing inspiration from the work of Ferdinand de Saussure. I shall finally argue for the necessity of a more procedural understanding of the rule of law. (shrink)

Emerging neuroscientific insights are changing our understanding of what it means to be human. The resulting reconceptualization continues to impact law and the fit between law and morality. This book takes account of those developments and suggests that normative theory, particularly in its non-instrumental iterations, will be challenged, most profoundly. If we are, as the science suggests, nothing more than the coincidence of mechanical forces, then law and normative theory that depend on the immaterial and that would draw distinctions between (...) the "mental" or "emotional" and the more manifestly physical are misguided, so misguided that they would actually undermine human thriving. Indeed, they already do. The ramifications of that conclusion are profound. Trialectic posits and investigates the impact of those ramifications on law. (shrink)

Practice theory has lately taken a turn towards modelling the evolution of practices, which appear situated at the centre of the study of social action. I argue in this paper, following previous criticisms, that such centrality can be revised in order to better incorporate elements of agency and normativity, which are much determinant of the emergence and development of practices. The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative heuristic which advances on lefebvrean trialectics, in order to better (...) account for process in the study of practices. For this I rely on previous concepts from anthropology and sociology, such as fetishisation, ritualisation and bricolage. A relevant case study is merely outlined in order to illustrate how such a conceptual framework can identify agencies and situate practices in relation to power structures and performance at an early stage within the research process. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

This article argues for epistemic decolonization by developing a relational model of knowledge, which we locate within indigenous knowledges. We live in a time of ongoing global, epistemic coloniality, embedded in and shaped by colonial ideas and practices. Epistemological decolonization requires taking nondominant knowledges and their epistemes seriously to open up the possibility of interrogating and dismantling the hegemony of the Western knowledge tradition. We here ask two related questions: What are the decolonial affordances of indigenous knowledges? And how do (...) these compare to other contemporary critiques of epistemic coloniality, specifically those mounted by posthumanism? In answer, we develop three definitional senses of relational with reference to indigenous knowledges. First, we define indigenous knowledges in relation to Western knowledge, with which they share a dialectical origin at the moment of colonial contact. Second, indigenous knowledges are relational in their ontological and axiological orientations. Third, relationality in indigenous knowledge suggests a trialectic space, rather than a dialectic space. We argue for the necessity of an anticolonial framework, which assigns priority to indigenous people’s perceptions and ways of knowing for theorizing recurring colonial relations and their (imperialistic) manifestations in producing and reproducing knowledge. (shrink)

Many patients experience aspects of treatment and care as dehumanizing because the body is considered separate from the self and its life context. An attempt to transcend viewing persons in dualistic terms is posed by phenomenologists who focus not on “the body” as such but on what it means to be “embodied.” In this paper, we review the relevance of the phenomenology of the body for health care and report the results of comparing Sally Gadow’s phenomenological insights about body-self unity (...) with a qualitative analysis of patients’ accounts of satisfaction with the outcome of hand surgery. We illustrate the ways in which our findings were and were not congruent with Gadow’s conceptualization of embodiment and highlight aspects that are ambiguous. We conclude that the body-self dialectical relationship should be recast as a body-self-society trialectic and discuss the implications of this new conceptualization for clinical practices. (shrink)