In this paper I examine the account of courage offered in Books 3 and 4 of the Republic and consider its relation to the account of courage and cowardice found in the final argument of the Protagoras. I defend two main lines of thought. The first is that in the Republic Plato does not abandon the Protagoras’ view that all cases of cowardice involve mistaken judgment or ignorance about what is fearful. Rather, he continues to treat cowardly behavior as an (...) indication that, at least at the time of action, the agent lacked correct belief about what is best and least fearful. The evidence for this view will include an argument that what it means for the thumoeides to ‘preserve what is announced by rational accounts’ in the Republic is for it to prevent the fluctuation or corruption of reasoning under the deceptive influence of appetite. Second, I will argue that the Protagoras anticipates this account of courage in important ways. In particular, it draws attention to the problematic instability of belief and adumbrates the need for something like the spirited element of our psychology. According to my interpretation, the Republic’s account of courage is an elaboration or supplementation of the Protagoras’ account, rather than a rejection of it. (shrink)

Starting from the platonic concept of thumos/thumoeides formulated in the Republic, the paper intends to show (1) the originality of the those concepts for the Plato’s anthropological conception of the individual and the citizen; (2) its coherence with the platonic doctrine of the Principles, delivered by the so called indirect tradition of the Platonism, and, (3) its fecundity for a contemporary reflection about the action of the statesman and about the political action of the philosopher. Key words: Plato, courage, (...) moderation, measure, mixture, indirect tradition. (shrink)

Em breve “diálogo” com dois textos do Prof. John Cooper, este artigo trata um aspecto particular da relação entre os tratamentos da “alma”, principalmente, no Livro IV da República de Platão; e por Aristóteles no De anima, na Retórica e nos tratados éticos. Para Platão, a alma humana representa a combinação de três elementos, partes ou fatores - logistikon, thumoeides, epithumêtikon -, comparáveis a um homem, um leão e um monstro e respectivamente associados a ações causadas pela razão, pelo (...) “thumos” ou por nossos apetites. A tripartição é uma ideia dominante pelo menos em contextos relacionados à psicologia moral e à explicação da ação nos diálogos platônicos a partir da República. Não há grande interesse de Aristóteles pelas “partes” da alma, mas pelo menos no contexto ético há alguma tendência a dividir a alma, se bem que apenas por analogia, e divide frequentemente o desejo em três subtipos - boulêsis, thumos e epithumia. Contudo, naqueles textos aristotélicos que se preocupam mais diretamente com a psicologia moral, isto é, os tratados éticos e a Retórica, o que realmente mais chama a atenção é, acima de tudo, a ausência da tripartição da alma. Para Aristóteles, não há muita utilidade para qualquer ideia de “partes” da alma no sentido platônico. (shrink)

In the tripartite psychology of the Republic, Plato characterizes the “spirited” part of the soul as the “ally of reason”: like the auxiliaries of the just city, whose distinctive job is to support the policies and judgments passed down by the rulers, spirit’s distinctive “job” in the soul is to support and defend the practical decisions and commands of the reasoning part. This is to include not only defense against external enemies who might interfere with those commands, but also, and (...) most importantly, defense against unruly appetites within the individual’s own soul.1 Spirit, according to this picture, is by nature reason’s faithful auxiliary in the soul, while appetite is always a potential enemy to be watched .. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that although the Republic’s tripartite theory of the soul is not explicitly endorsed in Plato’s late work the Laws, it continues to inform the Laws from beneath the surface of the text. In particular, I argue that the spirited part of the soul continues to play a major role in moral education and development in the Laws (as it did in earlier texts, where it is characterized as reason’s psychic ‘ally’). I examine the programs of (...) musical and gymnastic education in the Laws and highlight parallels to the accounts of the spirited part of the soul and its role in moral education and virtue that are offered in Republic and Timaeus. I also examine the educational role given to the laws themselves in Magnesia, and I suggest that the education provided through them is largely directed at the spirited part of the soul as well. (shrink)