The problem of evil and theodicy is one of the most important subjects in the field of Philosophy of Religion. The problem of evil is basically understood as the problem of incompatibility of the existence of God with evil. While the problem of evil is used to justify atheistic claims, theodicy has been developed to strengthen theistic claims. Mawlânâ D̲j̲alāl al-Dīn Rūmī (1207-1273), who is the important sufi thinker of Turkish-Islamic culture, is (...) generally known for his mystical and literary works. Although Mawlânâ 's philosophical views have not been studied sufficiently, it is seen that he presents his important ideas in the philosophical field, especially in the philosophy of religion, in a non-systematic and hidden way in his works. In this study, the problem of evil has been studied in the case of Mawlânâ, within the scope of the evil’s types and the problem of evil’s types in the literature. In addition, it has been examined whether Mawlânâ discussed the evil as a philosophical problem and contributed to the solution of the problem of evil. Then, one of the theodicy used by Mawlânâ, which is related to contrasts, has been called the theodicy of contrasts and has been explained and systematized. It is known that theodicy related to theme of contrast was developed before Mawlânâ. As a result, Although it cannot be said that Mevlânâ made an original contribution to the problem of evil with his theodicy of contrasts in terms of content, it can be said that he approached originally to this problem in terms of his metaphorical manner and expression style. (shrink)

The Problem of Evil (POE), the idea that inexplicable human and non-human suffering is inconsistent with the existence of a benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent God, stands as one of the greatest challenges to classical theism. Many philosophers and theologians have offered theodicies, defense of God, in an attempt to blunt the force this problem. Others, however, believing that those theodicies have been effective have abandoned the classical definition of God and have embraced more liberal theologies, including deism, (...) pantheism, process theology, and alterity theism. Theists of this sort argue that their theologies are immune from the POE. This is so because the POE derives its force from the supposed attributes of God. If God is not omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, the problem disappears. So rather than seek to resolve the POE, theists who hold one or the other of these non-classical positions seek to walk around it altogether. The problem simply dissolves, it is claimed, when these alternative theologies are embraced. This article critiques the most prominent liberal responses to the POE and demonstrates how they fail. (shrink)

For decades, the problem of evil has occupied a centre stage in the Western philosophical discourse of the existence of God. The problem centres on the unlikelihood to reconcile the existence of an absolute and morally perfect God with the evidence of evil in the universe. This is the evidential problem of evil that has been a source of dispute among theists, atheists, agnostics, and sceptics. There seems to be no end to this dispute, (...) making the problem of evil a perennial one in Western Philosophy of Religion. In this essay, I will contribute to this discourse from an African perspective. This essay, therefore, explores the evidential problem of evil within the African philosophy of religion. I argue that it is unlikely for the evidential problem of evil to be a problem in African philosophy of religion. I invoke an Ejima-based argument to support this claim. I conceptualize the Igbo word Ejima to metaphysically mean the inevitable coexistence of two opposite variables as complements to argue that God could be both good and evil within the African Traditional Religion, which explains why good and evil exist in the universe. (shrink)

The problem of evil is very old in philosophy (if God is omnipotent and benevolent, why does he allow evil in the world?), but it has not been sufficiently discussed in the context of sports. This article discusses how athletes and fans in sports relate to it. In sports, there are moral evils, such as cheating, trash talking and unjust retaliation. Theists have traditionally appealed to free will as a way to respond to the challenge of moral (...) evil, but this appeal is not without problems. In sports, there are also natural evils, such as injuries and the unfair distribution of natural talents. Theists also have traditional ways of responding to that, but again, it is not clear that these answers are fully satisfactory. (shrink)

The Holocaust is one of the most intractable and challenging tragedies of moral evil to understand, assuming the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and all-loving God, and it has important implications for all theists. This paper critically examines the problem of evil in the philosophical theologies of two prominent Jewish philosophers: Emil Fackenheim and Richard Rubenstein. The article defends their view that the six million deaths are existentially meaningless because no justifiable reason exists why God permitted this. (...) Thus, a Jewish theodicy is not possible for them. Fackenheim attempts to salvage traditional Judaism, and urges Jews not to lose their faith, lest Hitler be given a posthumous victory. Rubenstein rejects Fackenheim’s position and encourages Jews to accept the death of God and his mystical radical theology, and still continue traditional religious practices. I question both these responses, and hold that it is more plausible that God is not perfectly loving. (shrink)

Many distinct, controvertial issues are to be found within the labyrinthine\ntwists and turns of the problem of evil. For philosophers of the\nseventeenth and early eighteenth centures, evil presented a challenge\nto the consistency and rationality of the world-picture disclosed\nby the new way of ideas. In dealing with this challenge, however,\nphilosophers were also concerned with their positions in the theological\ndebates about original sin, free will, and justification that were\nthe legacy of the Protestant Reformation to European intellectual\nlife. Emerging from a (...) conference on the problem of evil in the early\nmodern period held at the University of Toronto in 1999, the papers\nin this collection represent some of the best original work being\ndone today on the theodicies of such early modern philosophers as\nLeibniz, Suarez, Spinoza, Malebranche, and Pierre Bayle. (shrink)

800x600 Normal 0 21 false false false RO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabel Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";} The purpose of this paper is to explore the concept of hermeneutic phenomenology in Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy. A major thesis of this study is that Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology is never freed from religious insights. If in a text like “Hermeneutics and existence”, written in 1965, one (...) finds, for the first time, “hermeneutic phenomenology” as an elaborated concept with a specific purpose and a specific area of problems to be solved, ten years later, in “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” (1975), the aim, the problems and even the method change. This study will argue that hermeneutic phenomenology is deeply rooted into the problem of evil. In other words, hermeneutic phenomenology emerges in the early works of Ricoeur as a “tool” for the perpetual problem of evil, even if, later, hermeneutic phenomenology loses its binds with the problem it emerged from and it becomes a landmark for Ricoeurian thought. Moreover, the paper also argues that Ricoeur develops “hermeneutic phenomenology” in order to find a philosophical method for approaching the religious discourse.  . (shrink)

All the aspects related to good and bad paths have been explained in the Quran, which is a guideline for every Muslim. If we talk about philosophical theories related to evil in Buddhism, we will understand a different kind of concept. In Buddhism, it has been said that the purpose of life is the purification of the soul, and evils in life serve as opportunities to make the soul. The first important philosophical development related to the problem of (...) evil is will-free defense. This theory emphasizes the freedom of human beings given by God. Because of this freedom of human beings, they can opt for evil in life. This theory explains that a human being is a combination of matter of virtue and evil as well, so it depends upon human will what he opts for in his life. The other and most important theory related to the philosophy of evil is soul-making theodicy. This philosophical theory explains that God's objective in making the universe is the development of the soul and spiritual values of human beings. These soul-making processes can be made better in the presence of any evil factor. (shrink)

I argue that the problem of evil, As a problem with theological significance, Cannot be specified in terms simply of truth and logic. For a problem specified in this way can be seen to be either trivial or necessarily insoluble before any of the substantive issues are decided. I then argue that it should be construed as a special sort of rhetorical problem, One posed by beliefs about the compatibility of other beliefs. On the basis (...) of the logic and truth values involved I distinguish two sub-Classes of such problems, And discuss appropriate methods of resolving them. (shrink)

In recent years historians of modern philosophy have begun to pay much more attention to the theological thought of both major and minor figures in the period. These theological views are interesting and important in their own right, but they also provide substantial insights into the interconnections between, and the motivations for, many philosophical positions these figures advocate. This volume continues this recent tradition by providing an engaging look at the ways in which key figures in the modern period addressed (...) facets of the problem of evil. The nine essays included in this volume, originally presented at a conference at the University of Toronto in 1999, cover a range of figures and topics, though British figures are somewhat surprisingly excluded altogether. (shrink)

Chapter 1 addresses some preliminary issues that it is important to think about in formulating arguments from evil. Chapter 2 is then concerned with the question of how an incompatibility argument from evil is best formulated, and with possible responses to such arguments. Chapter 3 then focuses on skeptical theism, and on the work that skeptical theists need to do if they are to defend their claim of having defeated incompatibility versions of the argument from evil. Finally, (...) Chapter 4 discusses evidential arguments from evil, and four different kinds of evidential argument are set out and critically examined. (shrink)

If the problem of evil is one of justifying how a perfect God could create evil, then there is no problem of evil in early Chinese thought, but my claim in this paper is that the problem of evil is one manifestation of a deeper problem, which is the conflict between the world and human values and desires. This deeper problem appears in early Chinese thought in ways analogous to the (...) class='Hi'>problem of evil in theistic traditions. Daoists respond to this problem with a call to harmonize with heaven by overcoming conventional values and desires. Mencius, a Confucian, offers a more complex response, in which it is natural to cultivate virtue and certain desires even though nature itself is indifferent to them. My paper focuses on this Confucian response. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that if the libertarian free will defence were seen to fail because determinism were seen to be true, then another solution to the problem of evil would present itself. I start by arguing that one cannot, by consideration of agents' choices between morally indifferent options, reach any conclusion as to these agents' moral qualities. If certain forms of consequentialism were false, determinism true, and if there were a God who chose to create this (...) universe, then His choice would have been between such options. Consideration of the general nature of the universe God putatively chose to create would not then license any conclusion as His moral qualities. (shrink)

The problem of evil can be captured by the following four statements which taken together are inconsistent: 1) God made the world 2) God is a perfect being 3) A perfect being would not create a world containing evil 4) The world contains evil Traditional attempts to grapple with this problem typically center on rejecting (3). Thus Descartes, following Augustine, rejects (3), arguing that evil is the result of man’s exercise of his free will. (...) However, given Descartes plausible claim that God could have created man in such a way that through exercising his free will man comes to only virtuous actions, it is not clear how the problem is solved. Descartes also repeats the Augustinian orthodoxy that though the world contains evil it does not contain it as a positive existence; evil has no real being but is simply the reflection of the inherent lack of full-being in merely finite individuals. Again, that this is a solution is open to serious doubt. (shrink)

Discusses the problem of evil, and, in particular, the question whether the world could have been created by God, when he is conceived in the way I have proposed. I consider the way in which the existence of free will might make the existence of evil in a good world inevitable, and whether the existence of free will is essential to any solution. I also consider the problem posed by unintended evil and the existence of (...) terrible lives. (shrink)

In this study, Surah al-Kahf verses 66-82 are discussed in the context of the problem of evil. According to us, the events that take place in the parable of Moses-Hizir in the verses are closely related to the problem of evil. In the study, firstly, the nature and historical background of the problem of evil is discussed. Then, the approaches to the problem of evil and the theodicy theories were analyzed and the (...) perceptions of the problem of evil in both Greek philosophy and the Islamic world were investigated. In the second part of the study, the exegesis of verses 66-82 of Surah al-Kahf is examined and the aspects pointing to the problem of evil in these texts are identified. Finally, the position of the parable of Moses-Hizir in the discussions on the problem of evil was tried to be determined. The aim of this study is to explain the relationship between the events in the parable of Moses-Khizir and the problem of evil and to determine the coordinates of the parable in the discussions. Thus, it is aimed to look at the problem of evil, which is widely discussed and debated even today, from a Qur'anic perspective. In the study, which was handled using the documentation method, it was determined that there are many theories about the problem of evil. There are those who use the problem of evil to argue for the non-existence of God, as well as those who argue that God has nothing to do with the events in the world by claiming that the universe was not created by God. On the other hand, there are those who say that the universe was created by God and that there may be relative and accidental evil in the universe. While some of these people have evaluated these evils as the maturation and perfection of human beings, others have considered them as God's warning and anger. In our opinion, the events described in the parable of Moses and Hizir and the mentioned evils are close to the views of those who consider the evils in the world as relative and accidental. (shrink)

The problem of evil is the problem of reconciling the existence of a perfect God with the existence of horrible things in the world. Many take this problem as a convincing reason to be an atheist. But others think that the problem can be solved. One prominent solution is called ‘sceptical theism’. A sceptical theist is someone who believes in God but thinks that the problem of evil is not a real problem (...) since humans are unable to see whether the horrible things in our world are truly pointless or else serve some greater purpose. (shrink)

In this essay, I attempt to solve the problem of the existence of evil in a world created by an omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent God. I conclude that evil exists because God wanted to create moral creatures. Because choice is necessary for morality, God created creatures with enormous capacities for choice—and therefore enormous capacities for evil. Material creatures are subject to pain and death because, for such creatures, moral choices are deeply serious. The laws that underlie the (...) material world and from which material life arises are such that, from their workings out on a planet that can support life, natural evils happen. (shrink)

Abstract:The problem of evil is of significant concern to theologians and to philosophers of religion. Despite the extensive discussion this problem has received in various Anglo-American philosophical circles, relatively liĴ le aĴ ention has been paid to the theodical insights specifically of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa (ca. ninth–tenth centuries ѐ.ђ.). Here, it is sought to address this lacuna by highlighting certain theological insights within the Bhāgavatapurāṇa that offer explanations for the existence of suffering. These insights are also drawn upon (...) in order to formulate a response to the evidential problem of evil. Although this is not an aĴ empt to construct a comprehensive theodicy with these textual materials, it is highlighted how the Bhāgavatapurāṇa can address certain dimensions of the evidential problem for evil, and some pathways are noted for further inquiry into the theodical insights of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa. (shrink)

How does the Christian response to the problem of evil contrast with that of other worldviews? Most attempts at answering the problem of evil either present a straightforward account of the truth claims of Christianity or defend a minimalist concept of God. This book is different. Inside, you'll examine four worldviews' responses to the problem of evil. Then, you'll hear the author's argument that Christian theism makes better sense of the phenomenon of evil (...) in the worldâe"equipping you to reach an informed conclusion. This book's unique approachâe"integrating worldviews with apologetics with theologyâe"will give you a better understanding of the debate surrounding the problem of evil, in both philosophy and theology. Learn to think cogently and theologically about the problem of evil and Christianity's ability to answer its challenges with Worldviews and the Problem of Evil as your guide. (shrink)

The Problem of Evil, the idea that inexplicable human and non-human suffering is inconsistent with the existence of a benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent God, stands as one of the greatest challenges to classical theism. Many philosophers and theologians have offered theodicies, defense of God, in an attempt to blunt the force this problem. Others, however, believing that those theodicies have been effective have abandoned the classical definition of God and have embraced more liberal theologies, including deism, pantheism, (...) process theology, and alterity theism. Theists of this sort argue that their theologies are immune from the POE. This is so because the POE derives its force from the supposed attributes of God. If God is not omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, the problem disappears. So rather than seek to resolve the POE, theists who hold one or the other of these non-classical positions seek to walk around it altogether. The problem simply dissolves, it is claimed, when these alternative theologies are embraced. This article critiques the most prominent liberal responses to the POE and demonstrates how they fail. (shrink)

I place my analysis and naturalization of the problem of evil in relation to (1) Holmes Rolston’s views on disvalues in nature and (2) the challenge posed to theology by environmental philosophy in the work of Frederick Ferré. In the analysis of the problem of evil that follows my discussion of Rolston and Ferré, I first discuss the transformative power for the religious believer of reflection on the problem of evil, using the biblical Job (...) as a case study. I point out difficulties with Job’s particular resolution of the problem of evil and suggest that these difficulties can be satisfactorily addressed by naturalizing spirituality. (shrink)

Wang Yangming believes that human nature is entirely good. A question naturally arises: where is evil from? It has been argued that Wang’s idealism gives rise to the problem of evil. I first argue...

This paper argues that the logical coherence of classical theism can be defended through the traditional free-will defense and argument from divine omniscience and human finitude, but only at the cost of moral scepticism. The above two-pronged defense entails moral scepticism because it demands that we construe clear and undeniable cases of morally unjustifiable evil as merely apparently unjustifiable evils which can be morally justified from some moral point of view. The paper argues that justification is impossible because such (...) basic evils can never be justified from any "moral" perspective. The very conditions necessary for having a moral perspective demand that one recognize certain evils as unjustifiable from any moral point of view. This is the case because moral theories are designed to give us insight into such evils. Moreover, I argue that even if one rejects the above argument, moral scepticism still follows because any intelligible account of moral knowledge requires that its proponents be able at least to point to certain cases of unjustifiable evil if their theory is to have any purchase in the real world and avoid the charge of moral irrelevance and moral scepticism. But this is precisely what the classical theist cannot do. If, however, the classical theist rejects this moral scepticism, then real cases of morally unjustifiable evil must be admitted to exist and a single one of these is sufficient to undermine the logical coherence of classical theism. (shrink)

In this article, we contest the idea that evil does not exist, or that it is a mistaken grasp of reality to contend that evil exists. We analyze two versions of this argument: the 'orchestra argument' and the 'mystical argument.' In common, these arguments contend that those who affirm the existence of evil in the world have a limited view of reality. We argue that these views are either over-abstract from reality or do not offer a plausible (...) approach to the problem of evil. We then advance a decolonial perspective on evil. According to the perspective advanced here, evil is conceptualized as a phenomenon that diminishes life. We contend this view provides a better account of how to understand evil. (shrink)

In this chapter, the problem of evil is understood in a narrow, intellectual sense: as the problem of how a theist can best reply to various arguments for the non-existence of God that are based on the fact that the world contains evil. Two such arguments are examined. One proceeds from a general fact about the world: that it contains a vast amount of truly horrendous evil. The other proceeds from a particular horrible event. It (...) is argued that each of these arguments is a “failure” in this sense: ideally rational agnostics, having reflected on the argument, could, without any offense against reason, remain agnostics. (shrink)

A prominent Christian apologist suggests it is inconsistent for an atheist to have a favourable attitude towards procreating while maintaining that a loving God would not place vulnerable beings in such a harmful world. I put this analogy to the test with a series of thought experiments, revealing crucial disanalogies between God and procreators that absolve the atheist from the charge of inconsistency and draw the reader's attention to the central issues on the problem of evil as debated (...) by contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

The Problem of Evil: New Philosophical Directions brings together a diversity of philosophical views, methods, and approaches to the much-discussed topic of evil and its bearing on religious belief. Through both general and specific examinations of the problem of evil, this book proposes new directions for philosophical thought.

Editorial for issue 29 of Scandinavian Jewish Studies, 'The Problem of Evil and Images of Humanity'.

This article explores imagination as a means of ethical re-orientation in the aftermath of atrocity. The discussion of the problem of evil is based on Hannah Arendt’s critique of Kant and her notion of ‘rootless’ rather than ‘radical’ evil. On this basis, the orienting potential of visual images is investi­gated with regard to images of violence in the media on the one hand, and, on the other, with regard to Michelangelo’s Creation of Adam. Then the role of (...) verbal and mental images of humanity or inhumanity is discussed with reference to the Holocaust survivor Jorge Semprun’s testimony in his book Literature or Life. Finally, the biblical motif of the human being created in the image of an invisible God, the imago Dei, comes into view as an exemplary image of humanity that appears in a framework of interpretation where the invisible is mediated with the help of verbal, visual and/or mental images. (shrink)

Open theism argues that traditional responses to the problem of evil fail to provide comfort amidst suffering because of their notion of metaphysical determinism and over-dependence on Greek philosophy. Open theists argue that the best solution to the problem of evil lies in our understanding of the nature of God’s power, which has been relinquished due to his love, the open nature of creation, and the creatures’ inherent powers. This study argues that the open-theistic notion of (...) divine power is reductionistic because it does not consider coercive power as part of divine power. Further, the open theistic logic-of-love defence propagates a loveless God who respects his covenant with the beloved more than the beloved. Finally, the study argues that the open theists’ notions of divine omniscience and divine power are not viable; they raised many questions and objections and, therefore, created room for despair rather than comfort in adversity. (shrink)

The shift from the logical to the empirical argument from evil against the existence of God has been seen as a victory by analytic philosophers of religion who now seek to establish that the existence of evil fails to make the existence of God improbable. I examine several arguments in an effort to establish the following: (i) Their victory is pyrrhic. They distort the historical, philosophical and religious nature of the problem of evil. (ii) In attempting (...) to refute the empirical argument they rely on disguised but well-worn strategies. (iii) A refusal to let evil count in any way against the probability of the existence of God indicates that their rejection is ideological and contrary to traditional theism. (iv) Aspects of their arguments are morally repugnant. (v) Their arguments are indicative of a lack of vitality, relevance and “seriousness” in Christian analytic philosophy of religion. (shrink)

In this chapter probability and confirmation theory are used to investigate the problem of evil, concentrating on whether a theist should consider our ignorance of a good reason for God to permit evil to support a non-religious alternative over a typical theist's beliefs. It is argued that according to Likelihoodism, our ignorance of a good reason does not favor a competing hypothesis over the religious view that there is an incomprehensible good reason for God to permit (...) class='Hi'>evil. Bayesian accounts of comparative confirmation, which are alternatives to Likelihoodism, have the same result. Furthermore, according to both Likelihoodism and Bayesian accounts of contrastive confirmation, our ignorance of a good reason for God to permit evil may actually support typical religious beliefs over the alternative hypotheses. (shrink)

Discussion of the concept of evil in Indian philosophy.

A standard reaction to the problem of evil is to look for a greater good that can explain why God (with the traditional attributes) might have created this world instead of a seemingly better one which has no (or less) evil. This paper proposes an approach we call the Moral Progress Approach: Given the value of progress, a non-perfect world containing evil may be preferable to a perfect world without evil. This makes room for the (...) possibility that this world, with all its evil, may be preferable to a world with less evil. We argue that our proposal is different from apparently similar views such as soul-making theodicy. (shrink)

I argue that the creation and freely chosen salvation and everlasting bliss of even just one person is a greater good than any finite amount of evil and suffering. Since it is extremely likely (if not certain) that, out of all possible individuals that could exist, some (or at least one) would only be freely saved through the contemplation and experience of evil and suffering, then God would be justified in creating a world with evil and suffering (...) to allow for the salvation of such individuals, so long as no one else freely lost their salvation who otherwise would not have lost it because of the evil and suffering. Thus, the problem of evil dissipates, as a world with evil and suffering, even seemingly gratuitous evil and suffering, would be entirely expected given theism. (shrink)

In this study of evil in the framework of theology and its practical consequences in the light of Christian teaching, the author holds that the problem of evil is insoluble apart from ideas of the Fall and redemption. The volume is designed to summarize Christian doctrine in which "evil, itself an absence of being, becomes, by the void that it creates, an appeal to God and to the divine action.".

The aim of this book is to ascertain how ancient Greek and Latin authors, both pagan and Christian, formulated and answered what is now called the problem of evil. The survey ranges chronologically from the classical and Hellenistic eras, through the Roman era, to the end of the pagan world. Six of the twelve chapters are devoted to Christianity (including Manichaeism), as one thesis of the book is that the problem of evil takes an acute form (...) only for Christians, since no other philosophy of antiquity posits a personal God exercising providence over individuals without having to overcome countervailing forces. None the less it will also be shown that Greek philosophies, Platonism in particular, come close to the Christian formulation. Being conscious of the affinity between Greek thought and their own, early Christians respond to the problem of evil in the same way as the philosophers, by questioning the existence of evil rather than of the divine. (shrink)

The problem of evil is the problem of reconciling the world's afflictions with the fundamental attributes and justice of God. Throughout their lives people encounter painful events originating from nature and other individuals. Furthermore, it is believed that God created everything, particularly in divine religions. Scholars and thinkers have debated for centuries why an omniscient, omnipotent, just, and compassionate God would create evil. The problem of evil is sometimes employed by atheists as evidence against (...) religion, and at times as philosophical proof for the absence of God. Nowadays, it exerts a profound impact on people's beliefs within social media platforms. This article aims to address doubts and objections surrounding the problem of evil. Numerous studies have been conducted on this current issue. The subject, which is basically examined as natural and moral evil in the philosophy of religion, has been examined under the titles such as justice and cruelty, goodness and evil, will and power in classical theology. In this study, the subject is examined in terms of the relationship between the subject of evil and its object, and attention is drawn to the role of man in the formation of evil. In this context, a general overview of the problem of evil is presented in the introduction. The second section delves into how the problem of evil is approached in philosophical and theological traditions, specifically examining the viewpoints of classical kalam schools. In the later parts of the study, the subject has been tried to be reinterpreted under different titles. Within this framework, it is suggested that some doubts and questions about the problem of evil arise from a lack of understanding of religion, while others stem from interpretations perceived as religious within the tradition. To propose a solution to the problem, the concept of God, known for its power and authority in classical times, should be reevaluated. In the context of Islam, God should be considered as an entity possessing complete knowledge, absolute will and power, and creating the universe for goodness, possesses justice and mercy and bestows numerous blessings upon humanity. This perspective finds ample support in the verses of the Qur'an. The problem of evil sometimes emerges from misconceiving the relationship between God and nature as equivalent to a God-human relationship. However, God designed the universe's order to support the emergence of life in nature and make it conducive to the lives of all living beings, particularly humans. Natural phenomena and events unfold by the laws set by Allah. Evils such as diseases, fires, earthquakes, floods, storms, volcanic eruptions, rain, and lightning are not events directly orchestrated by God to harm humans. The harm they cause is primarily a result of humans' negative interactions with nature. Precautions can mitigate these harms. Yet, humans who pollute air, water, and forests and build poorly located structures hastily attribute the resulting evils to God. A careful examination of the numerous blessings in nature underscores that the universe was created by God as a benevolent order. God created humanity to undergo tests within such a world, aiming for human happiness in both this world and the hereafter. Thus, the entirety of God's will be goodness. Evil, conversely, arises from humanity's exercise of free will and the potential to commit malevolent acts. Consequently, evil stems from human interactions with nature and fellow beings. Destiny is another frequently misconstrued aspect. It refers to the natural and moral laws established by Almighty Allah to govern the order of nature and human existence. Destiny presents a realm of possibilities and does not coerce anyone's actions. To address the problem of evil, the portrayal of God, whose sole intent is good, must be reconstructed. Additionally, concepts like testing, fate, death, and sustenance need to be reinterpreted in alignment with this conception. Furthermore, methods that facilitate the acquisition of accurate religious information through social media should be developed to suit contemporary requirements. (shrink)

Much of the contemporary discussion over the problem of evil is undermined by a violation of a basic conceptual truth: no rational agent would knowingly engage in self-sabotage. The argument of this paper contends that several prominent versions of the Evidential Argument from Evil are undercut as these arguments imply an incentive structure that would generate perverse outcomes. Put another way, these arguments imply that an omniscient agent would knowingly engage in self-sabotage. Interestingly, however, it is not (...) just arguments from evil which run afoul of the principle that no rational being would knowingly engage in self-sabotage. As several prominent theodicies suffer from the flaw of incentivizing perverse outcomes as well. (shrink)

This paper argues that God may create and exist in any possible world, no matter how much suffering of any sort that world includes. It combines the traditional free will defence with the notion of an 'occasion' for good or evil action and limits God's responsibility to the creation of these occasions. Since no possible world contains occasions for more evil than good action, God is morally permitted to create any possible world. With regard to suffering that is (...) not due to free will, namely the suffering of beings who are not moral agents, the paper questions the idea that the relief of such suffering is a moral perfection. (shrink)

The author’s goal is to weigh capabilities of theistic reason in regard to the problem of evil, and two formats of reasoning in this regard are strictly differed, i.e. attempts at building theodicies and defenses. The upshot is that while there is no doubt that the great multitude of evils and sufferings in the world are surely beyond reach of any theodicies, it is similarly doubtless that many sound reasons are suitable for countering atheist “evidential refutations”. Some new (...) arguments are offered to counterbalance Rowe’s “friendly atheism”, Draper’s “hypothesis of indifference”, and Schellenberg’s “argument from hiddenness”, along with analysis of wishful thinking underlying all of them. (shrink)

This short chapter evaluates the logic of Epicurus' argument that considers the problem of evil (how could an all powerful, all knowing, and all good God permit the existence of evil?) It is part of larger set of evaluations of famous arguments presented in the history of philosophy.

It is inconsistent to believe both that values are subjective and that the problem of evil is a good argument against the existence of god. David hume, Bertrand russell, Antony flew, And many others fall into this inconsistency. It arises because the existence or non-Existence of God is an issue about objective fact, But reports or expressions of subjective human states cannot get a grip on objective reality. Since the problem of evil is the only substantial (...) positive argument for the non-Existence of god, The subjectivist unbeliever can be rationally at most an agnostic, Not an atheist. (shrink)

The vast amount of suffering in the world is often held as a particularly powerful reason to deny that God exists. Now, one of the world's most distinguished philosophers of religion presents his own position on the problem of evil. Highly accessible and sensitively argued, Peter van Inwagen's book argues that such reasoning does not hold: his conclusion is not that God exists, but that suffering cannot be shown to prove that He does not.

In “Descartes’s Theodicy of Error,” Michael J. Latzer argues that the Fourth Meditation has “general significance for the project of theodicy” and offers “asolution to the problem of evil as complete, in its own succinct way, as Leibniz’s is on a grander scale.” I do not think that anyone has accurately understood the complex theodicy offered there, however. Commentators disagree about the argument(s) and have not carefully explained exactly what Descartes says that applies to the problem of (...) evil. The purpose of my paper is three-fold. I (1) explain the theodicy that Descartes offers to explain philosophical error in the Fourth Meditation; (2) argue that although we are justified in understanding this theodicy as concerning the problem of evil, the advice Descartes offers for avoiding philosophical error does not apply to avoiding sin (an example of evil); and (3) argue that the theodicy may actually be no theodicy at all. (shrink)

Theodicy, the enterprise of searching for greater goods that might plausibly justify God’s permission of evil, is often criticized on the grounds that the project has systematically failed to unearth any such goods. But theodicists also face a deeper challenge, one that places under question the very attempt to look for any morally sufficient reasons God might have for creating a world littered with evil. This ‘anti-theodical’ view argues that theists (and non-theists) ought to reject, primarily for moral (...) reasons, the project of ‘justifying the ways of God to men’. Unfortunately, this view has not received the serious attention it deserves, particularly in analytic philosophy of religion. Taking my cues from such anti-theodicists as Kenneth Surin, D.Z. Phillips and Dostoyevsky’s Ivan Karamazov, I defend several reasons for holding that the way of thinking about God and evil enshrined in theodical discourse can only add to the world’s evils, not remove or illuminate them. (shrink)