Aristotle is often credited with views about practical reasoning, desire, and action collectively referred to as the theory of the practical syllogism.Some commentators are skeptical about the existence of any such general theory, but most would agree that a theory of some sort is outlined in the De Motu Animalium and that it influences Aristotle’s account of akrasia in the icomachean Ethics.This paper will begin by describing the most important ideas in the De Motu Animalium discussion of (...) the practical syllogism. The ideas are simple but I think that their implications and philosophical importance have not been appreciated. I will suggest that the practical syllogism is Aristotle’s model for the rational explanation of action. Other commentators have made this claim, but I think that it can be given a very precise sense. Aristotle thinks that an action can be rationally explained if the agent acts in response to the strength of the reasons that he sees for acting. The practical syllogism is an argument that expresses the reasons in favor of the action, so if the agent acts for those reasons the action is explained by the practical syllogism. The second part of the paper considers the work that the practical syllogism does in Aristotle’s account of akrasia. I will argue that in akrasia—at least in the most extreme kind of akrasia—the agent acts intentionally to satisfy a desire but the action cannot be explained by a practical syllogism. Aristotle distinguishes between explanation by the motivational strength of desires and explanation by a practical syllogism. The last part of this paper comments on David Charles’s interpretation of Aristotle’s views about desire, practical reason, and akrasia. Charles discusses the traditionally disputed questions in a provocative way, and more importantly his suggestions fit together into a complex and philosophically sophisticated reading of Aristotle. I disagree with his most important claims, but I can best explain and defend my own interpretation by contrasting it with his. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: The Practical Side of Deliberation The Analogy between the Theoretical and Practical Syllogism and the Importance of the Middle Term Formulating the Practical Syllogism and the Analogous Middle Term The Middle Term and the Ethical Agent The Middle Term and Ethical Virtue: Deliberation Re‐visited A Note on the Enkratic, the Akratic, and the Learner Conclusion Acknowledgments Notes Reference Further reading.

Does Aristotle by his phrase “syllogisms of things to be done” mean syllogisms of a distinctive and inherently practical content, perhaps syllogisms subject to an unfamiliar logic? Or does he just mean syllogisms that are relevant in contexts concerning what to do next? I propose the second interpretation, taking the syllogisms in question to constitute the deductive kernel of stretches of practical thinking. They are pieces of deduction that take on a practical function in context.

In the present paper, I want to contribute to a correct understanding of Aristotle's action theory by explaining just how two of the key concepts which it involves are connected and by showing that, contrary to what a number of commentators have said, there are causal concepts. The concepts in question are those of deliberation and the so-called "practical syllogism.".

Does Aristotle by his phrase “syllogisms of things to be done” mean syllogisms of a distinctive and inherently practical content, perhaps syllogisms subject to an unfamiliar logic? Or does he just mean syllogisms that are relevant in contexts concerning what to do next? I propose the second interpretation, taking the syllogisms in question to constitute the deductive kernel of stretches of practical thinking. They are pieces of deduction that take on a practical function in context.

Prevailing interpretations of Aristotle’s use of syllogistic language outside the Organon hold that he offers a single, comprehensive theory of the practical syllogism spanning his ethical and biological works. These comprehensive theories of the practical syllogism are plausible neither philosophically nor as interpretations of Aristotle. I argue for a multivocal account of the practical syllogism that distinguishes (1) Aristotle’s use of syllogistic language to explain aspects of his account of animal motion in MA from (...) (2) his use of syllogistic language to explain aspects of his account of the distinctive practical cognition of the phronimos in EN. I offer a novel account of the role of syllogistic language in ethics, arguing that it elucidates a nuanced account of universals and particulars in ethics according to which acting virtuously requires an understanding of underlying universal values and a capacity to relate them to concrete, particular features of our circumstances. (shrink)

This article tackles a number of puzzles related to Aristotle’s practical syllogism, notably the relationship between deliberation and the practical syllogism, the distinction between deliberative and reconstructive practical syllogisms, and the nature of the conclusion of the practical syllogism.

The purpose of this dissertation is to show how it is that three interpreters of Aristotle's texts on deliberation and the practical syllogism come to views which differ considerably from each other. I argue that the differences are largely due to which set of texts the interpreter takes as most important in relation to Aristotle's theory of the practical syllogism. Neither G. E. M. Anscombe, John M. Cooper, nor Martha Craven Nussbaum has expressed adequately Aristotle's use (...) of the practical syllogism in his writings. I argue that the practical syllogism is one phenomenon for which Aristotle has different purposes in the different places that it appears in his texts. Due to its different appearances, it is sometimes given different interpretations because of the context in which it appears. ;In the first chapter I list several texts which are relevant to Aristotle's theory of deliberation and of the practical syllogism. I then state briefly the kinds of views that are held on the relationship between deliberation and the practical syllogism, which leads me to formulate the questions to which this dissertation is to offer answers. In order to respond to these questions, I develop a separate set of questions which guide my examination of the interpretations by Anscombe, Cooper, and Nussbaum on deliberation and the practical syllogism in Aristotle's texts. My elucidation of these three interpreters' views is shown in chapters two through four. In the fifth and final chapter, I return to the former questions and answer them according to my elucidations of the interpreters' views. I then take four passages from Aristotle--DA 434a16-21, MA 701a17-25, EN 1112b11-12, 15-20, and EN 1147a24-28--which passages are important to his theory of the practical syllogism, and show the differences among the interpretations of these passages by Anscombe, Cooper, and Nussbaum. This, in conjunction with what I have shown up to this point, enables me to offer a conclusion concerning the entire controversy. My conclusion is compatible with the view that the practical syllogism and deliberation are one phenomenon for Aristotle, which phenomenon he puts to several uses. (shrink)

(2013). In the beginning was the doing: the premises of the practical syllogism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 303-321.

In Nicomachean Ethics VII Aristotle describes akrasia as a disposition. Taking into account that it is a disposition, I argue that akrasia cannot be understood on an epistemological basis alone, i.e., it is not merely a problem of knowledge that the akratic person acts the ways he does, but rather one is akratic due to a certain kind of habituation, where the person is not able to activate the potential knowledge s/he possesses. To stress this point, I focus on the (...) gap between potential knowledge and its activation, whereby I argue that the distinction between potential and actual knowledge is at the center of the problem of akrasia. I suggest that to elaborate on this gap, we must go beyond the limits of Nicomachean Ethics to Metaphysics IX, where we find Aristotle’s discussion of the distinction between potentiality and actuality. I further analyze the gap between potential and actual knowledge by means of Aristotle’s discussion of practical syllogism, where I argue that akrasia is a result of a conflict in practical reasoning. I conclude my paper by stressing that for the akratic person the action is determined with respect to the conclusion of the practical syllogism, where the conclusion is produced by means of a ‘conflict’ between the universal opinion which is potential and the particular opinion which is appetitive. (shrink)

The present paper proposes to analyse the role of the practical syllogism in G.E.M. Anscombe’s theory of action. To this end, I have rst of all chosen to examine, even if in broad terms, the conception of practical syllogism as it is present in the Aristotelian doctrine, and to reveal/delineate some critical points found within it. The following section is the central part of the paper, where, starting from § 33 of Intention, a re ection is (...) carried out on the practical syllogism, which is among Aristotle’s most signi cant discoveries, chie y bringing into focus its teleological prospective. Action, in Anscombe’s thought, almost seems be the cornerstone of a profound, and in a certain sense “contextual”, comprehension of the subject. (shrink)

Among scholars it is common to assume that Aristotle’s practical syllogism does two jobs. It is often taken to explain both animal motion and human deliberation. I will call this the “two-jobs view of the practical syllogism”. In what follows, I will argue that the two-jobs view of the practical syllogism is not working. I will then try to give a very brief and incomplete sketch of how to conceive of a non-two-jobs view of (...) the Aristotelian practical syllogism. Finally, I will discuss two possible problems for the non-two-jobs view. (shrink)

Among scholars it is common to assume that Aristotle’s practical syllogism does two jobs. It is often taken to explain both animal motion and human deliberation. I will call this the “two-jobs view of the practical syllogism”. In what follows, I will argue that the two-jobs view of the practical syllogism is not working. I will then try to give a very brief and incomplete sketch of how to conceive of a non-two-jobs view of (...) the Aristotelian practical syllogism. Finally, I will discuss two possible problems for the non-two-jobs view. (shrink)

In ancient philosophy, Logic was seen as the instrument and method of philosophy. However, sometimes detailed and profound discussions have been made about the demonstrativeness of philosophical sciences. Most philosophers have accepted that the mathematical sciences were especially demonstrative and likewise, most of the natural sciences are demonstrative for them. But can metaphysics be demonstrative or not? This is one of the fundamental issues around which the great debates were made in Islamic philosophy. While these issues are known to specialists (...) in this field, we can hardly find studies and research that deal with this issue to a sufficient degree and precise discussions in our day, I mean the issue of demonstrativeness of art of demonstration, art of dialectic, art of sophistry, art of rhetoric and art of poetry. It is clear that the peripatetic philosophers did not write a separate book or treatise on the issue of the demonstrativeness of the logical arts, but we can claim that they believed that all these arts were demonstrative and that they were extracted/abstracted using the art of demonstration. We can come across important phrases and statements that prove this claim between the lines of the books that these philosophers wrote in the science of logic. And while Aristotle is the founder of the science of logic, then how is it to be understood that there are practical particular examples and some easy rules of these arts? According to their texts, we can say that they believed that the actual performance of these arts by their actors in materials by particular and practical actions differs from extracting their universal rules by abstracting them from their materials through theoretical and analytical research. For example, the poems of the great poets; Homer and al-Mutanabbi, are particular works in the matter of the art of poetry performed by poets. The books written by Aristotle and Ibn Rushd in the art of poetry contain universal rules extracted abstractly from the materials of their particular poems. As for understanding the demonstrativeness of the remaining four arts, it is easier, but how should we understand the demonstrativeness of the art of demonstration itself? It seems that the peripatetic logicians also distinguished between applying demonstrative inferences to significant materials and extracting the universal rules of the art of demonstration from these materials. These five logical arts are not particular and practical things, but they are philosophical, demonstrative, and analytical studies for the peripatetic logicians in Islam. In this paper, we will try to draw attention to the issue of the demonstrativeness of the five arts and to open a new discussion about it based on some important sentences and phrases expressed by al-Fārābī, Ibn Zur‘a, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Bājja and Ibn Rushd between the lines in their books, which they wrote in the field of logic and within different and multiple contexts. (shrink)

Aristotle says that conclusions of practical syllogisms are actions that occur εὐθύς, which is normally translated to indicate temporal immediacy. Both aspects of this—that the conclusions are actions, and that they occur immediately—seem wrong. Interpreting εὐθύς as atemporal, specifically as indicating that nothing more is needed to explain the action, makes better sense of practical syllogisms and solves the problems raised by calling their conclusions actions.

In ancient philosophy, Logic was seen as the instrument and method of philosophy. However, sometimes detailed and profound discussions have been made about the demonstrativeness of philosophical sciences. Most philosophers have accepted that the mathematical sciences were especially demonstrative and likewise, most of the natural sciences are demonstrative for them. But can metaphysics be demonstrative or not? This is one of the fundamental issues around which the great debates were made in Islamic philosophy. While these issues are known to specialists (...) in this field, we can hardly find studies and research that deal with this issue to a sufficient degree and precise discussions in our day, I mean the issue of demonstrativeness of art of demonstration, art of dialectic, art of sophistry, art of rhetoric and art of poetry. It is clear that the peripatetic philosophers did not write a separate book or treatise on the issue of the demonstrativeness of the logical arts, but we can claim that they believed that all these arts were demonstrative and that they were extracted/abstracted using the art of demonstration. We can come across important phrases and statements that prove this claim between the lines of the books that these philosophers wrote in the science of logic. And while Aristotle is the founder of the science of logic, then how is it to be understood that there are practical particular examples and some easy rules of these arts? According to their texts, we can say that they believed that the actual performance of these arts by their actors in materials by particular and practical actions differs from extracting their universal rules by abstracting them from their materials through theoretical and analytical research. For example, the poems of the great poets; Homer and al-Mutanabbi, are particular works in the matter of the art of poetry performed by poets. The books written by Aristotle and Ibn Rushd in the art of poetry contain universal rules extracted abstractly from the materials of their particular poems. As for understanding the demonstrativeness of the remaining four arts, it is easier, but how should we understand the demonstrativeness of the art of demonstration itself? It seems that the peripatetic logicians also distinguished between applying demonstrative inferences to significant materials and extracting the universal rules of the art of demonstration from these materials. These five logical arts are not particular and practical things, but they are philosophical, demonstrative, and analytical studies for the peripatetic logicians in Islam. In this paper, we will try to draw attention to the issue of the demonstrativeness of the five arts and to open a new discussion about it based on some important sentences and phrases expressed by al-Fārābī, Ibn Zur‘a, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Bājja and Ibn Rushd between the lines in their books, which they wrote in the field of logic and within different and multiple contexts. (shrink)

The philosophy of Aristotle and its impact on the process of empirical scientific inquiry has been substantial. The influence of the clarity and orderliness of his thinking, when applied to the acquisition of knowledge in nursing, can not be overstated. Traditional empirical approaches have and will continue to have an important influence on the development of nursing knowledge through nursing research. However, as nursing is primarily a practice discipline, the transition from empirical and syllogistic reasoning is problematic. Other types of (...) inquiry are essential in the application of nursing knowledge obtained by empirical scientific approaches and to understand how that knowledge can best be used in the care of patients. This paper reviews the strengths and limitations of syllogistic reasoning by applying it to a recently published study on temperature measurement in nursing. It then discusses possible ways that the empirical knowledge gained from that study and confirmed in its reasoning by logical analysis could be used in the daily care of critically ill patients. It concludes by highlighting the utility of broader approaches to knowledge development, including interpretative approaches and contemporary empiricism, as a way to bridge the gap between factual empirical knowledge and the practical application of that knowledge in everyday clinical nursing practice. (shrink)

Resumen Se sostiene que la operación general de la silogística en la Lógica cumple con un programa trazado tempranamente por Hegel, consistente en concebir la unidad de la forma racional del silogismo y el contenido absoluto de la idea como resultado de una dialéctica inmanente a la propia forma del silogismo, mediante la cual éste abandona su carácter meramente formal y alcanza su propio concepto: ser forma objetiva o racional. Para esto se acude a la sección Subjetividad de la Doctrina (...) del Concepto, procurando reconstruir los antecedentes sistemáticos del capítulo sobre el silogismo, así como la operación específica que éste realiza en vista del tránsito a la sección Objetividad. El sentido de dicha operación consiste en la superación de un exceso que, al comienzo, la necesidad de la sustancia tiene por sobre la libertad del concepto, de lo cual resulta un exceso del concepto por sobre la sustancia. Para verificar esta operación se examinan los silogismos del estar y la necesidad, concluyendo con la determinación del tipo de objeto y de conocimiento que resulta del silogismo, y con la proyección del problema a estadios ulteriores de la Lógica, en los cuales el problema avistado adquiere un cariz marcadamente práctico.In this paper I argue that the general operation of syllogistic in the Logic fulfills a philosophical program that was early outlined by Hegel. This program conceives the unity of the rational form of the syllogism and the absolute content of the idea as a result of an immanent dialectic to the syllogism's form, by which it abandons its merely formal character and attains its own concept: being an objective or rational form. For the purposes of this argument, I analyze the Subjectivity section of the Doctrine of the Concept and reconstruct the systematic background of the chapter on syllogism, as well as the specific operation it performs in view of the transit to the Objectivity section. This operation consists in overcoming a certain excess that the necessity of the substance has, first, over the freedom of the concept, which results in an excess of the concept over the substance. To clarify this operation, I examine the syllogisms of qualitative existence and necessity. Finally, I show the determination of the type of object and knowledge that results from the syllogism and explain how this problem projects to later stages of Logic, in which the analyzed problem acquires a relevant practical aspect. (shrink)

This article discusses how inference to the best explanation can be justified as a practical meta - argument. It is, firstly, justified as a practical argument insofar as accepting the best explanation as true can be shown to further a specific aim. And because this aim is a discursive one which proponents can rationally pursue in — and relative to — a complex controversy, namely maximising the robustness of one’s position, IBE can be conceived, secondly, as a meta (...) - argument. My analysis thus bears a certain analogy to Sellars ’ well - known justification of inductive reasoning ; it is based on recently developed theories of complex argumentation. (shrink)

Traditionally, syllogisms are arguments with two premises and one conclusion which are constructed by propositions of the form “All… are…” and “At least one… is…” and their respective negated versions. Unfortunately, the practical use of traditional syllogisms is quite restricted. On the one hand, the “All…” propositions are too strict, since a single counterexample suffices for falsification. On the other hand, the “At least one …” propositions are too weak, since a single example suffices for verification. The present contribution (...) studies algebraic interpretations of syllogisms with comparative quantifiers (e.g., “Most… are…”) and quantitative quantifiers (e.g., “n/m… are…”, “all, except n… are…”). This modern version of syllogistics is intended to be a more adequate framework for argumentation theory than traditional syllogistics. (shrink)

In this essay, I take on the problem of how to explain the socio-historical dimension of practical reason in Hegel. In contrast to many contemporary socio-historical readings of Hegel, I claim that a logical concept of spirit frames Hegel’s account of the historical process through which human beings have come to know their practical agency as actualized in institutional relations of mutual recognition. On my reading, Hegel conceptualizes each shape in the ‘Spirit’ chapter of his Phenomenology of Spirit (...) as syllogistically working out, practically and institutionally, how to mediate the demands of individual self-determination with the universal laws and customs of the community. At the same time, logical form doesn’t determine historical development, because the content of individuality, universality, and their mediation is earned only through historical experience. (shrink)

For Aristotle the fallacy of accident arises from mistakes about being per accidens and not from accidental predication. Mistakes in perceiving per accidens come from our judgements about being per accidens and so commit that fallacy. Practical syllogisms have the same formal structure as being and perceiving per accidens . Moreover perceiving per accidens typically provides the minor premise for the practical syllogism as it makes it possible for us to know singular propositions, especially those about substances. (...) Thus these minor premises may come about through fallacious reasoning, what today would be called reasoning via collateral information. On account of these foundations for the practical syllogism, even a person of practical wisdom will need a lot of luck to avoid mistakes. (shrink)

In Kant scholarship, the concept of maxims is discussed, for the most part, from the perspective of the universalization procedure of the Categorical Imperative. In fact, however, it has a much wider relevance. As is shown in this contribution, maxims are fundamental to Kant’s theory of action and value. Since the agent expresses her pro-attitudes, i.e., interests, preferences, and life-plans based on maxims, they figure as constitutive elements of her practical identity. After some general and historical considerations on Kant’s (...) concept of maxims, it is shown that their function in the theory of the ‘practical syllogism’ implies that maxims play an important role in considerations on the agent’s ends, goals, and purposes. Additionally, I will discuss the function of maxims in Kant’s action theory. I will defend an interpretation of the Kantian idea according to which practical deliberation can be understood based on a hierarchical order of maxims. Finally, the problem of higher-order maxims and the issue of the unity and inner consistency of maxims is debated. (shrink)

Espino and Santamaria experimentally demonstrate that, if the syllogisms in the first figure are not presented as is the usual practice, that is, separating their two premises into two different lines, but linking the two premises into one line by means of a full stop, individuals tend to draw from such premises conclusions in which the subject and the predicate are not in the customary order, but rotated. In their view, this finding is consistent with the assumptions of the mental (...) models theory. Nevertheless, in this paper, I will show that what this fact really depends on the approach that is adopted, since a framework based on formal logic also has resources to explain it, and hence can lead us to assume theses different from those proposed by Espino and Santamaria. Espino y Santamaría demuestran experimentalmente que, si los silogismos de la primera figura no son planteados como se hace tradicionalmente, esto es, separando sus dos premisas en dos líneas diferentes, sino en una sola línea uniendo las dos premisas mediante un punto seguido, los individuos tienden a deducir a partir de tales premisas conclusiones en las que el sujeto y el predicado no se encuentran en el orden habitual, sino invertidos. Desde su punto de vista, este hallazgo es consistente con los supuestos de la teoría de los modelos mentales. No obstante, en este trabajo, vamos a mostrar que lo que tal hecho significa verdaderamente depende del enfoque que se adopte, ya que un marco basado en la lógica formal también cuenta con los recursos para explicarlo y, por tanto, puede conducirnos a asumir tesis diferentes a las propuestas por Espino y Santamaría. (shrink)

In Kant scholarship, the concept of maxims is discussed, for the most part, from the perspective of the universalization procedure of the Categorical Imperative. In fact, however, it has a much wider relevance. As is shown in this contribution, maxims are fundamental to Kant’s theory of action and value. Since the agent expresses her pro-attitudes, i.e., interests, preferences, and life-plans based on maxims, they figure as constitutive elements of her practical identity. After some general and historical considerations on Kant’s (...) concept of maxims, it is shown that their function in the theory of the ‘practical syllogism’ implies that maxims play an important role in considerations on the agent’s ends, goals, and purposes. Additionally, I will discuss the function of maxims in Kant’s action theory. I will defend an interpretation of the Kantian idea according to which practical deliberation can be understood based on a hierarchical order of maxims. Finally, the problem of higher-order maxims and the issue of the unity and inner consistency of maxims is debated. (shrink)

The relation between ex falso and disjunctive syllogism, or even the justification of ex falso based on disjunctive syllogism, is an old topic in the history of logic. This old topic reappears in contemporary logic since the introduction of minimal logic by Johansson. The disjunctive syllogism seems to be part of our general non-problematic inferential practices and superficially it does not seem to be related to or to depend on our acceptance of the frequently disputable ex falso (...) rule. We know that the acceptance of the ex falso is a sufficient condition for the acceptance of the disjunctive syllogism, but the interesting question is: is the ex falso a necessary condition for the acceptance of the disjunctive syllogism? The aim of the present paper is to discuss some possible ways to define systems that combines the preservation of the disjunctive syllogism with the rejection of the ex falso. (shrink)

Although written in Japanese, 実践的三段論法について（On Practical Syllogisms）pursues a logical form of the practical syllogism.

This paper argues against the indeterminacy thesis that attempts to defeat traditional natural law by asserting that specific moral norms cannot be based on human nature. As put by Jean Porter (Nature as Reason 2005, 338): “the intelligibilities of human nature underdetermine their forms of expression, and that is why this theory does not yield a comprehensive set of determinate moral norms, compelling to all rational persons.” However, if this were so, one could adopt any morality with impunity from nature’s (...) sanctions. But I argue that nature punishes violators of the natural law in various ways. In addition, I argue that the indeterminacy thesis cannot be supported by appealing to the diversity of moral norms across the globe. Such diversity is required, for instance, both by the reliance of Thomistic natural law on the practical syllogism and by its reliance on practical reason’s ability to prescribe for the sake of the person in highly unique situations as required by Wojtyla’s Personalistic Norm and Aquinas’s norm of neighborly love. (shrink)

Ambivalence of desire and action in light of it are ordinary human engagements and yet received conceptions of desire and action deny that such action is possible. This paper contains an analysis of the possibility of fertile ambivalent compromises conjointly with a reconstruction of (Davidsonian) basic rationality and of action-desire relations. It is argued that the Aristotelian practical syllogism ought not to be conceived as paralysing the ambivalent agent. The practical syllogism makes compromise behaviour possible, including (...) compromise action in the strong sense of acting to satisfy both of one's contrary desires at once. One's action can to a certain extent fulfil both desires by not exactly satisfying either. In showing this, attitudes including desires are analysed in terms of a soft identity, according to which they are both defined by concrete interlinkages with other attitudes and actual and possible behaviour, and transcend any such connections. In particular, not only do desires have a range, but rather the relation of desire and fulfilment is such that to want something allows a wider range as to what counts as fulfilment. (shrink)

According to one version of the Causal Theory, an action is a mental or bodily event caused by an intention to act. Deliberate action requires prior planning. The practical syllogism is interpreted as a summary description of the planning process, where the conclusion reports the agent's intention. Social action differs from individual action in that only the former requires coordination of one's action with members of a group. This difference is reflected in the intention with which we act, (...) labeled 'we-intention' by Raimo Tuomela. Reports of we-intentions are the conclusions of interpersonal practical syllogisms. We-intentions differ from individual intentions both cognitively and conatively. The cognitive component of a we-intention includes a representation of the pattern of group activity into which one's action fits, as well as expectations of other's actions; the conative component includes at least one socially generated motive. These cognitive and conative components of we-intention find their explication in cognitive and motivational psychology and related fields. (shrink)

This book is a study of the role of intellect in human action as described by Thomas Aquinas. One of its primary aims is to compare the interpretation of Aristotle by Aquinas with the lines of interpretation offered in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship. The book seeks to clarify the problems involved in the appropriation of Aristotle's theory by a Christian theologian, including such topics as the practical syllogism and the problems of akrasia. Westberg argues that Aquinas was much closer (...) to Aristotle than is often recognized, and he puts forward important new interpretations of the relation of intellect and will in the stages of intention, deliberation, decision, and execution. In the concluding section of the book, he shows how this new interpretation yields fruitful insights on a range of theological topics, including sin, law, love, and the moral virtues. (shrink)

: A standard interpretation of Kantian "maxims" sees them as expressing reasons for action, implying that we cannot act without a maxim. But recent challenges to this interpretation claim that Kant viewed acting on maxims as optional. Kant's understanding of maxims derives from Christian Wolff, who regarded maxims as major premises of the practical syllogism. This supports the standard interpretation. Yet Kant also viewed commitments to maxims as essential for virtue and character development, which supports challenges to the (...) standard interpretation, and raises questions about the coherence of Kant's overall conception of the role of maxims in practical philosophy. (shrink)

This pioneer study of Aristotle's theory of deduction in early medieval Islam provides invaluable first-hand information on both the classical and the Islamic ...

This article is primarily concerned with Aristotle’s theory of the syllogistic, and the investigation of the hypothesis that logical symbolism and methodology were in these early stages of a geometrical nature; with the gradual algebraization that occurred historically being one of the main reasons that some of the earlier passages on logic may often appear enigmatic. The article begins with a brief introduction that underlines the importance of geometric thought in ancient Greek science, and continues with a short exposition of (...) Aristotle’s views and methods in regard to logic. We then offer an interpretation of syllogisms, as well as of the main proof methods that are utilized by Aristotle, in terms of diagrams that can be seen as analogous to those of Euclidean geometry; where the various proofs proceed by appropriately manipulating an initially drawn diagram, in a way parallel to constructions that occur in Euclid’s Elements. In this way, logic is presented as following, to a large degree, methodological tenets established by the practice of geometry. Finally, we present a diagrammatic decision procedure that allows one to directly read off the validity of syllogisms from a corresponding diagram, in a way such that no further manipulation of it is necessitated. (shrink)

Against recent commentators such as Annstrong, D’Arcy, Copleston, O’Connor, Bourke, and Grisez, I argue that the logic referred to by Thomas in his “Treatise on Law” should not be understood metaphorically. Instead, it involves a chain of syllogisms, beginning with the synderesis principle, followed by primary, secondary, and tertiary principles, and ends with a practical syllogism. In showing this, I attack the view that the synderesis principle, “good ought to be done and evil avoided,” is tautological. Second, I (...) show the syllogistic relation between this and the more subordinate moral principIes. Finally, I argue that the practical syllogism also involves a logical deduction, where the minor premise is a propositional attitude of perception, and the conclusion is an action which expresses a proposition. What emerges is a more precise account of how actions are related to natural law. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;The purpose of this thesis is to study the account given by Thomas Aquinas of prudentia or right practical reasoning. While there is no doubt that Aristotle's ethical doctrine was the source for St.Thomas, it is commonly thought that the spirit if not the substance of Aristotelian phronesis is altered by the Christian concepts of law, obedience to God, free will and sin. ;To assess the influence of (...) the Christian theological tradition, a short survey is made of the history of the notion of liberum arbitrium. A tendency emerges to equate free choice with 'free will', identifying the element of freedom with the will and not with the intellect. Much of the reason for this is the need to explain the psychology of sin. ;With the infusion of Aristotelian philosophy in the twelfth century, many theologians began to develop a more balanced philosophy of human action, but the voluntarist view of freedom, sin and grace was strongly defended and came to dominate, in spite of Thomas' profound explanation. ;A new account is given of the stages of the process of human action, reducing the steps from twelve to four. The basis for this is to combine cognition and volition in each stage, so that Thomas can be seen to have given more precise names to a basically Aristotelian account, although Thomas' stage of execution is a genuine contribution adding more possibilities for an explanation of akrasia. ;The heart of practical reasoning is the process of decision, and this thesis looks at all of Thomas' examples of the 'practical syllogism' to show the development of his views from his early works to the Summa Theologiae. ;Having shown how the intellect and will are closely related in each stage of practical reasoning, prudence emerges clearly as the right disposition of the intellect for deliberating, deciding and executing action. A firm basis for a new view of freedom, law and the possibilities for error is provided by Aquinas' psychology of action. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics ALFRED R. MELE COM~rNTATORS ON THr Nicomachean Ethics (NE) have long been laboring under the influence of a serious misunderstanding of one of the key terms in Aristotle's moral philosophy and theory of action. This term is prohairesis (choice), the importance of which is indicated by Aristotle's assertions that choice is the proximate efficient cause of action (NE 6. 1139a31--32) and (...) that in which "the essential elements of virtue and character" lie (NE 8. x163a2'~-23). The accepted view is that Aristotle employs two importantly different notions of choice in the NE, one on which the term refers exclusively to means or things which are pros (toward, related to)' ends and another on which it does not have this reference? This "two notion" interpretation is motivated by the following three considerations: i. Aristotle's good or virtuous agent is said (NE 2. 11o5a28-33, cf. NE 6. 1144ax8-2o ) to choose actions for their own sakes; but, according to the This paper is derived in part from a chapter of my doctoral dissertation, which was submitted to the University of Michigan in January of 1979. 1 would like to express my gratitttde to the chairman of my dissertation committee, Nicholas P. White, for his comments and criticisms on the relevant sections during the preparation of my dissertation and to theJHP's anonymous reviewers for their helpful criticisms and queries. ' It has often been pointed out that things which are pros an end are not necessarily "means," in the ordinary sense of the word. E.g., constituents of an end are pros the end, but they are not means to it. See, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6, trans. Leonard H. G. Greenwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19o9), pp. 46-47, 53ff.: and John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 1o-22. ' Among the many proponents of this "two notion" interpretation are William D. Ross and Donald J. Allan. See Ross, Aristotle, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, t953), p. 2oo. See Allan, The Philosophy of Aristotle, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 197o), p. 132; idem, "Aristotle 's Account of the Origin of Moral Principles," Xlth International Congress of Philosophy 12 (1953):124; idem, "The Practical Syllogism," in Autour d'Aristote, Studies for A. Mansion (Louvain : Publications Universitaires, 1955). Richard Sorabji, in "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 l t973-74]:t t6), says that he has noticed sixteen commentators who take this view. [4o5] 406 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY so-called formal account of prohairesis (NE 3. 2-3, 6. 2), the object of choice is what has been decided upon by deliberation (bouleuais), and what is decided upon by deliberation is a "means" to an end. 2. Aristotle says that choice is "closely bound up with virtue" and "discriminates characters better than actions do" (1 1t lb5; cf. t i lob3t, 1117a 5, 1163a22, 1t64bi); but commentators argue that these claims about choice are false unless choice is "of ends." 3. Though Aristotle holds that the impetuous akrat~s (incontinent agent) does not deliberate (e.g., t 152a 18-19), he says that the akrat~s' choice is good (1152ax5--17; cf. l l51a5-- 7, 29--32); and this appears to contradict his position in Book 3 that the object of choice is what is decided upon by deliberation, s In this paper I shall show that only one (philosophically significant) notion ofprohairesis is employed in the NE, namely, the notion developed in the "formal account" of deliberation and choice (3- 2-3, 6. 2), according to which choice is specifically of things which are pros ends. This point has several interesting applications. For example, it makes it easier to find in Aristotle (as I shall briefly explain) a comprehensive theory of practical reasoning or inference rather than several unconnected accounts of what practical inference is like in different types of cases; and it is helpful in clarifying what is involved in the evaluation of character on Aristotle's view (see Sec. ~). However, though I do think that the main point to be made... (shrink)

ABSTRACT:In response to criticism of empirical or “positive” approaches to corporate social responsibility (CSR), we defend the importance of these approaches for any CSR theory that seeks to have practical impact. Although we acknowledge limitations to positive approaches, we unpack the neglected but crucial relationships between positive knowledge on the one hand and normative knowledge on the other in the implementation of CSR principles. Using the structure of a practical syllogism, we construct a model that displays the (...) key role of empirical knowledge in fulfilling a firm’s responsibility to society, paying special attention to the implications of the “ought implies can” dictum. We also defend the importance of one particular class of empirical claims; namely, claims from the field of economics. Even positive economic theory, which is often criticized for endorsing profits rather than values, can cooperate in intriguing ways with non-economic concepts in the implementation of CSR goals. (shrink)

The article presents a proposal of explanation what practical rationality is, how it works and what are its criteria. In order to define practical rationality, the author starts from the general characteristics of reason, and then in the realm or reason activity distinguishes practical rationality from theoretical rationality. The necessary conditions of practical rationality are presented, as well as its standing between freedom and values. Next, the sources and nature of practical reasons are characterized, as (...) well as their relation to values and desires. The problem of practical syllogism is briefly commented on. In the final part of the article the author proposes five criteria of practical rationality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:276 THE WILL AS IMPRESSION Hume writes, in the Treatise: Let no one, therefore, put an invidious construction on my words, by saying simply, that I assert the necessity of human actions, and place them on the same footing with the operations of senseless matter. I do not ascribe to the will that unintelligible necessity, which is suppos'd to lie in matter. But I ascribe to matter, that intelligible (...) quality, call it necessity or not, which the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to belong to the will. I^ change, therefore, nothing in the receiv'd systems, with regard to the will, but only with regard to material objects. It is surely false that Hume changed "nothing in the receiv'd systems, with regard to the will." In one such "receiv'd system," that of Thomas Aquinas, the concept of will or volition is presented as internally related to two further concepts: that of the "final cause" or goal of the action, and that of "practical intellect," a form of cognition which is productive of its object. Will is always the will to something, a goal to be reached or a product to be produced. Thus will and final cause are concepts which presuppose one another. The mark, however, of the fact that someone wills to do something, i.e., that s/he in fact has some goal, is precisely that that agent knows, non-inductively and without observation, what s/he is doing or will do. The basis of this knowledge is neither evidence nor proof, but rather what Aristotle called "the practical syllogism." We will ask below what it means to describe the relationships among will, final cause, and practical knowledge as 'internal.' 277 The question to be explored here is this: what in fact becomes of the 'receiv'd concept of will' when one contends, in the empiricist spirit common to both Locke and Hume, that all of our knowledge about matters of fact is based on observation and induction? The answer to this question will turn out to be that, in the absence of a notion of "practical knowledge," the concept of final cause becomes unintelligible (since the final cause is precisely the object of practical knowledge); and thus the notion of will must be reconstrued, for Hume as an impression. As an impression it is a brute given, one that is furthermore mute (or lacking in propositional content). Hume views volition as an event, that object of inner experience which is the (Humean) cause of our voluntary actions. In what follows I shall first of all sketch Thomas Aquinas' view of the will (section I), following this with a discussion of the important hybrid view in Locke's Essay, where older notions of volition are presented within an incompatible epistemological framework. In section III we look at Hume's sharp response to Locke, and in section IV at his own doctrine of the will as impression. In the final section I attempt to distinguish two strands of causality in Hume's philosophy of human action, drawing at the same time a moral for the contemporary dispute about reasons and causes. One of the most fully developed of the "receiv'd systems with regard to the will" was that of St. Thomas Aquinas, who combined Neo-Platonist, Patristic, and Aristotelian sources into an 2 impressive and influential synthesis. Thomas' 278 doctrine on the will is guided by a Grand Analogy, one inspired by the Creation story in Genesis. He writes, at the beginning of the second main part of his Summa : Man is made to God's image, and since this implies... that he is intelligent and free to judge and master of himself, so then, now that we have agreed [in part one of the Summa] that God is the exemplar cause of things and that they issue from his power through his will, we go on to look at this image, that is to say, at man as the source of actions which are his own and fall under his responsibility and control. The analogy is this: God, the Divine Craf tsperson, is to the Creation as human agents are to their... (shrink)

There is a tension between deliberation and desire when both are relevant to explaining the same action. A common way of understanding this situation, as contained in a standard version of the practical syllogism, is problematic. This paper attempts to resolve the tension by explaining what 'motivation by what one wants' comes to when deliberation is involved.