The article describes the problematic spots of the court system ordained by the temporary law during the inter-war period in Lithuania and the prolonged attempts of the authority to transform it into the permanent one. It demonstrates that there has been a constant involvement in this situation among the authority representatives and the institutions until the issue of the Judiciary Act in 1933. The new legislation has been prepared, even though not all of it has been implemented. The first legislation (...) on judiciary of an independent Lithuania was enacted in 1918 as the Temporary Act on Lithuanian Courts and their Operation. It acknowledged the weak spots such as the procedure for assigning peace judges, no provision for cassation, elimination of jury as well as no limitations of guarantees during assignment and dismissal of judges, etc. Current imperfections resulted from lack of knowledge and no possibility to have an election as well as the limited financial potential of the state. It has been intended to solve these problems in the near future. The legal regulation of the fundamental points on court organization and operation, that lacked in the Temporary Judiciary Act, has been supported by the provisions incorporated into the Constitution of Lithuania of 1922. The distinct laws have let the colegially operating courts to temporary incorporate the advocate under oath as a member of the judicial board. Also, considerably transcendent salaries of the court official workers as compared to other civil servants has been established. The bill ascertaining the court system and their operation has finally been drawn and hereafter for several years it has been refined by various legal institutions and experts. This situation ended with enactment of the new Judiciary Act in 1933. Although it retained the assignment of judges and finally eliminated the institution of the jury, it solved the majority of questions related to the court organization and operation that had not been regulated by law before. (shrink)

The aim of the present article is to explain the role of the judiciary in forming the family policy in Lithuania. For this purpose in the first part of the article the legal basis for the state family policy formation is discussed. The conclusion is drawn that the judiciary is not separated from the formation of the family policy by any constitutional means. The article further describes how this function is actually implemented by the judiciary. The actual influence of the (...) judiciary is demonstrated by an analysis of the Lithuanian case law in three different areas: dissolution of marriage, child maintenance and the protection of the rights of children born outside marriage. The results of the analysis suggest that the influence of the judiciary on the state family policy works in diverse ways: when filling in legal gaps overlooked by the legislator; determining specific criteria which are important to the state family policy (while the legislator has determined only general principles); introducing international human rights standards in the national legal system, etc. One of the most controversial ways for the case law to influence the state family policy is through the modification of the legal regulation models prescribed by the laws. (shrink)

The very idea of the draft European Union (EU) Constitutional Treaty was reexamined after the failed French and Dutch referendums and the Treaty of Lisbon (also known as the Reform Treaty) was drafted and entered into force on 1 December 2009 after it’s ratification by all 27 member states. The traditional notion of a Constitution as a national legal document establishing the social contract and a moral minimum for a particular socially unified group still prevails in legal and political thinking. (...) Indeed, the European Union has some constitutional elements, but absence of the so called ‘European demos’ prevents us from recognizing the founding treaties as a real ‘European constitution’ in the proper sense of the word. The author agrees with the decision to exclude the term ‘Constitution’ from the title and contents of the new Reform Treaty. The author also suggests that softer terms, like ‘European constitutional order’ and ‘European Constitutionalism’ might better reflect the scope of contemporary European integration than the term of ‘a Constitution for Europe’. A rethinking of the ‘constitutional core’ of the Lisbon Treaty was inspired following the so-called Lisbon judgments of Czech, Latvian and German constitutional courts. (shrink)

The article deals with the concept of the court’s fault in the action for damages against a state suffered due to infringement of European Union law. The author searches for the right position of the criterion in the system of the conditions of state liability and discusses whether European Union law establishes a uniform standard of fault, or at least the guidance on the application of the criterion that would enable uniform national judicial practices concerning state liability for the infringements (...) attributable to the courts of last instance. The article also analyses national legal regulation and jurisprudence of several Member States such as France, Belgium and Italy, providing the definitions of different forms of fault and (or) examples of their practical implementation. (shrink)

This essay deals with conditions, challenges and perspectives concerning the legal system of the European Union after the Lisbon treaty has entered into force. It starts out by recalling constitutional principles such as primacy, direct effect and consistent interpretation of the European legal order on the one hand and the relationship of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts – notably pointing out the importance of the preliminary procedure (Article 267 TFEU) – on the other hand. In addition, (...) characteristics of the legal system of the European Union such as the integration of national legal systems are highlighted. It is accentuated that the legal community of the European Union depends on the acceptance by all 27 Member States. Furthermore, the normative quality of European law-making is discussed as well as the necessity for a sufficient democratic legitimation of European Law. As impressively illustrated by the financial crisis, the European Union is much better equipped with possibilities to effectively fulfil regulatory tasks than any Member State. The author shows developments with regard to European Union citizenship, non-discrimination, the Charter of Fundamental Rights - that is now equipped with binding character – and the vertical distribution of competences between the European Union and the Member States, including explanations relating to subsidiarity requirements and their judicial review. Moreover, challenges to the institutions of the European Union are discussed. (shrink)