Článok analyzuje antropologicko-existencialistickú a etickú koncepciu človeka v diele F. M. Dostojevského a jej aktuálnosť v súčasnosti. Chce ukázať, že Dostojevského človek je zložitou, vnútorne protirečivou bytosťou, v ktorej sú nerozlučne spojené dobro a zlo, sebaobetavosť s egoizmom, čistota so zlomyseľnosťou. Je tiež pokusom o vymedzenie princípu etickej zodpovednosti a zmyslu života ako kľúčových princípov etiky Dostojevského.This article analyzes the anthropological - existential and ethical concept of man in the work of F. M. Dostoyevsky and its currentness. It aims to (...) show that Dostoyevsky’s man is a complicated and internally ambivalent being, in which good and evil, selfishness and self-sacrifice, purity and mischievousness are inextricably connected. It also attempts to define the principle of ethical responsibility and meaning of life as key elements of Dostoyevsky's ethics. (shrink)

How do the pictures Wittgenstein and his relatives took during his life relate to his philosophical work? The exhibition at the Leopold Museum in Vienna in 2021 demonstrated a complex network of resemblances, overlaps, and cross-references between Wittgenstein’s way of working and the pictures he collected. In this essay, the network is used as an example to argue that a combination of philosophy and artistic sensibility might be a fruitful enrichment for a philosophical practise.

The book is mainly concerned with the problem of the logical analysis of hypothetical (conditional) statements.

Book review:Galilei, Galileo. Prubíř. Translation by Markéta Ledvoňová and Jana Malá. Edited and commented by Markéta Ledvoňová, Daniel Špelda, and Vladimír Štefl. Praha: Togga, 2020. 354 pages.

Scholarly attempts to analyze the history of science sometime suffer from an imprecise use of terms. In order to understand accurately how science has developed and from where it draws its roots, researchers should be careful to recognize that epistemic regimes change over time and acceptable forms of knowledge production are contingent upon the hegemonic discourse informing the epistemic regime of any given period. In order to understand the importance of this point, I apply the techniques of historical epistemology to (...) an analysis of the place of the study of astrology in the medieval and early modern periods alongside a discussion of the “language games” of these period as well as the role of the “archeology of knowledge” in uncovering meaning in our study of the past. In sum, I argue that the term “science” should never be used when studying approaches to knowledge formation prior to the seventeenth century. (shrink)