In providing a good foundation for mathematics, set theorists often aim to develop the strongest theories possible and avoid those theories that place undue restrictions on the capacity to possess strength. For example, adding a measurable cardinal to $ZFC$ is thought to give a stronger theory than adding $V=L$ and the latter is thought to be more restrictive than the former. The two main proponents of this style of account are Penelope Maddy and John Steel. In this paper, (...) I’ll offer a third account that is intended to provide a simple analysis of restrictiveness based on the algebraic concept of retraction in the category of theories. I will also deliver some results and arguments that suggest some plausible alternative approaches to analyzing restrictiveness do not live up to their intuitive motivation. (shrink)

An original, theoretical work on cross-linguistic word order from a leading syntactician.

Normal 0 21 false false false ES X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} The main aim of this paper is to argue on behalf of instrumentalism in the philosophy of physics. Following Theo Kuipers’ terminology of domain extension and domain restriction I claim, contradicting him, that the methodology of domain (...) revision can only support an antirealist approach to the theory of physics. The existence of both extensions and restrictions of the application domain of theoretical models and the theoretical incompatibility between successive theories provide respectively with minor and major arguments for instrumentalism in physics. (shrink)

The ideas of fixed points (Kripke in Recent essays on truth and the liar paradox. Clarendon Press, London, pp 53–81, 1975; Martin and Woodruff in Recent essays on truth and the liar paradox. Clarendon Press, London, pp 47–51, 1984) and revision sequences (Gupta and Belnap in The revision theory of truth. MIT, London, 1993; Gupta in The Blackwell guide to philosophical logic. Blackwell, London, pp 90–114, 2001) have been exploited to provide solutions to the semantic paradox and have achieved (...) admirable success. This happy situation naturally encourages one to look for other philosophical areas of their further applications where paradoxical results seem to follow from intuitively acceptable principles. In this paper, I propose to extend the use of these ideas to give two new treatments of abstract objects. Sections 1 and 2 below check several abstractionist theories and their main defects. Section 3 shows how the two ideas can be applied to generate consistent theories of abstract objects without any ad hoc restriction on any principle. (shrink)

The still unsettled decision problem for the restricted purely universal formulae 0-formulae) of the first order set-theoretic language based over =, ∈ is discussed in relation with the adoption or rejection of the axiom of foundation. Assuming the axiom of foundation, the related finite set-satisfiability problem for the very significant subclass of the 0-formulae consisting of the formulae involving only nested variables of level 1 is proved to be semidecidable on the ground of a reflection property over the hereditarily finite (...) sets, and various extensions of this result are obtained. When variables are restricted to range only over sets, in universes with infinitely many urelements the set-satisfiability problem is shown to be solvable provided the axiom of foundation is assumed; if it is not, then the decidability of a related derivability problem still holds. That, in turn, suggests the alternative adoption of an antifoundation axiom under which the set-satisfiability problem is also solvable . Turning to set theory without urelements, assuming a form of Boffa's antifoundation axiom, the complement of the set-satisfiability problem for the full class of Δ0-formulae is shown to be semidecidable; a result that is known not to hold, for the set-satisfiability problem itself, even for a very restricted subclass of the Δ0-formulae. (shrink)

The formalism of general probabilistic theories provides a universal paradigm that is suitable for describing various physical systems including classical and quantum ones as particular cases. Contrary to the usual no-restriction hypothesis, the set of accessible meters within a given theory can be limited for different reasons, and this raises a question of what restrictions on meters are operationally relevant. We argue that all operational restrictions must be closed under simulation, where the simulation scheme involves mixing and classical post-processing (...) of meters. We distinguish three classes of such operational restrictions: restrictions on meters originating from restrictions on effects; restrictions on meters that do not restrict the set of effects in any way; and all other restrictions. We fully characterize the first class of restrictions and discuss its connection to convex effect subalgebras. We show that the restrictions belonging to the second class can impose severe physical limitations despite the fact that all effects are accessible, which takes place, e.g., in the unambiguous discrimination of pure quantum states via effectively dichotomic meters. We further demonstrate that there are physically meaningful restrictions that fall into the third class. The presented study of operational restrictions provides a better understanding on how accessible measurements modify general probabilistic theories and quantum theory in particular. (shrink)

It is often possible to know what a speaker intends to communicate without knowing what they intend to say. In such cases, speakers need not intend to say anything at all. Stanley and Szabó's influential survey of possible analysis of quantifier domain restriction is, therefore, incomplete and the arguments made by Clapp and Buchanan against Truth Conditional Compositionality and propositional speaker-meaning are flawed. Two theories should not always be viewed as incompatible when they associate the same utterance with different propositions, (...) as there may be many ways to interpret speakers that are compatible with their intentions. (shrink)

Orthorexia Nervosa has gained increased attention in academia since 1997. However, like other “Exia” conditions, there is debate around its inclusion in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. This study aimed to examine the experiences of those following a diet indicative of ON in the United Kingdom. This information is essential to the development of diagnostic criteria and classification of ON. Behavioural Reasoning Theory was used to explore reasons contributing to the development of ON. Ten individuals, aged (...) 23–35 years, took part in semi-structured interviews. Inductive thematic analysis was used to analyse the results. Four themes emerged from the data—journey, social, rules/control, and ethical considerations which highlighted contributing factors to the development of ON behaviours, the impact of these behaviours on individuals' social lives, and a strive for control. These findings are the first to suggest that ON involves a more complex set of behaviours than current definitions and proposed diagnostic criteria suggest and highlight the need to consider a variety of reasons for restricted diet when developing diagnostic criteria, screening tools, and classification in the DSM. (shrink)

We show that the ordered field of real numbers with restricted $\mathbb{R}_{\mathscr{H}}$-definable analytic functions admits quantifier elimination if we add a function symbol $^{-1}$ for the function $x\mapsto \frac{1}{x}$ (with $0^{-1}=0$ by convention), where $\mathbb{R}_{\mathscr{H}}$ is the real field augmented by the functions in the family $\mathscr{H}$ of restricted parts (real and imaginary) of holomorphic functions which satisfies certain conditions. Further, with another condition on $\mathscr{H}$ we show that the structure ($\mathbb{R}_{\mathscr{H}}$, constants) is strongly model complete.

The naive set theory problem is to begin with a full comprehension axiom, and to find a logic strong enough to prove theorems, but weak enough not to prove everything. This paper considers the sub-problem of expressing extensional identity and the subset relation in paraconsistent, relevant solutions, in light of a recent proposal from Beall, Brady, Hazen, Priest and Restall [4]. The main result is that the proposal, in the context of an independently motivated formalization of naive set (...) class='Hi'>theory, leads to triviality. (shrink)

We show here that the first order theory of the positive integers equipped with multiplication remains decidable when one adds to the language the usual order restricted to the prime numbers. We see moreover that the complexity of the latter theory is a tower of exponentials, of height O(n).

Classical generalized quantifier (GQ) theory posits that quantificational determiners (Q-dets) combine with a nominal argument of type et, a first order predicate, to form a GQ. In a recent paper, Matthewson (2001) challenges this position by arguing that the domain of a Q-det is not of type et, but e, an entity. In this paper, I defend the classical GQ view, and argue that the data that motivated Matthewson’s revision actually suggest that the domain set can, and indeed in (...) certain languages must, be contextually restricted overtly. (shrink)

Realist theories about fictional entities must explain the fact that, in ordinary contexts people deny, apparently in all seriousness, that there are such things as the Big Bad Wolf and Santa Claus. The usual explanation treats these denials as involving restricted quantification: The speaker is said to be denying only that the Big Bad Wolf and Santa Claus are to be found among real or actual things, not that there are no such things at all. This is unconvincing. The denials (...) may just as naturally be phrased as “The Big Bad Wolf and Santa Claus don't exist”, and claims of nonexistence seem not to admit of interpretations corresponding to statements of restricted quantification. Ordinary denials of the existence of fictional entities constitute a severe difficulty for realist theories. (shrink)

Maddy gave a semi-formal account of restrictiveness by defining a formal notion based on a class of interpretations and explaining how to handle false positives and false negatives. Recently, Hamkins pointed out some structural issues with Maddy's definition. We look at Maddy's formal definitions from the point of view of an abstract interpretation relation. We consider various candidates for this interpretation relation, including one that is close to Maddy's original notion, but fixes the issues raised by Hamkins. Our work brings (...) to light additional structural issues that we also discuss. (shrink)

This thesis presents a proof theoretical investigation of some constructive set theories with restricted set induction. The set theories considered are various systems of Constructive Zermelo Fraenkel set theory, CZF ([1]), in which the schema of $\in$ - Induction is either removed or weakened. We shall examine the theories $CZF^\Sigma_\omega$ and $CZF_\omega$, in which the $\in$ - Induction scheme is replaced by a scheme of induction on the natural numbers (only for  formulas in the case of the first (...) theory, for arbitrary formulas in the second theory). Of particular interest is the system CZF− + INAC, which is obtained by removing $\in$ - Induction and by adding an axiom, INAC, for inaccessible sets. The main outcome is that CZF− + INAC is a predicative set theory with inaccessible sets, its proof theoretic ordinal being $\Gamma_0$. The proof theoretic strength of these theories, has been determined by means of proof theoretical reductions. The upper bounds have been obtained by interpreting the set theories in classical theories of (iterated) inductive definitions with ordinals. A significant feature of these interpretations is that they are realizability interpretations, which make an indirect use of Aczel’s interpretation of CZF in Martin Löf type theory, and, in the case of CZF− + INAC, also employ a maximum bisimulation relation to represent equality between sets. The lower bounds are obtained by interpreting appropriate subsystems of intuitionistic second order arithmetic in the set theories. At the conclusion of the thesis we present work unrelated to the previous chapters. It is a preliminary study of the constructible hierarchy in CZF. We begin by formalizing the notion of definability in constructive set theory and then introduce Gödel’s L in CZF. We prove that intuitionistic L is a model of a subsystem of CZF strong enough to include intuitionistic Kripke-Platek set theory, and also that L is a model of the axiom of constructibility, provably in CZF. (shrink)

Relevance logic has become ontologically fertile. No longer is the idea of relevance restricted in its application to purely logical relations among propositions, for as Dunn has shown in his (1987), it is possible to extend the idea in such a way that we can distinguish also between relevant and irrelevant predications, as for example between “Reagan is tall” and “Reagan is such that Socrates is wise”. Dunn shows that we can exploit certain special properties of identity within the context (...) of standard relevance logic in a way which allows us to discriminate further between relevant and irrelevant properties, as also between relevant and irrelevant relations. The idea yields a family of ontologically interesting results concerning the different ways in which attributes and objects may hang together. Because of certain notorious peculiarities of relevance logic, however,1 Dunn’s idea breaks down where the attempt is made to have it bear fruit in application to relations among entities which are of homogeneous type. (shrink)

Two theories of implicit domain restriction have gained considerable prominence over the last two decades. According to von Fintel (Restrictions on quantifier domaines, Ph.D. thesis, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1994), quantifiers come with covert restrictors and, as a result of this, induce domain restriction; according to Stanley [in Gerhard and Peter (eds) Logical form and language, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002; Stanley and Szabó (Mind Lang 15(2–3):2192–2161, 2000)], by contrast, nouns, as opposed to quantifiers, come with covert restrictors. In this (...) article, I do three things. First, I assess the arguments that have been given for and against these two accounts and show that none of them is conclusive. Second, I advance a novel empirical argument based on the observed pragmatic behaviour of bare nouns, an argument that falsifies Stanley’s theory while providing clear evidence in support of von Fintel’s (1994). Finally, I discuss the relevance of the bare noun data in the context of another important debate—namely, whether domain restriction is a local mechanism only, or whether it can also be achieved by global means. (shrink)

This paper investigates how naive theories of truth fare with respect to a set of extremely plausible principles of restricted quantification. It is first shown that both nonsubstructural theories as well as certain substructural theories cannot validate all those principles. Then, pursuing further an approach to the semantic paradoxes that the author has defended elsewhere, the theory of restricted quantification available in a specific naive theory that rejects the structural property of contraction is explored. It is shown that (...) the theory validates all the principles in question, and it is argued that other prima facie plausible principles that the theory fails to validate are objectionable on independent grounds. (shrink)

Let's suppose you think that there are no uncountable sets. Have you adopted a restrictive position? It is certainly tempting to say yes---you've prohibited the existence of certain kinds of large set. This paper argues that this intuition can be challenged. Instead, I argue that there are some considerations based on a formal notion of restrictiveness which suggest that it is restrictive to hold that there are uncountable sets.

Procedural theories of practical reasoning provide rules according to which agents' reasons for action are constructed. Those procedures operate on some given input (an agent's desires, other mental states, and circumstances) to the reasoning process in a way that determines the output of an agent's reasons for action. I argue that a procedural theory of practical reasoning must include a previously unrecognized normative restriction on what counts as acceptable input, roughly, that agents should take features of their own, but (...) not others', selves as input. Using Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity as a case study, I show that common features of procedural theories result in a threat to each person's view of themselves as practically distinct from others. I then show that psychological claims are insufficient to defeat this threat, and that maintaining a practical distinction between ourselves and others requires a normative restriction on the input to practical reflection. (shrink)

I here settle a recent dispute between two rival theories in distributive ethics: Restricted Prioritarianism and the Competing Claims View. Both views mandate that the distribution of benefits and burdens between individuals should be justifiable to each affected party in a way that depends on the strength of each individual’s separately assessed claim to receive a benefit. However, they disagree about what elements constitute the strength of those individuals’ claims. According to restricted prioritarianism, the strength of a claim is determined (...) in ‘prioritarian’ fashion by both what she stands to gain and her absolute level of well-being, while, according to the competing claims view, the strength of a claim is also partly determined by her level of well-being relative to others with conflicting interests. I argue that, suitably modified, the competing claims view is more plausible than restricted prioritarianism. (shrink)

Abstract -/- Quantifier domain restriction (QDR) and two versions of nominal restriction (NR) are implemented as restrictions that depend on a previously introduced interpreter and interpretation time in a two-dimensional semantic framework on the basis of simple type theory and categorial grammar. Against Stanley (2002) it is argued that a suitable version of QDR can deal with superlatives like tallest. However, it is shown that NR is needed to account for utterances when the speaker intends to convey different restrictions (...) for multiple uses of the same quantifying determiner. We argue that NR generally fares better with such examples but also observe that examples like Every sailor waves at every sailor might be pragmatically anomalous. An account of contextual domain restriction is proposed that (i) excludes these anomalous readings (but it is shown how they could be included), (ii) makes it possible to express different contextual domain restrictions as long-range dependencies on an interpreter and an interpretation time, and (iii) additionally models restrictions based on locative constructions as general mereological constraints introduced by shifting the index. (shrink)

This dissertation investigates the ways in which natural language restricts the domains of quantifiers. Adverbs of quantification are analyzed as quantifying over situations. The domain of quantifiers is pragmatically constrained: apparent processes of "semantic partition" are treated as pragmatic epiphenomena. The introductory Chapter 1 sketches some of the background of work on natural language quantification and begins the analysis of adverbial quantification over situations. Chapter 2 develops the central picture of "semantic partition" as a side-effect of pragmatic processes of anaphora (...) resolution. I argue that the apparent effects of topic/focus articulation and presuppositional information on the interpretation of quantifiers are not the result of a direct and local mechanism of sentence grammar. Instead, I develop an analysis where the link is established via the anaphoric dependence of quantifier domains on the discourse context. Chapter 3 discusses the analysis of conditional clauses as quantifier restrictors, concentrating on the question whether conditional clauses restrict quantifiers directly or indirectly. A treatment is explored which has if-clauses constrain the value of the hidden domain variable of the restricted quantifier. Chapter 4, on unless-clauses, and Chapter 5, on only if- and even if-clauses, present some issues in the compositional analysis of complex conditional clauses. These chapters significantly expand the data coverage of the theory of A-quantification. Building on previous work of mine on exceptives, I analyze unless-clauses as exceptive operators on A-quantifiers. The analysis of only if-clauses, treated as conditional clauses that combine if with the focus adverb only, unearthes some interesting new properties. Chapter 6, finally, examines the phenomenon of donkey-anaphora in the light of the results of the previous chapters. I show that a solution to the proportion problem may become possible once we combine the situation-semantic approach to adverbial quantification with the pragmatic theory developed in Chapter 2 and further elaborated in the analysis of donkey anaphora in complex conditionals. (shrink)

This paper investigates the meaning of restricted quantification when the embedded conditional is taken as the conditional of some first-order connexive logics. The study is carried out by checking the suitability of RQ for defining a connexive class theory, in analogy to the definition of Boolean class theory by using RQ in classical logic. Negative results are obtained for Wansing’s first-order connexive logic QC and one variant of Priest’s first-order connexive logic QP. A positive result is obtained for (...) another variant of QP. (shrink)

Prepaid service is not only a financial tool, but also a common promotion mode in tourism and hospitality. Due to the limited resources of the enterprise, the enterprise needs to reasonably allocate the promotion resources to maximize the effectiveness of the promotion. As two common promotion purchase restrictions, limited-time promotion and limited-quantity promotion how to interact with prepaid services in the form of discounts or freebies to enhance consumers’ willingness to share is the focus of this study. This study carried (...) out three experiments based on framing effect theory, stimulus-organism-response theory, and social capital theory, which has found that the prepaid service mode moderates the relationship between promotion purchase restrictions and consumers’ willingness to share. When the prepaid service mode is a discount type, the limited-quantity promotion can generate higher sharing willingness than the limited-time promotion, and the perceived scarcity plays a mediating role. When the prepaid service mode is a freebie type, the limited-time promotion can generate higher sharing willingness than the limited-quantity promotion, and the perceived certainty of opportunity plays a mediating role. (shrink)

Spinoza's causal axiom is at the foundation of the Ethics. I motivate, develop and defend a new interpretation that I call the ‘causally restricted interpretation’. This interpretation solves several longstanding puzzles and helps us better understand Spinoza's arguments for some of his most famous doctrines, including his parallelism doctrine and his theory of sense perception. It also undermines a widespread view about the relationship between the three fundamental, undefined notions in Spinoza's metaphysics: causation, conception and inherence.

We introduce a restricted second-order logic $\textrm{SO}^{\textit{plog}}$ for finite structures where second-order quantification ranges over relations of size at most poly-logarithmic in the size of the structure. We demonstrate the relevance of this logic and complexity class by several problems in database theory. We then prove a Fagin’s style theorem showing that the Boolean queries which can be expressed in the existential fragment of $\textrm{SO}^{\textit{plog}}$ correspond exactly to the class of decision problems that can be computed by a non-deterministic (...) Turing machine with random access to the input in time $O^k)$ for some $k \ge 0$, i.e. to the class of problems computable in non-deterministic poly-logarithmic time. It should be noted that unlike Fagin’s theorem which proves that the existential fragment of second-order logic captures NP over arbitrary finite structures, our result only holds over ordered finite structures, since $\textrm{SO}^{\textit{plog}}$ is too weak as to define a total order of the domain. Nevertheless, $\textrm{SO}^{\textit{plog}}$ provides natural levels of expressibility within poly-logarithmic space in a way which is closely related to how second-order logic provides natural levels of expressibility within polynomial space. Indeed, we show an exact correspondence between the quantifier prefix classes of $\textrm{SO}^{\textit{plog}}$ and the levels of the non-deterministic poly-logarithmic time hierarchy, analogous to the correspondence between the quantifier prefix classes of second-order logic and the polynomial-time hierarchy. Our work closely relates to the constant depth quasipolynomial size AND/OR circuits and corresponding restricted second-order logic defined by David A. Mix Barrington in 1992. We explore this relationship in detail. (shrink)

We show a faithful restriction theorem among infinite chains which implies a reconstructibility conjecture of Halin. This incite us to study the reconstructibility in the sense of Fraïssé and to prove it for orders of cardinality infinite or ≥ 3 and for multirelations of cardinality infinite or ≥ 7, what improves the theory obtained by G. Lopez in the finite case. For this work we had to study the infinite classes of difference which have to be a linear order (...) of type ω, ω* or ω* + ω; this complete the theory made by G. Lopez for the finite case . We show also Ulam-reconstructibility for linear orders which have a fixed point. (shrink)

I develop and defend a novel answer to Peter van Inwagen’s ‘Special Composition Question,’ (SCQ) namely, under what conditions do some things compose and object? My answer is that things will compose an object when and only when they exist simultaneously relative to a reference frame (I call this ‘Temporally Restricted Composition’ or TREC). I then show how this view wards off objections given to ‘Unrestricted Mereology’ (UM). TREC, unlike other theories of Restricted Composition, does not fall prey to worries (...) about vagueness, anthropocentrism, or arbitrariness. TREC also has advantages over all the other answers to the SCQ. TREC is an account an A-theorist anti-Eternalist who wants an unrestricted mereology should accept. I also engage in some conceptual hygiene by showing how UM, as it should be used, should not, in itself, entail or contain a commitment to either Eternalism or Four-Dimensionalism. (shrink)

This essay examines prominent New Confucian Mou Zongsan’s account of Confucian democracy by focusing on his key notion of “self-restriction.” According to Mou, true sage-kings would willingly respect ordinary people’s individual endeavors in the political realm and endorse democracy as a form of government. This move of self-restriction then aligns Confucianism with democracy in a way that fundamentally restructures traditional Confucian rulership. I make contributions on two fronts. First, I offer a reading of Mou’s self-restriction different from existing ones that (...) can help to disambiguate many aspects of Mou’s political thought. Second, what is often left out of existing discussion on Mou is the narrative of political myth and distinctive personality types associated with it. For Mou, political leadership’s impetus for transcending rule-based order and the people’s aspirations for the “superman” run deep and lie in the lasting appeal of political myth. Invoking Nietzsche, I discuss the sense in which transforming traditional rulership is not only a question of ought—why Confucians ought to adopt self-restriction—but a question of how it is possible for self-restriction to fulfill its mission. Commentators on his thought have so far largely glossed over this second aspect of Mou’s thought, thereby selling short the complexity of the idea of self-restriction. My key argument is that Mou’s self-restriction shows an effort to revamp the superman’s politics of the extraordinary into a politics of the ordinary. (shrink)

Dietary restriction (DR) is the most consistent environmental manipulation to extend lifespan. Originally thought to be caused by a reduction in caloric intake, recent evidence suggests that macronutrient intake underpins the effect of DR. The prevailing evolutionary explanations for the DR response are conceptualized under the caloric restriction paradigm, necessitating reconsideration of how or whether these evolutionary explanations fit this macronutrient perspective. In the authors’ opinion, none of the current evolutionary explanations of DR adequately explain the intricacies of observed results; (...) instead a context‐dependent combination of these theories is suggested which is likely to reflect reality. In reviewing the field, it is proposed that the ability to track the destination of different macronutrients within the body will be key to establishing the relative roles of the competing theories. Understanding the evolution of the DR response and its ecological relevance is critical to understanding variation in DR responses and their relevance outside laboratory environments. (shrink)

The paper begins with the prerequisite assumption that social deprivation is a fragile and porous category. Thus, our hypothesis is, that how people are affected by the restrictions against the spreading of the coronavirus is often discussed in far too general and simplistic terms. It is often taken as a given, that the virus and the restriction measures not only have caused severe difficulties for us all (due to social distancing, fear, affected health, etc.), but that the measures have exacerbated (...) already previously existing forms of social deprivation. Therefore, it is assumed that marginalized groups are particularly affected by these effects of the pandemic. Two major German studies show the alleged effects of the relevant measures on adolescents and emerging adults (COPSY and FIBS) against the backdrop of social and economic deprivation; their results confirmed that social deprivation entails a higher degree of being affected by the pandemic.However, this picture becomes thwarted by considering the results of 10 narrative interviews, that were conducted by us with emerging adults in a German vocational training institute between April and August 2021 and showed variegated forms of experiencing issues related to the pandemic. In our analysis, we used the method of objective hermeneutics. In this paper, we present our considerations by outlining two contrastive experiences with the Covid-19 pandemic, in order to highlight the divergent ways in which the pandemic has been experienced even among individuals who previously had been affected by social deprivation – at least at first glance – in similar ways. The conceptual lens through which we interpret these two examples is, firstly, the one of precariousness and precarity (Butler 2009). And secondly, the concept of recognition derived from Honneth’s pertinent theory and Butler’s account of recognizability will play a pivotal role. While Honneth’s approach allows us to emphasize the normative and existential role of the fulfilment of our basic desire for recognition and the detrimental implications of disregard, Butler provides us with the means to thoroughly analyse the socio-historical conditions of misrecognition and social invisibility. Moreover, Butler focuses specifically on the recognizability of precariousness (Honneth’s triad of love, being respected as a rights bearer and solidarity shows a different focus). Combining qualitative research on precarious live circumstances with a theoretical perspective on recognition can also be found in a stunning research on couples in atypical working relations (Wimbauer and Motakef 2019). Proceeding from these theories and ‘applying’ them to our empirical material, we seek to call into question a too generalizing and hegemonic picture of how people were affected by pertinent restrictions. Qualitative interviews are able to point us to significant differences in the experience of the restrictions.In terms of an outlook, we suggest that a sensitization for previously excluded kinds of experiences forms a crucial basis for a less normalizing, that is, more inclusive account of interpreting the affectedness and needs of variegated social groups; the pandemic has influenced and altered structures of the recognition of vulnerability and, by the same token, made them more explicit. It thus is an occasion for a critical engagement with the recognizability of needs, deprivation, discrimination, and related phenomena. (shrink)

paper offers both explication and defence. Standard consequentialism is a theory of decision. It attempts to identify, for any set of alternative options, that which it is right that an agent should..