The article offers to look at modern political processes through the prism of the participation of the religious factor in them. Considering the current Russian-Ukrainian war as a kind of trigger that launched global changes in the system of international relations, burying its previous bipolar model, the authors analyze the changes that have taken place in Ukraine, in its religious segment. Ukraine is turning from a little-known part of the world religious space into (...) an active reformer of this space. At a certain moment, it becomes the center of a global confrontation between three main religious points - Constantinople, Rome and Moscow, reformatting the usual Christian landscape of the world. The given quantitative and qualitative indicators of the presence of Ukraine as a religious entity in the European and world space demonstrate both its enrichment and problematic conflict. The war revealed latent inter-denominational confrontations in Ukraine and in the world. Such a powerful tool of ideological influence as religion/church is used by conflicting parties to justify and sanctify aggression and protect against it. The authors focus their attention on Ukrainian Orthodoxy, on its role in reformatting the religious space. Ukrainians put an end to the unlimited dominance of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ecumenical Orthodoxy, which affected other Christian communities. The absence of Ukraine in the geopolitical space, which lasted due to historical circumstances, has been overcome. Now it is subjectively present in the worldwide religious community and is there as an independent spiritual and organizational force that will only increase its potential. The former world security system has collapsed, and the old levers of restraining the aggressive and dangerous intentions of individual countries do not work. So, it is suggested to think about new forms of geopolitical coexistence. In the constructive solution of controversial issues, the human community must accumulate the efforts of all possible participators of the democratic alliance, including such a powerful religion, which over the millennia of its spiritual and practical activity has developed its own specific methods of peacemaking. (shrink)

The article is updated by several circumstances, which the authors reflect on. In their opinion, there are 1) obvious and external threats — violations of freedom of conscience in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea, which arose as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and 2) internally hidden and potential dangers for freedom of religions of Ukrainian citizens. The well-known examples of discrimination of believers of certain faiths in the so-called DPR-LPR and Crimea given by (...) the authors are constantly updated. Relevant monitoring and analytical reports are prepared by both Ukrainian and international experts. They submitted these reports to international human rights organizations, including the rights for Freedom of Religion and Belief. Despite such convincing documented materials, separate accusations have recently appeared against Ukraine, which allegedly violates freedom of religion in the territory under its control. Some are trying to prove that Ukraine, taking advantage of the war situation and referring to the spiritual dangers for Ukraine from those religious organizations whose centers are in the aggressor country, threatens some churches, thereby violating the Constitution and the Law on Freedom of Conscience, which guarantee for all citizens, regardless of from their religious affiliation, freedom of religion. The authors refute these narratives lashed out by Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church. Such negative conclusions, which express concern about the situation in Ukraine regarding freedom of conscience and religion, influence on the world public, experts on issues of freedom of conscience, religious organizations, spoil the image of Ukraine as a country with high level of freedom of conscience even among European countries. Religious freedom, as the authors conclude, needs protection today, but they call for separating real threats from imaginary ones and clearly defining who persecutes, whom he/she persecutes and where persecutes. Ukraine is consistent in its intentions to protect the rights of people and communities, to protect the freedoms of believers and their organizations. (shrink)

The article explores the semantic potential of social narratives associated with the creation and constitution of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which caused a interpretations conflict, marked by conflicting interpretations and differences in meanings that are applied in different contexts. The narrative arranges events in a certain time sequence, accumulates and translates meanings, individual and social experience. The presence of meanings in the interpretation of the narrative depends on the perspective, interpretation horizons and the subject's ability to (...) analyze information and its correct application. The social narrative accumulates a set of stories and messages that are fragmentary and disordered, constructs a coherent plot aimed at finding and defining meanings, and forming social discourse. Social narratives materialized in social structures, orientations, expectations, and stereotypes of their bearers due to everyday modification in the form of simple images, attitudes, and principles. Since each social narrative claims to be exclusive and correct in its own way of understanding events, a clash of narratives and their interpretations is inevitable. A large-scale event determines the modification of social structures, standards, and evaluation criteria, is accompanied by the transformation of everyday life, reveals deep mental layers, and opens up new perspectives. The extraordinary event that was marked by the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is accompanied by diametrically opposite assessments from the clergy, believers, politicians, experts – from the statement about autocephaly as the only opportunity to achieve unity and recognition of Ukrainian Orthodoxy to the political subtext justification of the new religious organization creation. Church circles represented by representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate claim that the state interferes in the internal Affairs of the Church. The Constitution of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine takes place in the context of the confrontation of two social narratives – the «ukrainian world» and the «russian world». The social narrative «ukrainian world» is based on values rooted in the national soil, but the social narrative «russian world» denies the existence of the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian state. Under the patronage of the Russian Orthodox Church, the expression of the ideas of the «russian world» is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which enshrines in the minds of believers ideologies about «the common origin of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples», «the common baptismal font», «the unity of the historical space of Holy Rus», «the identity of the East Slavic Orthodox civilization». The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate did not support the decision of patriarch Bartholomew to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Metropolitan Onufriy did not give his blessing to the hierarchs to participate in the Unification Council, which is called «a non-canonical assembly of schismatic groups». The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, according to its primate, has de facto autocephaly, so it is the only canonical local Orthodox Church in Ukraine. In the face of the conflict of public narratives, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, along with meeting the spiritual needs of believers, contributes to the formation of national identity, the formation of a worldview matrix that will determine the vision of the future development of the country. (shrink)

This article describes present day reaction of Ukrainian Baptist community on the current geopolitical situation in Ukraine and its reflection in first modern independent theological steps of named Late Protestant denomination. It is stressed, that complete process of theology creation is a maker of healthy and protected, factually free religious life in certain boundaries of country or land. Also it’s shown that in Ukrainian case for present day’s start of the modern Baptist theology discourse the (...) trigger factor was Revolution of dignity 2013-2014 and de-facto Russian-Ukrainian ongoing war. Ideas and practices raising up in their environment mark how all this impacts the whole Ukrainians and members of Ukrainian Baptist Churches, do they feel themselves as responsible citizens of their country, would they react or not on realities of their country life or not, and do they think about question of their identity. This entire things signal about deeper processes of final institutionalization of named denomination, its entry into democratic era together with state. (shrink)

The article defines the nature of the Russian war against Ukraine in the context of social and state transformations of the 20th — 21st centuries. It is emphasized that this is a war of different worlds, mentalities, worldviews, ways of life, values, etc., which has been going on for many centuries in various forms (direct and mediated, open and veiled, hot and cold). The role of the religious-legal factor in the Russian war against Ukraine at (...) various stages of Ukrainian state formation (periods of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, Soviet, modern) is revealed. It is emphasized that it was during the time of the Ukrainian People’s Republic that the legal basis for the organization of the Ukrainian Local Orthodox Church, confessional differentiation and the establishment of freedom of conscience and interconfessional tolerance in Ukrainian society was created. Emphasized attention is paid to the fact that in the Soviet period, the Russian war against Ukraine continued in a new, veiled, hidden, invisible (at first glance) form with the active use of the religious factor. The results of this period have been determined, namely: rampant militant/ scientific atheism, radical extermination, Russification of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, etc. Special attention is paid to the Soviet secular/political religion (Marxism-Leninism) as a key basis for the implementation of an aggressive policy regarding the historical memory and cultural identity of the Ukrainian people and a manipulative tool for the destruction of Ukrainian history, culture, worldview, nation, state and law in the information, hybrid, total, full-scale and other Russia’s wars against Ukraine. The article substantiates that improved legislation with an effective legal mechanism for its implementation, a strong civil society with developed institutions, including the institution of religion (church), adequate guarantees of religious rights and freedoms are important factors in ensuring state, national, religious security and victory of Ukraine (at the current stage) in the war waged against it by the Russian Federation. (shrink)

The task of this article is to clarify the appropriateness and adequacy of peace-making (confessional) rhetoric in the situation of the war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, in particular, the meaningful correspondence of the concept of «peace» in its application or reading by the bearers of different worldview paradigms. The «russkii mir» cannot be translated either as «Russian peace» or as «Russian world». This is because the scope and content of these concepts are (...) different. Rus (Kyiv`s Rus) — a thousand-year-old princely state with its center in Kyiv, where the ancestors of modern Ukrainians lived, baptized by Prince Volodymyr in 988. Rus is not Russia. But Muscovy adopted the name Russia to derive its historiography from Rus. «Russkii mir» actually refutes the axiological principles laid down by ancient Rus’s civilization (freedom, dignity, partnership, co-creation, mutual responsibility). «Russkii mir» destroys peace in global or any local images, trying to grab the territory it decided to own. «Russkii mir» encroaches on world domination and therefore tries to impose its rules of the game on the world, which would reshape the world structure according to the wishes of the Russian dictators. For this, «russkii mir» uses any means and institutions as a tool: the army, weapons of mass destruction, atrocities, terror, lies, propaganda, the church and peace-making rhetoric. The goal is not to restore peace, but to establish the world domination of the Russian Empire in any of its variants (Muscovy, Russian Empire, Soviet Union, Russian Federation or Orthodox Civilization). Russian Orthodox Church plays a leading role in this — it uses religious rhetoric to formu- late a worldview model of the «russkii mir», consolidates the Russian population for a war of aggression, and justifies the atrocities of the Russian military with the sacred mission of restoring the Holy Rus’. Russian Orthodox Church justifies the «civilizing mission» of the Russian troops, actually calls to protect «our Common Russian Fatherland» by killing Ukrainians on the territo- ry of Ukraine. False messianism, manichaeism, paternalism, hatred of the civilized world that lives by democratic standards and respects the dignity and freedom of the individual, Russian arrogance, conceit, supremacy and egomania — this is what Russian Orthodoxy promotes with its religious rhetoric. Therefore, if we hear calls for «peace» from the bearer of the «russkii mir»’s worldview, it actually means a demand to come to terms with all their whims, to give up one’s own identity, one’s own world, one’s own life, if they do not fit into the concept of «russkii mir». (shrink)

The phenomenon of information culture in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war is analyzed. It has been proven that changes in the priorities of the development of information culture during the war are determined by the course of spiritual confrontation with the enemy, accelerated transformations of public consciousness, the peculiarities of state information policy, and the urgent need to protect the country’s information sovereignty. It is argued that under the influence of the war in Ukraine, including in (...) the spiritual and informational space, all components of information culture are being transformed, particularly its core - the information worldview. The features of the development of the information worldview as a fundamental component of information culture are identified. It is noted that living in an information society without possessing the necessary information culture poses a danger of getting lost in both virtual and real worlds simultaneously. Personal mastery of information culture in modern society is based on theoretical knowledge about the essence, content, features, and regularities of its functioning in societies with different levels of informatization. The negative impact of informational aggression on the formation of the information culture of modern youth is demonstrated. During the war, the information culture of youth is formed and changed at an accelerated pace due to the increase in information flows of both negative and positive nature and under the influence of new information technologies. One of the main problems in the process of forming the information culture of youth in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war is mastering methods of countering enemy propaganda, developing critical attitudes towards information, and having a value-based worldview barrier to countering fake and anti-Ukrainian narratives. The role of knowledge and the education system in the formation of the information culture of Ukrainian society is revealed. (shrink)

This article analyzes Orthodox influence on developing national identity in modern Ukraine. The authors state that the factor of national specificity of Christianity is evident if we consider nations, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, Christianity influences the development of national cultures and has acquired the national characteristics of a particular community. Also, the war in Ukraine, which was started by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, has significantly impacted socio-cultural processes in (...) class='Hi'>Ukraine, the functioning of national identity, and the religious situation, especially regarding the Orthodox churches. Authors pay attention to the reference to the topic of national identity in the documents and sermons of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to show how the Orthodox hierarchies treat these issues. In addition, they study the ideologies that the Russian Orthodox Church creates and tries to impose through the faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church churches of the Moscow Patriarchate as a dominant cultural, religious, and political discourse. (shrink)

The article proposes to deepen and expand the classical methodological approaches formulated at the beginning of the 21st century within the framework of academic religious studies. Based on the methodological works of the founder of modern Ukrainian religious studies, Prof. Kolodnyi, who first clearly defined the principles of the scientific study of religion, in particular objectivity, historicism, worldview neutrality, pluralism, etc., the authors justify the need for contextualization as one of the main methodological approaches in the study (...) of current religious processes. They insist on rethinking not only the universality and effectiveness of some methodological principles in new circumstances — the Russian-Ukrainian war, but also on the actualization of new ones, critically rethinking their neglect in the pre-war period. It is proved that in the hierar- chy of religious principles, the principle of contextuality becomes a particularly sought-after re- ality of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Even the concepts that researchers use describing a new religious situation must be contextualized. The authors remind about those contextual dangers for the life world of Ukraine that exist in its religious segment, highlighting external and internal factors that cannot be ignored when analyzing the contemporary religious situation in Ukraine and in the world. Analyzing the current reality, the authors conclude that contextuality as a methodological approach in religious studies should consider: 1) The event context — Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine — as a condition for the manifestation of religion, which determines its functional and substantive features; 2) Features, depth and intensity of research’s contextual inclusion/exclusion. Tragic changes in the context of the life of Ukrainians — linguistic, cultural, informational, religious, etc. necessarily correct expert neutrality, objectivity, non-involvement. According to the authors, the war situation liberates from an unbiased, out-of-contextual analysis. The admis- sibility of such contextualization is a matter of debate. (shrink)

The armed aggression of the Russian Federation, which began in 2014, drew theattention of society and religious institutions to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and revealedproblems in the establishing and developing the institution of military chaplaincy. Thisstudy aims to assess the basics of spirituality and practice, mission and functions of chaplaincyin the Russian-Ukrainian war. It was found that according to their main credo “Beclose!”, military chaplains have become an integral part of the military teams providingspiritual (...) and moral support for military personnel. The activity of military chaplains extendsfar beyond direct service in military units in the combat zone or their deployment inUkraine. Military chaplains became volunteers who 1) coordinate and deliver humanitarianaid to the military and civilians, 2) maintain contacts with the families of servicemen,wounded and demobilized soldiers, 3) initiate the creation of special programs of spiritualrenewal at monasteries, rehabilitation courses at church communities, social events, etc.The chaplains have shown the readiness to resist the challenges of a new phase of largescalemilitary invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation since February 2022. Thereare no analogies in contemporary history of creating an institute of military chaplaincyunder such conditions that makes the current experience of Ukrainian chaplaincy unique. (shrink)

Summary. The article deals with the close link between the diminishing influence of the Moscow Patriarchate on social and political processes in Ukraine and the restoration of the Ukrainian cultural and civilizational space. Namely, the gradual deprivation of Orthodox believers of the post-imperial syndrome, including attitudes, perceptions, behavioral models, etc., associated with the stay of Ukrainians in the foreign-language and other people's mentality and culture of the empire. It is noted that the receipt of the Tomos on (...) recognition of autocephaly and the constitution of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine by Orthodox believers of Ukraine has a positive impact not only on the development of the OCU itself, but also the level of patriotism, restoration and development of the Ukrainian-speaking environment, archetypal traditions, rituals, behavior models, etc. The conclusion is about the religious aspect of promoting Ukrainian development from the Asian to the European cultural and civilizational model. (shrink)

The attainment of autocephaly by the Orthodox Church of Ukraine intensified the religious transitions of parishes that were preceded by individual parishioners’ switches. The highest dynamics of such transitions occurred in the Volyn Region in the north-western part of Ukraine. These transitions refer exclusively to a switch from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine without affecting other religious communities. Most of (...) the population supported the autocephalous status of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, for they consider granting autocephaly as a major historical event for the Ukrainian nation. The process of active religious transitions was primarily determined by the aptness of each parish community and political climate on a national level. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine was able to maintain its high regard, but with the change of political power in Ukraine in 2019, it lost political support. The process of religious transitions dwindled. (shrink)

Modern Ukrainian society is stratified not only economically, socially, professionally, informally, territorially, politically, historically, but ideologically and experiencedly. Is there something that unites Ukraine today? E. This - the present as a set of cultural and civilization factors and reality as a set of fateful events. The number and intensity of the fateful events for Ukraine in the last 3 years - from November 22, 2013, that is, the first protest against the non-signing of the association with (...) the EU - is abundant. It is not time to sum up, there is a permanent crisis, there is a war, we have a lot of losses, but we have already made our choice. (shrink)

Nowadays there are practically no political empires in the world: they have disintegrated. In the ruins of the former communist empire of the Soviet Union, our Ukraine became independent even in 1991. Who would have thought that the Ukrainian people, who for centuries had been taunting about its unbreakable fraternal union as if from a half-Russian people, suddenly decided to stay away from this "brother". Our 350-year-old colonial existence has come to an end.

Svitlana Shkil’s article «Reception of meeting Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis in the information space of the Russian Orthodox Church» examined reaction to a meeting of religious leaders in Havana speakers of the three trends in Russian Orthodoxy - conservatives, fundamentalists, liberals. This unprecedented event caused a wide resonance in the Russian information space of the church, caused a broad discussion on the future of Russian Orthodoxy.

The sequence and escalation of Russian–Ukrainian political and military conflicts since 2014, culminating in Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, have reopened interest in and debates on just war theory and practice in general and specifically in historic and modern Eastern Orthodox cultures and Orthodox-majority states. These debates have significant repercussions in areas like church–state and church–military relations in these cultures; ecclesial involvement in these conflicts has varied from war-justification rhetoric (in the (...) case of the Russian Orthodox Church) to reiterations of the inherited traditions of ecclesial pacifism/condemnation of all violence (the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, a number of Orthodox Churches, clerical and theological networks, etc.). The Russian ecclesial involvements in the justification of war/military necessity and formulation of just war narratives have triggered divisions and antagonisms in the Eastern Orthodoxy. The development and course of the ecclesial conflicts involving Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox churches and parishes (and other Orthodox ecclesiastic bodies) will show whether Orthodox religious actors may begin to play a more significant role in the articulation and application of newly emerging trends in areas like the theology of just peace, just peace-making and Christian realism, Orthodox social ethics and the dynamic praxis of just peace-making. (shrink)

A series of conflicts that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union culminated in the war in Ukraine waged by Russia in 2014. The international community was taken by surprise, and its reactions to the Russian aggression were often confused and inadequate. Even more confused and inadequate were the responses from global Christianity. Russian propaganda often renders the aggression against Ukraine as a quasi-religious conflict: a “holy war” against the “godless” or “heterodox” West. It would (...) be natural, therefore, for the Christian churches worldwide to loudly condemn both propaganda and aggression. However, in most cases, their response was silence. Such reactions came from most local Orthodox churches, the Roman Catholic church, and international ecumenical organizations such as the World Council of Churches. An exception was the reaction from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which decided to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The article argues that the Tomos for autocephaly was, among other reasons, a reaction to the war in Ukraine. The responses of other local Orthodox churches to the Tomos also indicate their attitude to the war in Ukraine. These reactions have demonstrated a profound crisis in inter-Orthodox solidarity and social ethics. (shrink)

The issue of inter-denominational understanding has been relevant to Ukrainians for many centuries. During the discussions the idea of ​​proclaiming the Ukrainian patriarchate was crystallized. According to the clergy, this would resolve the existing inter-denominational contradictions. However, the problem has become more political than religious. The emergence of such a powerful structure in Ukraine was opposed by the Polish authorities and the Polish-Latin clergy, as well as by the Russian government and its Orthodox Church. (...) For Catholic Poland and Orthodox Moscow, the establishment of an independent church in Ukraine was associated with state formation and signified a sharpening of the Ukrainian issue. Therefore, depending on the political situation, work in this direction was suspended or, conversely, revived. (shrink)

Publication date: 2 May 2019 Source: Author: Tetiana Tverdokhlib The article focuses on the pedagogical component in the content of Pastoral Theology in the Ukrainian educational institutions of the Orthodox Church, which were included in the system of religious education of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century – at the end of the 1860's. Basing on the studied works “On Positions of Parish Presbyters” by the bishop of the Smolensk Parfenii and (...) the Archbishop of Mogilev, Georgii, “Letters on Positions of Sacred Rank” by Olexandr Sturdza, “Pastoral Theology” by Archimandrite Anthonii, as well as programs, lecture notes and lecture reviews of lecturers of theological seminaries and the Kiev Theological Academy it has been established that much attention at classes on Pastoral Theology was paid to the preparation of future priests for the religious and moral upbringing of parishioners. The main forms and methods of teaching Pastoral Theology have been presented on the basis of the analysis of archival materials, historical, pedagogical literature. Attention is drawn to the widespread dissemination in the seminaries of rote learning and text dictating, despite the prohibition of such methods by the 1814 Statute. The quality of teaching and staffing of this subject in the secondary and higher Ukrainian educational institutions of the Orthodox Church in the period under research. It has been proved that Pastoral Theology in seminaries was on an equal footing with other branches of theology: teachers understood its great importance for future presbyters and paid much attention to the subject as distinct from the Kiev Theological Academy. (shrink)

After the arrival of Soviet troops on the territory of Ukraine, the Orthodox Church undergoes qualitative and quantitative changes here. She was "returned" by the clergy and the faithful of the newly-reunified Church, joined by the parishes of the Romanian Orthodox Church in the territories of Izmail, Odesa, Chernivtsi and other regions. A complicated process of liquidation in Ukraine of the structures of the UAOC revived during the war and "reunion" with the (...) class='Hi'>Orthodox Greek-Catholicism began. All these measures do not always have a clear explanation. In addition to imperial ambitions and attempts to avoid competition by eliminating the competitors themselves, the Orthodox Church often did not have the choice of performing a social order of power structures. (shrink)

In today's conditions, the heavy resistance of Ukrainians to Russian aggression, which is carried out, with the exception of the military, by way of information and economic methods, and now also through a non-gossip "hybrid" confrontation, it is very important to properly evaluate and play an appropriate role in this religious and religious factor. "Russian World" is no less effective weapon of the Moscow Church in the war with Ukraine than the military aid of (...) the Russian state to the separatists.. Religious communities have their potential in educating citizens - patriots of their homeland, or else. Different aspects of the problem of the role of religious-church factors in patriotic education of Ukrainians have long been in the zone of justified attention of domestic secular scholars and representatives of the Churches, among them: A. Kolodny, L. Filippovich, V. Shevchenko, P. Pavlenko, O. Sagan, C. Zdioruk, M. Cherenkov, O. Tuyeshin and others. Particular attention of the RCC and Protestant Churches in this regard was given by P. L. Yarotsky. (shrink)

Article I.Titovskogo "Problems of adaptation / changing canons and traditions in the OrthodoxChurch today Ukraine" investigate questions need to adapt Orthodox canons and existing processesunauthorized changes, upgrade, failure norms of canon law, the canons of modern Orthodox churches inUkraine and Russia, the arbitrary power of the church, resulting in the loss of the positive influence of theChurch on society of modern Ukraine.

Given the current division of modern Orthodox in Ukraine, the study of the history of the church movement of the 1920s, a significant component of which was the activity of the updated clergy, has not only scientific and cognitive but also practical significance, since it helps to clarify the causes and trends of inter-church confrontation in the conditions of existence of several Orthodox churches and to define conceptual approaches to the formation in the state of (...) a single independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church. (shrink)

The Department of Religious Studies is formed on an autonomous basis in the structure of the Institute of Philosophy by the decision of the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in June 1991 with the prospect of its transformation into an independent academic institution. The first director of the Department was Dr. Philos. Mr., O.S. Onischenko, Corresponding Member of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The Department includes departments of the philosophy of religion, (...) sociology of religion, the history of religion in Ukraine During the first three years, departments conducted research on the following topics: "Methodological Principles and Categorical Apparatus of Religious Studies"; "Contemporary Religious Situation in Ukraine: State, Trends, Forecasts"; "History of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine". Since 1994, they have been working on problems: "The phenomenon of religion: nature, essence, functionality"; "Religious activity in the context of social processes in Ukraine"; "Features and milestones of the history of Ukrainian Christianity". At the time, the research group on the history of theological thought in Ukraine studied the creative work of Metropolitan Petro Mohyla, a group on the study of neo-religions - investigated new religious currents and cults of post-socialist Ukraine, and a group on the history of Protestantism conducted a large-scale study of archival sources on the history of the Gospel-Baptist movement in Ukraine. In 1995, the Department employed 30 scientific staff. (shrink)

The article explores the relationship between the dialogical way of existence of religion and social stability. The author argues that dialogue is becoming a way of existence of religion in societies with a high level of religious freedom. The author emphasizes constructive types of communication between religions, one of which is traditionally interreligious (interfaith) dialogue. The definition of religious dialogue as a broad communication phenomenon is considered, which, in particular, involves the interaction of not only religions with each (...) other (interreligious, interfaith dialogue), but also communication between religion and society (religious and social dialogue) on important issues of the present, and reactions to them. It is substantiated that the reluctance of a certain religious institution to engage in dialogue may be based on the theological position of the church caused by the phenomenon of «ambivalence of the sacred». Some ways to restore the dialogue of religions and overcome the conflict conditions of their interaction are proposed. In conclusion, it is noted that the «war of civilizations» launched by the Russian Federation in Ukraine brings the dialogue of religions to a new level, namely: requires a revision of certain theological theories, the formation of new theological visions; significantly actualizes the issues of justice, heroism, good and evil, the impossibility of violence, ethical problems and their reflection in theological thought; requires religions to take a civic stance, where it is no longer possible to speak of secularization in the sense of separation of religion from politics; sharpens and problematizes the attitude of religions to the national question as a result of the Russian Federation’s provoked terrorist methods of warfare, and thus the threat to humanity of genocide on a national basis; raises the issue of universal values, the humanistic paradigm and personal responsibility, which brings all religious systems too close together; meta-anthropologizes religion, absolutizes humanism as a value when a believer «goes beyond» mere existence to approach eternal truths, where the concept of «salvation» loses its narrowly individualistic characteristic. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to describe only one aspect of the missionary activity of the Orthodox Church - anti-sectarian. The author dwells on the analysis of the legal field in which religious sectarian communities function, the peculiarities of the organization of the Orthodox missionary apparatus and the confrontation between the sectarian and Orthodox missionary directions. Note that the use by the author of the term "sectarianism" is due to specific historical circumstances - in (...) the early twentieth century. Protestant and other religious entities were qualified as sectarian in official literature and official relations. (shrink)

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has not only a political, economic, and military component, but also a religious one. These components co-exist and support each other, both in Ukraine and in Russia. Why? In this essay I try to give an answer by analysing the religious elements of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict from a historical and a phenomenological perspective. In doing this I hope to shed light on a situation that worsens day by day.

In this paper, we examine how Patriarch Kirill and Archpriest Andrei Tkachev, the most prominent and official public representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, categorize and modify war in their sermons from the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 up to September 2022. Incorporating the framework of Ideological Discourse Analysis, we aim to demonstrate how the meaning of war is formulated in sermonic discourse through the use of war-substitutes and war-modifiers. The (...) findings of our research show that Russian Orthodox Church officials strategically employ lexical variation to align their evaluation of war with the state ideology, aiming to manipulate the congregation's perception and interpretation of this category. Additionally, we explore how religious context models, framed as spiritual guidance, involve war-categorization and modification as sophisticated tools to leverage the emotions of the faithful and subtly enforce ideological conformity. (shrink)

The article highlights the causes and consequences of the transformations cult-ritual practices of the Greek Uniate Church on the territory of the Right-Bank Ukraine on the eve of its accession to the Russian Orthodox Church.

The history of the Russian Old Believers who lived in Ukraine, as well as the question of the main methods and features of the power struggle with representatives of this peculiar ethno-confessional group and the ways of their adaptation to the conditions that existed in the Russian Empire in the middle of the XIX century remain a little researched topic. So, we can talk about the scientific relevance of a particular problem.

During the German-Soviet War and in the decades that followed, the Volyn Orthodox clergy functioned under a cohesive social ghetto, which was to ensure the gradual assimilation of the social group in accordance with the needs of the totalitarian regime. In this situation, the national self-awareness of a part of the sacred priests did not fit into the coordinates of the Nazi religious and ethnic politics and, later, into the process of creation of the Soviet people. The question (...) of national identity remains relevant, and now, when it is the basis of the newest Ukrainian state-making, it has caused division in the Orthodox field. The national consciousness of the Volyn clergy in the years of war and in the era of Soviet totalitarianism never became a topic of separate study. To date, scientists have only partially addressed the problem. Although in 1960, the head of the ROC Council, V. Kuroedov, said that the remnants of religious remnants contributed to preserving the bourgeois nationalist sentiment. The compilers of the first volume of documents and materials “Martyrology of the Ukrainian Churches” Osip Zinkevich and Alexander Voronin, analyzing the national composition of the bishopric of the Russian Church in Ukraine as of 1986, hoped that in case of revival of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, the origin of some of them role. (shrink)

The article examines the provisions of the catechisms of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church regarding the war and its challenges, as well as the defense of the Motherland. A comparative analysis of relevant thematic instructions in the Catechism “Christ is our Easter” (published in 2011), the Catechism for youth “We walk with Christ” (published in 2021) and the “Catechism of the Christian Warrior” (published in 2022) was carried out. It was determined that the provisions of the UGCC's own (...) fundamental doctrinal documents, its Catechisms, regarding the problems of war and defense of the Motherland, were formed, clarified and supplemented according to the circumstances and needs of the time. The catechism of the UGCC “Christ is our Easter” contains general Christian considerations on the subject under consideration, which are principled, establishing, and refer to how civilized peoples should conduct themselves. The catechism for youth, created in the previous years of the undeclared Russian Federation's “hybrid” war against Ukraine, covers the issues related to the war and the defense of the Motherland in a substantive way and closer to current Ukrainian realities, although it still has some idealistic approach. The Catechism of the Christian Warrior, the preparation of which was completed and the publication was carried out during the full-scale military offensive of the aggressor, is a set of thorough and competent advises for Ukrainian soldiers, where things are called by their names, and there are no provisions that can cause doubts due to experience and be problematically achievable for implementation. Therefore, it is concluded that especially this Catechism, together with and in addition to the two previous ones, is a useful and timely contribution of the UGCC to the instruction of Ukrainians during the war, and therefore to Ukraine's victory over the enemy. (shrink)

Eastern Churches in Russia and Ukraine are facing the fratricidal war caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These Churches maintain closeness in faith and liturgy. The similarities of these Churches’ teachings on war are juxtaposed with actual manifestations of their hierarchs’ hostility. The analysis will be carried out from the perspective of the Roman Catholic Church, which is in close unity with the Eastern Churches and understands the context of faith but is not a party to the (...) conflict, which makes it easier to remain objective in examining the phenomenon of fratricide. The first part of the article analyses the doctrinal and historical context. It helps to isolate the factors influencing the existence of enmity between doctrinally close Churches. The second part presents the biblical inspiration of Cain and Abel's story in a search for new ways to counteract this phenomenon. (shrink)

In the Ukrainian-Russian relations, especially in pre-revolutionary times, the religious component played an important role. The attitude of the Russian authorities toward Southwest Russia was shaped by the influence of several conceptions made in the church circles, which also significantly influenced the formation of Russian national identity.

Using a religious studies methodology, this paper offers a detailed contextual mapping and a structural configuration of how collective violence is justified in Orthodox Christianity. The research design is explanatory, whereby the functional perspectives of doctrine, ethics and worship are all investigated and probed as phenomena of lived religion and orthopraxy. While predominantly initiatory and pedagogical, the paper also proposes a systematic platform for advanced research on this subject, by flagging contexts, themes and areas of inquiry that a (...) researcher might examine in order to untangle the inner workings of the justification of violence in the mind of the Orthodox. Given the ongoing Russian War on Ukraine, relevant samples are drawn from this case.Contribution: This paper outlines the Orthodox Christian justification of violence from the perspectives of doctrine, ethics and ritual and identifies pivotal areas of ambiguity between orthodoxy and orthopraxy. (shrink)

Functional state of the Orthodox Church in the early twentieth century. was depicted in historical literature, usually in gloomy tones. Soviet historians in the contradictions of church life saw manifestations of the "crisis of the church in the conditions of capitalism," and various forms of church and community activity of the clergy endowed epithets with "reactionary" and "Black-Hundred monarchical". As a relic of the cultural past, which slowly died together with its guardian - autocracy, they (...) considered the Orthodox Church and many foreign researchers. A number of Ukrainian historians depicted in the Orthodox Church all the Statehood and Russified, also holding the idea of ​​its complete decline. (shrink)

The current complex inter-confessional relations in Ukraine compel the researcher to address their origins. In view of this, the issue raised by us is of increased interest. One of the most notable events in the history of the n Orthodox Church of the XIX century. was joining it in 1839 by the Uniate. The elimination of the union and the conversion of the Uniates to the fold of the Russian Orthodox Church, and at the (...) same time the weakening of the Polish landlord's land ownership and closely related Catholic church, attempted to implement autocracy in the second half of the XVIII century. In 1794, Catherine II issued an order to eliminate the union, but did not have time to implement it. (shrink)

Patriotic religion reveals a great interest in the problem of the Ukrainian national church, the forms of its implementation in Ukrainian history and modern times. In the field of attention, in particular, the adequacy of the idea of ​​the national church to the historical development and spiritual traditions of the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches. At the same time, the Ukrainian mentality of the Protestant churches, their significance as a national preservation factor remains a (...) very controversial issue. Given that Calvinism in Ukraine demonstrated its potential for socio-cultural adaptation in the era of the first national revival, and also witnessed its participation in the socio-political, cultural and educational processes of the modern period, the need to study this denomination in the context of the idea of ​​a national church becomes of some relevance. (shrink)

An important moment in the recent history of the Eastern Orthodox Church was for sure the recognition granted to the Ukrainian Orthodoxy by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople with the Tomos of autocephaly. Praised by some Orthodox churches and damned by other, it was preceded by some attempts of negotiation initiated by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and by a few meetings between the representatives of the aforementioned institution, Russian Patriarchate and the Ukrainian local churches that (...) was later recognised by Constantinople and by a Schism between the Constantinople and Moscow. At the same time, it divided the local Orthodox churches between the ones who sustain one or the other side or prefer to remain in a neutral state and determined later meetings like the one from Amman in Jordan, between leaders and representatives of the Orthodox Church. Conscious of the relevance of the event and its potential consequences, we have tried here to see how it was reflected in the ecumenical space. Therefore, we have proceeded to the investigation of the journals from the ecumenical area that spoke about it, and we analysed the way how they saw it and emphasised the main elements that have raised their interest. Together with the ecclesiastical challenges, we found that they were also interested in this problem not only for its theological meaning but also because of its geopolitical relevance. The research, based on the literature investigated, therefore presents the Ukrainian problem and its image in the ecumenical space.Contribution: The research investigates how the image of the Eastern Orthodox Church changed in the ecumenical space after the foundation of the New Ukrainian Church and the debates that followed inside of the Orthodox space in this context. It is linked with the scope of the journal due to the fact that investigates a topic relevant for the ecumenical area and presents a topic that can contribute in the future to the change of the relationships with different churches with the Orthodox one. (shrink)

: A series of imperial decrees of the 1820s ordering the establishment of a Greco-Uniate Theological Collegium and appropriate consistories contributed to the spread of the autocratic synodal system of government and the establishment of control over Greek Uniate church institutions in the annexed territories of Right-Bank Ukraine. As a result, the Greco-Uniate Church was put on hold in favor of the government's favorable grounds for the rapid localization of its activities. Basilian accusations of supporting the Polish (...) November Uprising of 1830-1831 made it possible to liquidate the OSBM and most monasteries. The transfer of the Pochaiv Monastery to the ownership of the Orthodox clergy in 1831 was a milestone in the liquidation of the Greco-Uniate Church and the establishment of a Russian-style Orthodox mono-confessionalism. On the basis of archival documents, the political motivation of the emperor's decree to confiscate the Pochayiv Monastery from the Basilians with all its property and capital was confirmed. The transfer to the category of monasteries of the 1st class and the granting of the status of a lavra indicated its special role in strengthening the position of the autocracy in the western region of the Russian Empire. The orders of the Holy Synod outline the key tasks of ensuring the viability of the Lavra as an Orthodox religious center: the introduction of continuous worship, strengthening the personal composition of the population, delimitation of spiritual responsibilities, clarifying the affiliation of the printing house. However, maintaining the rhythm of worship and financial and economic activities established by the Basilians proved to be a difficult task, the solution of which required ten years of hard work. In order to make quick changes in the monastery, decisions were made by the emperor and senior government officials, and government agencies were involved at the local level, which required the coordination of actions of all parties to the process. (shrink)

The article examines the problems of philosophy development in Ukraine during the thirty years of independence; an attempt is made to periodize this development. It is shown that the independence of Ukraine, in addition to the state, political and economic dimensions, also contains a spiritual component associated with religious, cultural, linguistic, and ideological independence. The key here was independence from the Moscow Church and creating an autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Nevertheless, since, according (...) to the Constitution of Ukraine, no ideology can be recognized by the state as mandatory, spiritual independence is also a secular category and presupposes worldview and philosophical independence. The article highlights several stages of the creation of philosophical independence. First, the first stage required overcoming the ideologically biased philosophy of Russian Marxism, that is, Marxism-Leninism. The second stage is the involvement of Ukrainian philosophy in the models of modern world philosophy, the assimilation of its leading trends and paradigmatic complexes. The role of translations of philosophical classics and modern philosophical literature in entering philosophy into world philosophical thought in Ukraine is also shown. Finally, the third stage is related to solving the critical problems of our time, related to globalization, ecological crisis, universalism and particularism in ethics, ethical reclamation of modern society, etc. The article also deals with the role of philosophy and philosophical education in substantiating the value orientations of the development of Ukrainian society, the formation of communicative, moral, professional competencies of citizens as a factor in the civilizational choice of Ukraine. (shrink)

The more than thirteen-year co-existence of the Ukrainian state and the Church in the qualitatively new conditions prevailing in the post-Soviet space together with the formation of an independent Ukraine, functioning during this period of state-church relations give reasonably reliable grounds for scientific analysis, a number of generalizations and conclusions regarding the results and conclusions conditions of state policy on religion, church and religious organizations, ensuring in Ukraine the right of everyone to freedom (...) of world view and religion - on the one hand, and repair and optimize -tserkovno and religious life - on the other. (shrink)

In this issue, the founder of the Donetsk regional branch of the Ukrainian Association of Religious Studies, theologian, candidate of historical sciences, senior researcher of the Department of Religious Studies of the GS Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, President of the Center for Religious Studies member of the Expert Council on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations under the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, member of the (...) Strategic Council under the Minister of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine. I. Kozlovsky worked for more than 25 years in the Donetsk Regional State Administration as a chief specialist and head of the department for religions, in the early 1990s he established the College of Religious Studies at Donetsk Open University, which was later transformed into the Faculty of Philosophy and Religious Studies of the State University of Information. intelligence, and has done much to promote interfaith and interreligious dialogue and cooperation in the Donetsk region, whose religious map is very diverse. At the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war, I. Kozlovsky became one of the organizers of the interfaith prayer marathon "Prayer for Ukraine", which took place in Donetsk from early March to November 2014, which was attended by members of the Donetsk branch of the UAR. Until 2016, some members of the UAR, led by I. Kozlovsky, who still remained in the occupied territories, collected data on the state of religious freedom in Donetsk and the region. In 2016, I. Kozlovsky was imprisoned by a terrorist group of the so-called "Donetsk People's Republic" and was held captive for almost 2 years. (shrink)

The rethinking of the events of the Soviet past largely concerns the sphere of church-state relations. The significant losses of cultural and architectural heritage during the Soviet period make it expedient to study the mechanisms of liquidation of church buildings in the second half of the 1960s. The purpose and objectives of the article. To determine the principles of state policy in the field of religion and methods of its implementation by party-state structures concerning the church network (...) of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian SSR. The research methodology. The research methodology is based on a set of philosophical, general scientific, and historical methods and principles. To solve the specific tasks of the study, the principles of objectivity, historicism, systematicity, and comprehensiveness were also used. Research results. The period of the second half of the 1960s was marked by the liberalization of official views on the religious sphere, the abandonment of repressive methods of fighting religion and the Church, the beginning of the latent destruction of sacred buildings, and the dominance of the Soviet state’s nihilistic attitude toward cultural heritage. The Russian Orthodox Church remained entirely subordinate to the Soviet state, which disregarded its legitimate rights and interests. Discussion. The repressions of the “Thaw“ period and the failure of building a communist society led to a loss of public confidence in the possibility of a just welfare state. It became clear that by practicing persecution, restricting the rights of priests, and banning them from studying in theological schools, the Soviet government was undermining its authority. Therefore, in the 1970s, ideologues of the CPSU Central Committee proposed a new model of churchstate relations — the adaptation to communism. There were no fundamental changes in party policy, as it was based on the Marxist doctrine of religion as the opium of the people. The anti-church orientation of state policy remained, only its forms and methods were transformed. The period of massive closure of Orthodox churches was replaced by a new long-term period, called the period of “streamlining the religious network”. Conclusions. One of the directions of the state’s policy towards religion in the mid-1960s was the targeted liquidation of religious buildings of the Russian Orthodox Church. The main reasons for it were the ideological and political priorities of the state leadership. The closure and destruction of religious buildings were systematic actions of the party-state structures in the process of implementing their policy in the field of religion in the Ukrainian SSR. (shrink)

Religion has an essential effect on the development of any society since it impacts religious norms and models of behaviour, establishes priorities and values, influences gender relations, predetermines gender roles, and influences the establishing of certain traditions, laws, and customs. This article is a review of the historic position of the Russian Orthodox Church – the dominant religion in Russia – its past and current status in Russia, and the issues relating to women in Russian (...) socio-cultural and religious community. While there is a lack of research on the Russian Orthodox Church and its influence on Russians and, particularly, Russian women, the increased religiosity in Russia within the last decade requires us to study the Russian Orthodoxy and its impact on people’s lives and its attitude to gender. This article provides a deep analysis of the impact of the Russian Orthodox Church on the image of women in Russia. It has been argued that Russian national character and heritage was formed by the Russian Orthodox Church and the existing gender stereotypes in Russia have been significantly impacted by the Russian Orthodox Church and have mainly been derived from the interpretation of the New Testament by the Russian Orthodoxy and its clergy. Particularly, gender roles and the perception of family, and marriage are understood to be in compliance with the values of the Russian Orthodox faith. For the faith the most important purpose of marriage is the birth and raising of children and the chief responsibility and duty of a woman is to care for her husband and children as these are considered as a way of the woman’s service to society and to God. (shrink)

Besides other changes that have taken place in the Russian Federation in our times, the process of constitution of an ideology, which is accompanied by different competing value-systems, is one of the crucial tendencies. This process also occurs in the area of the development and construction of religious institutions and religious consciousness. Historically, the Russian Orthodox Church has had a dominant position among the other religious institutions in the country. Unfortunately, it has not (...) and does not serve the role of promoting a democratic change, but is rather an “echo” of the authoritarian and totalitarian past of the Russian history. In my paper I will analyze different factors that contribute to these characteristics of the Orthodox Church, and their influence on the political culture of Russia. (shrink)

The Russian Orthodox Church, the biggest centralized religious institution in the post-Soviet space, has been going through major changes in the 2000s. These are connected to qualitative changes in the composition of believers and clergy as well as legal registration of rights on church property obtained from the government in the 1990s. This has led to substantial changes in internal policies, particularly a sharp decrease in the influence of fundamentalists, which had been rising over the (...) previous decade. Moreover, the years of Putin's rule were years of failure in the church's relations with the government, which consistently denied the ROC's most important requests. In this paper we will examine the principal social developments that have been taking place within the Church in the first years of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Orthodox church life in Ukraine from the summer of 1941 to the spring of 1944 was characterized by a sharp confrontation between two Orthodox churches, administrative centers of which were located in Volyn, in Lutsk and Kremenets. The Autonomous Orthodox Church was headed by an archbishop Alex. After his tragic death on May 7, 1943, the APC remained virtually without a chapter, since at this time the occupation authorities abolished the traditional system of (...) class='Hi'>church management. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church throughout its time was headed by an archbishop, and from May 1942 Metropolitan Polycarp. (shrink)

The leadership of the Russian Federation made visible organization and invested significant financial resources in support of the Russian Orthodox Church, making the latter a cementing ideological component of the Moscow government, its various aggressive policy. So, since 2012, the state support for the 2016 year celebration of the "1000th anniversary of the Russian presence on Athos" has begun. On this occasion, a special order of Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 16, 2012 for (...) №468-rp "On creation of working groups...". The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine appealed to the Specialized Department of the Department of Religious Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine with a request to comment on the next aspiration of the Russian Federation to steal Ukrainian history, attributing to itself what the Muscovites do not have any direct relation to. (shrink)