I argue for the primacy of the mental from recent physicalists’ endorsements of phenomenal transparency and the non-transparency of the physical. I argue that the conjunction of these views shows that (1) arguments for dualism from introspection are difficult to resist; and (2) a kind of Hempel’s dilemma that removes constraints that block substance dualism. This shows that (1) raises the probability of the primacy of the mental, while (2) lowers the probability of the primacy of the (...) physical. Lastly, I argue that the conjunction of (1) and (2) raise the probability of substance dualism. (shrink)

This study explores the primacy of interrelating and its ecopsychological significance. Grounded in evidence from everyday experience, and in dialogue with the phenomenology of Martin Buber, Emmanuel Levinas, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, we discover that humans are inherently relational beings, not separate egoic subjects. When experienced intimately , this realization may transform our interrelationship with the beings and presences in the community of nature. Specifically, interrelating is primary in three ways: 1) interrelating is always already here, transpiring from the beginning (...) of the human species and human culture, from the beginning of every infant's life, and from the continuously arising beginning of every presencing moment; 2) the quality of our interrelating is truly what matters most, the most important expression of and facilitator of health, compassion, and justice for humankind and the rest of nature; and 3) interrelating is the ever-present path via which we discover/create and carry on our existence. Interrelating is an existential given—indeed we are our interrelating—yet we are summoned ethically to cultivate our way of interrelating so as to serve others and the non-human natural community. Thus interrelating is our essence, our calling, and our path. (shrink)

How do things come to stand for something other than themselves? An understanding of the ontology of relations allows for a compelling account of the action of signs. The Primacy of Semiosis is concerned with the ontology of relations and semiosis, the action of signs. Drawing upon the work of Gilles Deleuze, John Deely, and John Poinsot, Paul Bains focuses on the claim that relations are 'external' to their terms, and seeks to give an ontological account of this purported (...) externality of relations. Bains develops the proposition, first made in 1632 by John Poinsot (John of St. Thomas), that, ontologically, signs are relations whose whole being is in esse ad ('being-toward'). Furthermore, relations are found to be univocal in their being as relations. This univocity of being is antecedent to the division between 'ens rationis' and 'ens reale'. The ontology of relations Bains presents is thus neither mind-dependent nor mind-independent insofar as the rationale of the relation is concerned. The book includes chapters on Deleuze and Deely on relations, Jacob von Uexkull and Heidegger on Umwelten (self-worlds), Maturana and Varela on Autopoiesis. It provides a form of vicarious causality, by way of the scholastic doctrine of the 'species', that complements the emerging school of 'object oriented ontology'. The Primacy of Semiosis provides a semiotic that subverts the opposition between realism and idealism; one in which what have been called 'nature' and 'culture' interpenetrate in an expanding collective of human and non-human. Bains' work promises to be a touchstone for semiotic discussion for years to come. (shrink)

This expanded second edition carries forward the initial insights into the biological and existential significances of animation by taking contemporary research findings in cognitive science and philosophy and in neuroscience into critical and constructive account. It first takes affectivity as its focal point, elucidating it within both an enactive and qualitative affective-kinetic dynamic. It follows through with a thoroughgoing interdisciplinary inquiry into movement from three perspectives: mind, brain, and the conceptually reciprocal realities of receptivity and responsivity as set forth in (...) phenomenology and evolutionary biology, respectively. It ends with a substantive afterword on kinesthesia, pointing up the incontrovertible significance of the faculty to cognition and affectivity. Series A. (shrink)

This article argues that shareholder primacy cannot be defended on the grounds that there is something special about the position of shareholders that grounds a right to preferential treatment on part of management. The notions of property and contract, traditionally thought to ground such a right, are now widely recognized as incapable of playing that role. This leaves shareholder theorists with two options. They can either abandon the project of arguing for their view on broadly deontological grounds and try (...) to advance consequentialist arguments instead, or they can search for other morally relevant properties that could ground shareholder rights. The most sustained argument in the latter vein is Marcoux’s attempt to show that the vulnerability of shareholders mandates that managers are their fiduciaries. I show that this argument leads to the unacceptable conclusion that it would be unethical for corporations to make incomplete contracts with nonshareholding stakeholders. (shrink)

The Primacy of God, the notion of justice toward God is seldom considered and often foreign. Far more discussed is how God might either undermine or motivate social justice. The Primacy of God by R. Jared Staudt offers an important intervention. With the aid of St. Thomas Aquinas, Staudt argues that it is vital for both contemporary society and contemporary Catholic theology to return to the traditional view of God as the one to whom all human and social (...) action must be ordered and to recover the virtue of religion as the virtue which orders all other virtues to God. Not only does Staudt helpfully remind readers of the ancient philosophical and biblical notion of worship as a dictate of the natural law, he also illuminates the way in which Christian liturgy, as an enactment of Christ's high priesthood, is the great fulfillment of natural and biblical worship. Accordingly, Staudt secures religion as essential for the virtue of love. This brings Staudt to criticize modern theologians like Karl Barth, who claimed that religion is inherently idolatrous, as well as Karl Rahner, who claimed that love of neighbor is the highest moral act. Staudt also considers the question of religious truth in light of the plurality of religions, soliciting the assistance of Hans Urs von Balthasar and Joseph Ratzinger, as well as the way in which religion relates to the development of culture, engaging the great Catholic social historian Christopher Dawson. The Primacy of God is a much-needed work that ought to set the agenda for Catholic theology in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Polanyi’s claim that a wholly tacit knowledge is possible is contested. Polanyi’s praise for the tacit, and his critique of the ideal of total explicitness, harbors a threat of Romanticism, which, in turn, may become a threat to the value of the explicit itself, and ultimately a political threat, something that Heidegger’s anti-Enlightenment philosophy and political life manifested all too dramatically. Polanyians must not lose sight of the primacy of the explicit for personal existence, something that Polanyi’s work need (...) not undermine, and indeed, that has the resources to affirm and support. (shrink)

The concept of justice, a cornerstone in Aristotle's political philosophy, holds intrinsic significance in both historical and contemporary contexts. This article embarks on an intricate exploration of the primacy of global justice within Aristotle's philosophical framework and its far-reaching implications in addressing contemporary challenges. Drawing from Aristotle's perspective on justice within the polis, the article navigates the terrain of his ideas, extending them beyond conventional boundaries and examining their pertinence in the global arena. Aristotle's nuanced definitions of justice lay (...) the foundation for dissecting its role within the community. The dichotomy of distributive and corrective justice adds depth to the discussion, setting the stage for the exploration of justice on a global scale. Indications within Aristotle's writings hint at a broader consideration of justice, encompassing global concerns that transcend political boundaries. The resonance between Aristotle's principles and contemporary global issues, including poverty, environmental degradation, and human rights violations, is brought to light through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This alignment underscores the enduring relevance of Aristotle's philosophy and its potential to inform contemporary ethical paradigms. Furthermore, the article contemplates the influence of Aristotle's justice-centred ideas on international relations, envisioning its impact on diplomacy, cooperation, and conflict resolution. Acknowledging critiques and counterarguments that question the adaptability of Aristotle's theories to modern complexities, the article upholds the enduring applicability of his principles. Aristotle's emphasis on equilibrium and rectification offers a portal for addressing multifaceted global injustices, even in the intricate web of contemporary interdependence. The article culminates in the assertion that the primacy of global justice within Aristotle's political philosophy reverberates profoundly in the present day. The convergence of his principles with contemporary ethical frameworks, the potential implications on international diplomacy, and the adaptability to intricate global challenges substantiate the perpetual wisdom encapsulated in Aristotle's ideas. Embracing the essence of his philosophy, humanity is poised to forge a path toward a more just, harmonious, and equitable world. (shrink)

Building upon the scholarship of Michael Polanyi, William Poteat has dedicated himself to offering an alternative model to the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and matter that has dominated Western thought for centuries. These essays, collected by James Nickell and James Stines, cover a wide range of subjects, from Poteat's analysis of the epistemological crisis brought on by the Cartesian program to his first attempts at formulating an alternative to the mind-body dichotomy. These essays relentlessly diagnose the present situation of Western (...) thought by making explicit the philosophical presuppositions to which it is committed. They include theological affirmations, reflections on epistemology, conceptual analyses, as well as dialogues with other writers in the field of cultural criticism and linguistic theory such as George Steiner, Noam Chomsky, and Walker Percy. Most significant is Poteat's bold affirmation of the primacy of persons and his analysis and critique of our cultural misconstructions of human awareness. _The Primacy of Persons and the Language of Culture_ provides an excellent introduction to the scholarship of William Poteat. It should be of particular interest to scholars of philosophy and theology, as well as others who share Poteat's deep concern for the state of human culture. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------- The above was already on the database - below was copied from the web William Poteat has dedicated himself to offering an alternative model to the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and matter that has dominated Western thought for centuries. These essays further diagnose the present situation of Western thought by making explicit the philosophical presuppositions to which it is committed. (shrink)

This paper raises the question of whether there is anything foundational to hopefulness when considering it as a virtue, and uses the Aristotelian distinction between virtue in the “natural sense” and virtue in the “strict sense” to make the claim that hopefulness has a primacy to it. While that primacy rests on the existence of care and responsiveness of community, those caretakers must themselves be possessed of hopefulness, which, at its best will be virtuous.

This paper examines the shareholder primacy norm as a widely acknowledged impediment to corporate social responsibility and explores the role of business schools in promoting the SPN but also potentially as an avenue for change by addressing misconceptions about shareholder primacy and the purpose of business. We start by explaining the SPN and then review its status under US and UK laws and show that it is not a likely legal requirement, at least under the guise of shareholder (...) value maximization. This is in contrast to the common assertion that managers are legally constrained from addressing CSR issues if doing so is inconsistent with the economic interests of shareholders. Nonetheless, while the SPN might be muted as a legal norm, we show that it is certainly evident as a social norm among managers and in business schools—reflective, in part, of the sole voting rights of shareholders on corporate boards and of the dominance of shareholder theory—and justifiably so in the view of many managers and business academics. We argue that this view is misguided, not least when associated with claims of a purported legally enforceable requirement to maximize shareholder value. We propose two ways by which the influence of the SPN among managers might be attenuated: extending fiduciary duties of executives to non-shareholder stakeholders and changes in business school teaching such that it covers a plurality of conceptions of the purpose of the corporation. (shrink)

What is the relation between the nature of the things you think about, and the ways you think about them? Christopher Peacocke argues that meaning is never prior to metaphysics - to the nature of the world. He shows that this view holds for a wide range of topics, including magnitudes, time, the self, and abstract objects such as numbers.

Responsibility is central to Emmanuel Levinas as well as Hannah Arendt. A reading of their understanding of the concept and role of responsibility for politics and ethics and in regard to its social-ontological status of primacy, its reference to historical, worldly, and human conditions, brings out the similarities and differences of their work. Regarding their historical context, they could have engaged in a dialogue; but they never did. Their personal temperament and thematic approach to key issues concerning the concept (...) of responsibility—such as subjectivity, primordiality, or relationality—can be used to build pillars for a bridge between the two thinkers’ respective approaches. This essay tries to read each author in light of the other one. (shrink)

This paper suggests philosophical foundations for mixed methods research based on the philosophy of critical realism. In particular, it suggests that the critical realist idea of the primacy of ontology helps bridge the apparent paradigmatic gap between qualitative and quantitative research. It illustrates this foundational idea by showing why and how a multi-disciplinary team used a mixed methods approach to understand the significance of religion in prison through a multi-site study of religious conversion to Islam in prison and how (...) this gives a better account than a single method approach. The mixed method research design used in the project sets out a new way of mapping and understanding religious conversion and differences within a faith group that draws on the emancipatory potential of critical realist thought. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Primacy of God: The Virtue of Religion in Catholic Theology by R. Jared StaudtD. C. SchindlerThe Primacy of God: The Virtue of Religion in Catholic Theology. By R. Jared Staudt. Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022. Pp. xii + 409. $49.95 (hardcover). ISBN: 978-1-64585-167-7.Echoing and amplifying a theme from his predecessor, Benedict XVI was known for insisting that the deepest problem of our age, which has (...) not only distorted the culture of the West but has indeed in some ways infected the life of the Church itself, is the forgottenness of God. Recalling the “memory of God” is arguably what Benedict conceived to be the central mission of his papacy, and by that he meant recovering a sense of the primacy of God, not just in matters of private faith, but as a fundamental principle ordering the whole of human existence. In this respect, one can imagine that Benedict would have been heartened to see the new book by R. Jared Staudt, The Primacy of God: The Virtue of Religion in Catholic Theology, which draws not only on Joseph Ratzinger, but also Hans Urs von Balthasar, Christopher Dawson, and, most fundamentally, Thomas Aquinas, to show, indeed, that there is nothing more fundamental than religion.What prompts the need for such an effort is the pervasive sociological reduction of religion in the contemporary imagination to a culturally conditioned set of beliefs and practices that concern God, the divine, or in any event the “afterlife.” In other words, religion is wholly immanentized, understood as an essentially human contrivance, by which man attempts to relate himself to what he takes to be God. It is just this interpretation that lies behind the general assumption of the phenomenon of “religious pluralism”: the world is made up of a potentially infinite number of “different religions,” all of which must be “tolerated” (i.e., must be relegated to a circumscribed social space that renders them more or less politically innocuous) because they offer no rational basis for any sort of arbitration. In contrast to the more typically Protestant response to this “humanistic” reduction of religion, exemplified by Karl Barth, which would insist that Christianity is not “a religion,” Staudt attempts to recover a more robust tradition that recognizes both the deep natural roots of religion and the supernatural distinctiveness of Christianity. To do so, he wisely adopts what he calls a “ressourcement Thomist” approach, but what we might call a genuinely Catholic—and catholic—perspective, namely, one that affirms Thomas Aquinas as a culminating figure of the classical Christian tradition, rather than as one [End Page 685] current of that tradition that defines itself principally in contrast to other currents. In other words, Staudt reads Aquinas in light of Scripture, the Fathers of the Church, and classical philosophy, on the one hand, and in positively disposed engagement with more recent thinkers, such as Ratzinger and Balthasar, on the other. In treating such a fundamental theme as religion, it is especially fitting to attempt to take a fundamental, rather than a “partisan,” approach.The book falls into three basic parts. The first part seeks, in three chapters, to lay out the basic principles of the argument. In chapter 1, Staudt contrasts the opposition Barth presents between religion and the revelation of Scripture, to Aquinas’s interpretation of religion, which integrates philosophy—in this case, Cicero—with Scripture. Chapter 2 considers another objection to Christian religion, this time from the other side, namely, Kant’s attempt to rethink religion from within the limits of reason, and therefore in separation from God. The third chapter sets up the book’s second part by considering religion “as an unfolding of law” (11), specifically, as a matter that, while rooted in natural law, must contend, in its historical enactment, with the distorting reality of sin and the redemption of grace. In other words, religion must be considered in its fundamental expression in the Old Law, and in its fulfillment in the New.The second part of the book investigates in more depth the specifically Christian reality of religion, again in three chapters. Chapter 4 presents religion as exemplified in the... (shrink)

_The Primacy of Perception_ brings together a number of important studies by Maurice Merleau-Ponty that appeared in various publications from 1947 to 1961. The title essay, which is in essence a presentation of the underlying thesis of his _Phenomenology of Perception,_ is followed by two courses given by Merleau-Ponty at the Sorbonne on phenomenological psychology. "Eye and Mind" and the concluding chapters present applications of Merleau-Ponty's ideas to the realms of art, philosophy of history, and politics. Taken together, the (...) studies in this volume provide a systematic introduction to the major themes of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. (shrink)

The article conducts an analysis of everyday notions of witnessing as emerging from the marginal writings of a mid-twentieth century Belgian medievalist, François Louis Ganshof (1895-1980). The aim of the analysis is threefold: to explore a specific set of cultural conditions shaping the understanding of witnessing; to demonstrate the primacy, in witnessing, of an intricate notion of historicity as moulded by scholarly practice; and to indicate that, and in what manner, witnessing and historicity informed a notion of political experience (...) that appears foundational to Ganshof's understanding of, and attitude towards, matters political in general. The article also stipulates the legitimacy and the value, in a historical investigation of political thought, of focusing on minor figures, discursive patterns and events of seeming insignificance. It ultimately proposes that the small-scale cultural labour on the discursive formations centred on historicity may be deployed for rethinking our understanding of epochal concepts such as modernity. (shrink)

The question of the relation between the collective and the individual has had a long but patchy history within both philosophy and psychology. In this chapter we consider some arguments that could be adopted for the primacy of the we, and examine their conceptual and empirical implications. We argue that the we needs to be seen as a developing and dynamic identity, not as something that exists fully fledged from the start. The concept of we thus needs more nuanced (...) and differentiated treatment than currently exists, distinguishing it from the idea of a ‘common ground’ and discerning multiple senses of ‘we-ness’. At an empirical level, beginning from the shared history of human evolution and prenatal existence, a simple sense of pre-reflective we-ness, we argue, emerges from second-person I-you engagement in earliest infancy. Developmentally, experientially and conceptually, engagement remains fundamental to the we throughout its many forms, characterized by reciprocal interaction and conditioned by the normative aspects of mutual addressing. (shrink)

We argue that current constructive approaches to the special theory of relativity do not derive the geometrical Minkowski structure from the dynamics but rather assume it. We further argue that in current physics there can be no dynamical derivation of primitive geometrical notions such as length. By this we believe we continue an argument initiated by Einstein.

This paper deals with three topics: types of rights, the development of the terminology of rights, and the question of the primacy of welfare rights. Because these topics are interrelated, my exposition does not observe rigid boundaries among them. There is no pretence at all that any of these subjects is fully covered here; nor is it proposed, except for one writer, to touch upon the contemporary literature on rights, as noteworthy as some of that literature is. In order (...) to gain entrance into the field, on which the writing has grown to massive proportions, I shall begin with an interesting historical phenomenon, some of whose philosophical import I want to explore. I should say at the outset, however, that the general motivation of this paper is the problem of the significance of the language of “rights.” Does it really make a difference, for instance, to speak of the “rights of man” rather than the “common duties of humanity”? Does the term “rights” add anything of special significance or is its only significance rhetorical and ideological? Can we dispense with the language of rights and still say everything we need to say about our moral relations? I confess to a moderate skepticism about the necessity of the language of rights in the last analysis. At any rate, this paper is intended as a contribution, however small, to this problem. The historical phenomenon with which I am going to begin will enable us to bring into focus the issue of the meaning of “rights.”. (shrink)

Peacocke introduces The Primacy of Metaphysics with the apt observation that ‘[t]here can be few issues as fundamental as the relation between the metaphysics o.

Schopenhauer conceives the will as metaphysically primary, as the thing in itself that underlies all phenomena, but also as having primacy over the intellect in human psychology. Experience is a function of the brain, which receives a teleological explanation as furthering the life of the organism. This is one example of Schopenhauer's conception of will to life, a blindly striving principle that manifests itself throughout individuals in the empirical world. The chapter examines the coherence of Schopenhauer's philosophy of the (...) self as will with his notion of the pure subject or ‘I’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Primacy of Christ: The Patristic Patrimony in Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI's Analogy in Theology by Vincent C. AnyamaRoland MillarePrimacy of Christ: The Patristic Patrimony in Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI's Analogy in Theology by Vincent C. Anyama (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2021), xii + 263 pp.In the famous dispute between Erich Przywara and Karl Barth, Przywara held the view that the analogy of being is the "formal principle of Catholic thought," (...) whereas Barth maintained the position that the analogy of being is the "invention of the Antichrist." The recent work of Fr. Vincent Anyama presents how the theology of Joseph Ratzinger, with this emphasis on the primacy of Christ, under the influence of the Church Fathers, contributes to the discussion revolving around the role of analogy within theology. Gottlieb Söhngen, one of Ratzinger's mentors and teachers, had appeased Barth with his argument of a Christocentric "analogia entis within an analogia fidei" (2–3). Anyama argues that Ratzinger has taken up the mantle of his mentor in appropriating his Christocentric synthesis of the analogy of faith and reason via his study of Augustine. The unique contribution of Anyama's work is that his study of Ratzinger takes the reader beyond the typical presentation of Ratzinger as an Augustinian and Bonaventurian theologian. Anyama's work engages the patristic influence of Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Clement of Alexandria, Irenaeus, Tyconius, Justin Martyr, and Maximus the Confessor in addition to the significance of Augustine in Ratzinger's theology.Anyama's study is concerned with addressing Ratzingerian scholarship in two different areas. First, he wants to address what is an inadequate assessment of the patristic influence upon Ratzinger's theology in the scholarship of Peter Fletcher and Peter Kucer. Second, he intends to address varying questions relating to Ratzinger's use of analogy in the work of Peter McGregor, Justin Kizewski, Peter Kucer, and Gabino Bilbaco (235). Anyama explicitly notes that he relies upon a "hermeneutic of continuity" that is limited to the continuity between the patristic heritage and Ratzinger's theology (13). Anyama limits the scope of his study on Ratzinger's use of analogy by adopting the patristic categories utilized by Justin Kizekski in work God-Talk: (1) faith and reason, (2) image and participation, and (3) God-talk (12). These categories will frame the structure for part two of the book (chapters 3–5), whereas the first part of the book (chapters 1–2) focuses on the general patristic understanding of analogy and the Church Fathers quoted by Ratzinger.Jesus Christ is the Incarnation of the logos of the Father. The Church Fathers use "wisdom" and logos in reference to both philosophy and the Christian faith. In the thought of Origin, Christ is the one unique Logos, [End Page 307] who is both the source and ultimate end of the many words (logoi) of natural reason (26). As the eternal Logos, Jesus Christ is the consummate Image, whereas the human person is an "image of the Image" via the rational soul in the theology of Clement of Alexandria (33–34). This line of patristic thought will become important later on in Anyama's work as he addresses the theme of the primacy of Christ within Ratzinger's thought. Creation in the image of God is distinct from the notion of likeness to God within much of patristic thought. In the thought of Irenaeus and other Fathers, likeness is "understood as assimilation of creatures into God," which is a participation of the creature in the life of God via the gift of grace and the life of the Spirit (46–47). The notions used by the Fathers, which are underscored by Anyama, are the identification of reason as "seeds of wisdom" (Origen) and "Seeds of the Word" (Justin Martyr). The analogy between pre-Christian philosophy and the Christian faith will be a frequent theme in the writings of Ratzinger, who will begin his inaugural lecture at the University of Bonn with an insightful reflection upon the God of philosophy and the God of faith.When Anyama begins the second part of the book, he focuses on the thought of Bonaventure because of the prominent influence he... (shrink)

An item that stands out (is isolated) from its context is better remembered than an item consistent with the context. This isolation effect cannot be accounted for by increased attention, because it occurs when the isolated item is presented as the first item, or by impoverished memory of nonisolated items, because the isolated item is better remembered than a control list consisting of equally different items. The isolation effect is seldom experimentally or theoretically related to the primacy or the (...) recency effects—that is, the improved performance on the first few and last items, respectively, on the serial position curve. The primacy effect cannot easily be accounted for by rehearsal in short‐term memory because it occurs when rehearsal is eliminated. This article suggests that the primacy, the recency, and the isolation effects can be accounted for by experience‐dependent synaptic plasticity in neural cells. Neurological empirical data suggest that the threshold that determines whether cells will show long‐term potentiation (LTP) or long‐term depression (LTD) varies as a function of recent postsynaptic activity and that synaptic plasticity is bounded. By implementing an adaptive LTP‐LTD threshold in an artificial neural network, the various aspects of the isolation, the primacy, and the recency effects are accounted for, whereas none of these phenomena are accounted for if the threshold is constant. This theory suggests a possible link between the cognitive and the neurological levels. (shrink)

Following a brief reconstruction of Hutto & Satne’s paper we focus our critical comments on two issues. First we take up H&S’s claim that a non-representational form of ur-intentionality exists that performs essential work in setting the scene for content-involving forms of intentionality. We will take issue with the characterisation that H&S give of this non-representational form of intentionality. Part of our commentary will therefore be aimed at motivating an alternative account of how there can be intentionality without mental content, (...) which we have called skilled intentionality. Skilled intentionality is the individual’s selective openness and responsiveness to a rich landscape of affordances.A second issue we take up concerns the distinction between ur-intentionality and content-involving intentionality. We will argue that our notion of skilled intentionality as it is found in humans cuts across these two categories. Instead of distinguishing between different forms of intentionality we recommend focusing on how skilled intentionality takes different forms in different forms of life. (shrink)

In the realm of meaning, what territory belongs to pragmatics, and what to semantics? The paper defends the primacy of semantics; it is semanticist rather than pragmaticist. The vehicle of content is primarily semantic, and is run by its ‘semantic engine’ so to speak. But what about problematic examples? Some authors proposes an extreme pan-semanticist answer: their semantic content is complete, since it relies on the convention pointing to what speaker “has in mind”. The semantic vehicle is complete, pragmatics (...) offers just lining and paint. The opposite extreme is Bach’s proposal that semantics encompasses only the “skeleton”, often not truth-conditional.The present paper defends an intermediate semanticist position: semantic content provides the guidance to truth-conditions, the rest is pragmatics. Call this “the guidance view”. In terms of vehicle metaphor, semantic content provides and directs the main force, it is the powertrain of the vehicle. The paper assumes that anaphora is semantic, shows that anaphora guides the hearer in determining the truth-conditional content, and argues that most problematic cases are anaphora-like: this concludes the defense of our guidance view. (shrink)

What is at the heart of political resistance? Whilst traditional accounts often conceptualise it as a reaction to power, this volume (prioritising remarks by Michel Foucault) invites us to think of resistance as primary. The author proposes a strategic analysis that highlights how our efforts need to be redirected towards a horizon of creation and change. This text combines a range of political and philosophical scholarship and provides an innovative rethinking of Foucault's model of power relations that leads towards a (...) new autonomism for the 21st century. (shrink)

It has been shown that, when observing an action, infants can rely on either outcome selection information (i.e., actions that express a choice between potential outcomes) or means selection information (i.e., actions that are causally efficient toward the outcome) in their goal attribution. However, no research has investigated the relationship between these two types of information when they are present simultaneously. In an experiment that addressed this question directly, we found that when outcome selection information could disambiguate the goal of (...) the action (e.g., the action is directed toward one of two potential targets), but means selection information could not (i.e., the action is not efficiently adjusted to the situational constraints), 7- and 9-month-old infants did not attribute a goal to an observed action. This finding suggests that means selection information takes primacy over outcome selection information. The early presence of this bias sheds light on the nature of the notion of goal in action understanding. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the primacy of the present in Husserl’s philosophy is not an unquestioned ballast inherited from the tradition of metaphysics but rather a genuinely phenomenological discovery. First, I explore the present of things and argue that the phenomenological primacy of the present in this domain should be understood in terms of what Husserl calls “affection.” Strictly speaking originary affection and associative syntheses (as the most basic phenomena for the givenness of things) can only (...) take place in the present or starting from the present. Second, I consider the present in the egological sphere and analyze its primacy for both the transcendental and the personal ego. Finally, I move to the experience of the other and argue that only the perception of the other’s body in the present gives rise to an authentic empathic experience as the experience of the other’s governing in his own body. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Kant's Statement of the Principle of the Primacy of Practical Reason, and its Role in Kant's Moral Theology The Primacy of Practical Reason in the Broader Sense The Primacy of Practical Reason and the Assumption of Freedom: Their Relation The Primacy of Practical Reason in Relation to the Theological Postulates Kant's Argument in “On the Primacy” Other Texts Kant's Copernicanism and the Concept of Practical Cognition in the Context of the (...) Postulates Influence. (shrink)

In "Motivation and the Primacy of Perception," I offer an interpretation and defense of Merleau-Ponty's thesis of the "primacy of perception," namely, that knowledge is ultimately founded in perceptual experience. I use Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological conception of "motivation" as an interpretative key. As I show, motivation in this sense amounts to a novel form of epistemic grounding, one which upends the classical dichotomy between reason and natural causality, justification and explanation. The purpose of my book is to show how (...) this novel conception of epistemic ground allows Merleau-Ponty to offer a radically new account of knowledge and its relation to perception. Over the course of seven chapters, I show that through the notion of motivation, Merleau-Ponty offers a compelling alternative to the empiricist and rationalist assumptions that underpin modern epistemology. Indeed, I argue that Merleau-Ponty's epistemological thinking is preferable to its major historical and contemporary competitors, including what I see as the other great alternative to rationalism and empiricism: Kant's transcendental idealism. Bridging phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science, "Motivation and the Primacy of Perception" argues that epistemology has long been hampered by an inadequate phenomenology of knowledge. However, a careful description of the phenomenon of motivation can offer compelling new ways to think about knowledge and longstanding epistemological questions. (shrink)