Facit till några Argument i "Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi" innehåller, som titeln skvallrar om, ett facit till några övningar i boken Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi. Flera olika bevismetoder illustreras: sanningstabeller, naturlig deduktion och semantiska tablåer. Boken innehåller mer än 50 sanningstabeller, mer än 70 naturliga deduktioner och ca 100 semantiska tablåer. Den innehåller fullständiga lösningar till ca 240 argument och en stor mängd skisser till lösningar. I vissa fall indikerar svaret (...) bara om argumentet är giltigt eller ogiltigt. I vissa fall ingår bara en symbolisering av en viss paragraf. Det är upp till läsaren att själv försöka bedöma om dessa argument är bra eller inte. Boken innehåller exempel på satslogiska, predikatlogiska, modallogiska och deontiska härledningar. Alla argument från Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi som analyseras eller värderas i denna bok förekommer också i detta facit i sin helhet. Det är därför möjligt att ha utbyte av denna bok även om läsaren inte har tillgång till Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi. Men eftersom Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi innehåller många argument som inte tas upp i detta facit är det lämpligt att först arbeta med övningarna i Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi och därefter jämföra de egna analyserna med lösningarna i detta facit. -/- Produkt information Publicerad: Januari 18, 2021 Språk: Svenska Format: Paperback Antal sidor: 580 sidor. (shrink)

Denna artikel är den andra i en serie om två artiklar som introducerar astrobiologins filosofi. Detta är ett förhållandevis nytt och i Sverige nästan okänt forskningsfält som dock befinner sig i snabb tillväxt internationellt. Ämnet presenteras här i form av exempel på några centrala frågeställningar inom området. I den här artikeln presenteras några frågeställningar hemmahörande i praktisk filosofi.

Den här boken är en övningsbok i logik och en kort introduktion till politisk filosofi och rättsfilosofi. Tonvikten ligger på den politiska filosofin. Boken innehåller tio kapitel. Det första kapitlet är en allmän inledning till politisk filosofi och rättsfilosofi. Kapitel 2 handlar om konservatism. Kapitel 3 handlar om liberalism. Kapitel 4 handlar om socialism. Kapitel 5 handlar om anarkism. Kapitel 6 handlar om kommunism. Kapitel 7 handlar om ekologism. Kapitel 8 innehåller blandade övningar i politisk filosofi och (...) rättsfilosofi. De flesta argument i detta kapitel kan analyseras med hjälp av satslogik. Kapitel 9 innehåller blandade övningar i politisk filosofi och rättsfilosofi. För att analysera argumenten i detta kapitel krävs i regel predikatlogik. Även Kapitel 10 innehåller blandade övningar i politisk filosofi och rättsfilosofi. För att analysera argumenten i detta kapitel krävs i regel modallogik eller deontisk logik. Den här boken innehåller en stor mängd argument. Genom att studera dessa kan läsaren öva upp sin förmåga att analysera och värdera olika filosofiska härledningar, samt att tänka och resonera logiskt. Boken kan användas i undervisning i filosofi och logik på en grundläggande nivå eller för självstudier. Läsningen kompletteras lämpligen med en eller flera introduktionsböcker till logik, som behandlar olika fundamentala logiska fakta och metoder. OBS: De flesta argument i denna bok har tidigare publicerats i boken Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi och många lösningar har tidigare publicerats i boken Facit till Några Argument i ”Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi”, även om den också innehåller ett antal argument som är nya. -/- Produkt information Publicerad: April 15, 2021 Språk: Svenska Format: Paperback Antal sidor: 216 sidor. (shrink)

Filosofi og pædagogik er gamle fæller, og der er et overlap mellem filosofiens historie og pædagogikkens historiske litteratur. Store tænkere som Platon, Aristoteles, Augustin, Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Herbart og Dewey hører hjemme begge steder. I den pædagogiske filosofi kan almene teoretiske og praktisk filosofiske spørgsmål udforskes systematisk og historisk. Gennem diskussioner af sådanne spørgsmål kan man forholde sig mere nysgerrigt, bevidst, begrundet og kritisk til pædagogisk praksis såvel som til pædagogisk teori, empiri og undervisningsteknologi. (...) -/- Fællesskabet er ikke uproblematisk. Pædagogik er ikke filosofi, og pædagogisk filosofi ikke kun pædagogik. Både didaktik og almen pædagogik kan komme i konflikt med pædagogisk filosofi. Hvordan kan almene pædagogiske spørgsmål overhovedet belyses filosofisk, og hvad betyder de for filosofien selv? En pædagogisk filosofisk tilgang forandrer kanon i både pædagogik og filosofi. Udvalget af nøgletekster ændres. Emner, der er værd at diskutere, forskydes. Nye forskningsspørgsmål og prioriteringer viser sig. Et pædagogisk perspektiv på filosofiens udvikling vil fremhæve dens bidrag til at forstå ’den pædagogiske problem- og fænomenverden’, ligesom et filosofisk perspektiv på pædagogikken vil flytte – eller rettere udvide – fokus med hensyn til dens idéhistorie såvel som dens aktuelle teoretiske praksis. Som i al anden filosofi kan man i den pædagogiske filosofi diskutere teoretiske og praktiske, såvel som poetiske og æstetiske spørgsmål; men det er typisk med en særlig vinkel, nemlig den pædagogiske. Man kan således diskutere erkendelse, viden og sandhed, ligeså vel som man kan undersøge ret, retfærdighed og skønhed. Ofte vil det være med en særlig tvist. Den pædagogiske filosofi kan vise sig som særegen både ved sin særlige position og ved at relatere sig til det pædagogiske som genstandsfelt. Hvad denne position og dette genstandsfelt egentlig er, er der dog ingen enighed om. Det kan ikke engang siges at være udelukkende pædagogisk defineret, og derfor må den pædagogiske filosofi forholde sig åbent til begge dele. Studier i pædagogisk filosofi indbyder til denne drøftelse. (shrink)

Den här boken är en övningsbok i logik och en kort introduktion till metaetik. Den innehåller nio kapitel. Det första kapitlet är en allmän inledning till moralfilosofin. Det innehåller information om vad metaetik är och om hur metaetiken förhåller sig till den normativa etiken, till praktisk (eller tillämpad) etik och till deskriptiv moralfilosofi. Kapitel 2 handlar om språkfilosofiska frågor. Kapitel 3 handlar om medvetandefilosofiska frågor. Kapitel 4 behandlar kunskapsteoretiska frågor. Kapitel 5 handlar om metafysiska frågor. Kapitel 6 handlar om (...) logiska frågor. Kapitel 7 handlar om övriga metaetiska frågor, om relativism, objektivism och subjektivism. Kapitel 8 innehåller blandade övningar i predikatlogik. Kapitel 9 innehåller blandade övningar i modallogik och deontisk logik. Den här boken innehåller en stor mängd argument. Genom att studera dessa kan läsaren öva upp sin förmåga att analysera och värdera olika filosofiska härledningar, samt att tänka och resonera logiskt. Boken kan användas i undervisning i filosofi och logik på en grundläggande nivå eller för självstudier. Läsningen kompletteras lämpligen med en eller flera introduktionsböcker till logik, som behandlar olika fundamentala logiska fakta och metoder. OBS: De flesta argument i denna bok har tidigare publicerats i boken Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi eller i boken Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Teoretisk Filosofi och många lösningar har tidigare publicerats i boken Facit till Några Argument i ”Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi”, även om den också innehåller många argument som är nya. -/- Produkt information Publicerad: Juni 24, 2021 Språk: Svenska Format: Paperback Antal sidor: 448 sidor. (shrink)

Den här boken är en övningsbok i logik och en kort introduktion till normativ etik. Den innehåller nio kapitel. Det första kapitlet är en allmän inledning till normativ etik. Det innehåller information om vad normativ etik är och hur den normativa etiken förhåller sig till metaetik, praktisk (eller tillämpad) etik och deskriptiv moralfilosofi. Kapitel 2 handlar om dygdetik. Kapitel 3 handlar om naturlagsetik. Kapitel 4 handlar om kontraktualism (kontraktsetik) och rättighetsetik. Kapitel 5 handlar om kantianism, sinnelagsetik och pliktetik. Kapitel (...) 6 handlar om konsekvensetik. Kapitel 7 handlar om prima-facie-etik, omsorgsetik och situationsetik. Kapitel 8 handlar om fenomenologisk etik och existentialistisk etik. Kapitel 9 innehåller kort information om diverse andra normativa teorier och blandade övningar. Den här boken innehåller en stor mängd argument. Genom att studera dessa kan läsaren öva upp sin förmåga att analysera och värdera olika filosofiska härledningar, samt att tänka och resonera logiskt. Boken kan användas i undervisning i filosofi och logik på en grundläggande nivå eller för självstudier. Läsningen kompletteras lämpligen med en eller flera introduktionsböcker till logik, som behandlar olika fundamentala logiska fakta och metoder. OBS: De flesta argument i denna bok har tidigare publicerats i boken Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi och många lösningar har tidigare publicerats i boken Facit till Några Argument i ”Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi”, även om den också innehåller många argument som är nya. -/- Produkt information Publicerad: April 15, 2021 Språk: Svenska Format: Paperback Antal sidor: 418 sidor. (shrink)

Den här boken är en övningsbok i logik och en kort introduktion till religionsfilosofi. Den innehåller femton kapitel. Det första kapitlet är en allmän inledning till ämnet. Kapitel 2 tar upp några begreppsliga frågor. Vad är en religion? Det innehåller även en kort beskrivning av några vanliga religioner. Kapitel 3 handlar om språkfilosofiska frågor. Kapitel 4 handlar om religionssociologiska och religionspsykologiska frågor m.m. Kapitel 5 handlar om religiös monism, pluralism, relativism, naturalism m.m. Kapitel 6 handlar om berättelser, myter m.m. Kapitel (...) 7 handlar om fenomenologiska frågor. Kapitel 8 handlar om religiösa handlingar m.m. Kapitel 9 handlar om kunskapsteoretiska frågor. Kapitel 10 handlar om metafysiska frågor. Kapitel 11 handlar om moralfilosofiska frågor. Kapitel 12 innehåller blandade övningar i predikatlogik. Kapitel 13 innehåller blandade övningar i relationell predikatlogik (med och utan identitet). Kapitel 14 innehåller blandade övningar i modallogik och deontisk logik. Kapitel 15 innehåller en sammanfattning. Den här boken innehåller många olika argument. Läsaren kan förhoppningsvis öva upp sin förmåga att analysera och värdera olika filosofiska deduktioner, samt att tänka och resonera logiskt, genom att studera dessa. Boken kan användas i undervisning i filosofi och logik på en grundläggande nivå eller för självstudier. Läsningen kompletteras lämpligen med någon god introduktionsbok till logik. För att förstå de logiska lösningarna i den här boken kan det vara bra att känna till vissa grundläggande logiska fakta och metoder. Boken innehåller tre olika metoder: sanningstabeller, naturlig deduktion och semantiska tablåer. OBS: Många argument i denna bok har tidigare publicerats i boken Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi och många lösningar har tidigare publicerats i boken Facit till Några Argument i ”Logiska Övningar: En Introduktion till Praktisk Filosofi”, även om den också innehåller många argument som är nya. (shrink)

Just as we can be more or less certain that there is extraterrestrial life or that Goldbach’s conjecture is correct, we can be more or less certain about normative matters, such as whether euthanasia is permissible or whether utilitarianism is true. However, accommodating the phenomenon of degrees of normative certitude is a difficult challenge for non-cognitivist and expressivist views, according to which normative judgements are desire-like attitudes rather than beliefs. Several attempts have been made on behalf of non-cognitivism and expressivism (...) to meet the challenge Studies in metaethics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; Sepielli in Philos Stud 160: 191–207, 2012; Eriksson and Francén Olinder in Aust J Philos 94: 719–735, 2016). These attempts have all been found wanting. Michael Ridge has recently offered a quasi-realist solution, according to which expressivists can say exactly what cognitivists say about certitude, including normative certitude. In this paper, we explain the basic problem and Ridge’s quasi-realist solution. We then argue that the quasi-realist account of normative certitude faces severe difficulties that do not arise for cognitivist accounts, according to which normative judgements are beliefs. (shrink)

Contemporary population ethics is dominated by views that aggregate by summing, whether of well-being or of some construct based on well-being. In contrast, average well-being is generally considered axiologically irrelevant. To many of us, however, the number of future people does not seem important, as long as it is sufficient to enable rich and varied life experiences, and as long as the population continues throughout time. It therefore seems relatively plausible to aggregate future well-being by averaging. In particular, it seems (...) plausible to value high average well-being at any particular time, and to do so for all future times. I present a time-sensitive version of the Average View that underpins such axiological intuitions. I also address a series of issues and objections that confront such a view. (shrink)

The idea of reflective equilibrium remains the most popular approach to questions about method in ethics, despite the masses of criticism it has been faced with over the years. Is this due to the availability of compelling responses to the criticisms or rather to factors that are independent of its reasonableness? The aim of this paper is to provide support for the first answer. I particularly focus on the recent discussion. Some recent objections are related to general arguments against the (...) possibility of moral knowledge, such as so-called “evolutionary debunking arguments.” I argue that nothing that has come to light in that debate, or in the recent discussion about IRE more generally, decisively strengthens the case against it. If anything, the recent developments show that IRE deserves its present status. (shrink)

Rebecca Brown and Julian Savulescu argue in ‘Responsibility in Healthcare Across Time and Agents’ that if responsibility should play a crucial role in healthcare, then we need a concept of responsibility that reflects that an individual’s behaviour is sometimes, if not routinely, influenced by external factors in various ways. As Brown and Savulescu convincingly show, health-related behaviour in particular is often affected by other agents and typically involves multiple decisions on different occasions. Smoking and a poor diet are but two (...) examples where these factors are salient. Since health-related behaviour is often influenced by others, and often spread out over time, a notion of responsibility that does not take these two factors into account will be inadequate. In this comment to their paper I wish to raise an issue concerning Brown and Savulescu’s characterisation of individual responsibility for health-related behaviour that involves multiple choices by the same agent over a period of time. For simple acts—smoking a cigarette or eating some junk food for example—Brown and Savulescu assume two necessary conditions for responsibility: a ‘control condition’ and a ‘epistemic condition’. These conditions are intended to capture the plausible idea that …. (shrink)

Many moral error theorists hold that moral facts are irreducibly normative. They also hold that irreducible normativity is metaphysically queer and conclude that there are no irreducibly normative reasons and consequently no moral facts. A popular response to moral error theory utilizes the so-called ‘companions in guilt’ strategy and argues that if moral reasons are irreducibly normative, then epistemic reasons are too. This is the Parity Premise, on the basis of which critics of moral error theory draw the Parity Conclusion (...) that if there are no irreducibly normative reasons, there are no moral reasons and no epistemic reasons. From the Parity Conclusion and Epistemic Realism (the view that there are epistemic reasons), it follows that it is false that there are no irreducibly normative reasons. In this paper, I argue that the Parity Premise and the Parity Conclusion can both plausibly be rejected. (shrink)

This chapter focuses exclusively on normative reasons. Normative reasons count in favor of actions and attitudes like beliefs, desires, feelings, and emotions. Section 11.2 explores the common ground concerning the metaphysics of reasons. We shall see that the really controversial metaphysical issues in metanormative theorizing about reasons arise with respect to the metaphysics of the reason relation. The two subsequent sections therefore go beyond the common ground and consider competing accounts of the reason relation. Robust and quietist versions of non-naturalism (...) are considered in section 11.3 and naturalism is considered in section 11.4. Section 11.5 summarizes and gives a brief comparative assessment of the accounts considered. (shrink)

Philosophers traditionally distinguish between excuses and exemptions. We can excuse someone and still see them as a participant in normal human relationships, but when we exempt someone, we see them as something to be managed and handled: we take an objective attitude to them. Madness is typically assumed to ground exemptions, not excuses. So far, the standard philosophical picture. Seeing other people as objects to be managed and handled rather than as persons with whom one can have relationships is, however, (...) ethically problematic. If I am mad myself, consistently seeing myself this way becomes downright unsustainable. A better option, I will argue, is to fully appreciate my own difficulties and learn to show myself compassion and understanding. I, then, can excuse myself on those grounds. Furthermore, a compassionate self-excusing attitude leaves room for both nuance and improvement in a way that total exemption does not. Finally, I will argue that many mad actions ought to be considered justifiable and justified rather than in need of exemption or excuse. (shrink)

Recently, it has been argued by several scholars that we have moral reasons to limit our procreation due to the harmful environmental consequences it entails. These calls for procreative restraint are typically made in relation to other lifestyle choices, such as minimizing driving and air travel. In such comparisons, it is assumed that the environmental impact of procreation encompasses the lifetime consumption of the child created, and potentially that of further descendants. After an overview of these arguments, I go on (...) to provide an examination of the main benefits of procreation, in relation to those of consumption, i.e., other lifestyle choices. My normative assumption is that benefits hold moral relevance, alongside harms. Procreation may benefit procreators and may provide more collective benefits. Some benefits tend to preempt the environmental impact associated with procreation. I conclude that the benefits of procreation are substantial and typically greater than those of consumption. (shrink)

Ever since environmental ethics began to take form as an academic discipline in the early 1970s, the notion of intrinsic value has occupied a prominent position within the field. Recently, however, various types of critique have emerged within EE against invoking this notion. Contrary to these critiques, I argue that appeals to intrinsic value are not problematic, given the reason-implying sense of 'intrinsic value' that is most relevant to EE. I further argue that also those who criticise 'intrinsic-value-talk' in EE (...) actually need this reason-implying concept of intrinsic value. However, once we realise that this is the sense of 'intrinsic value' that is most relevant to EE, it also becomes clear that it is the concept of a reason, rather than that of intrinsic value, that is most important to EE. (shrink)

This chapter addresses a general question: What is responsible risking? It explores the notion of "responsible risking" as a thick moral concept, and it argues that the notion can be given moral content that could be action-guiding and add an important tool to our moral toolbox. To impose risks responsibly, on this view, is to take on responsibility in a good way. A core part of responsible risking, this chapter argues, is some version of a Forethought Condition. Such a condition (...) requires us to not make decisions or plans such that we could not deliver on our responsibility obligations. This chapter argues that three moral obligations can be derived from descriptive notions of responsibility. They are (1) the control condition, (2) the responsibility to fix condition, and (3) the responsibility to explain condition. The idea is that in order to impose risks responsibly we ought not act in ways that undermine our ability to remain in control over the risks, undermine our ability to sort out negative outcomes by reparations or compensation, or undermine our prospects of providing an explanation for our actions that also makes sense in hindsight and to those affected. This idea is then tried out on the case of germline gene editing. It is argued that such a moral notion of responsibility is also action-guiding when we do not know for certain what is the morally right or obligatory action all-things-considered due to epistemic gaps. (shrink)

Error theories have been proposed and defended in several different areas of philosophy. In addition to ethics, there are error theories about numbers, color, free will, and personal identity. Moral error theories differ in scope. Theories at one end of the spectrum take normative judgments in general—of which moral judgments are a subclass—to be uniformly false, whereas theories at the other end of the spectrum take only a subclass of moral judgments—example those concerning duty and obligation, but not those concerning (...) virtue and vice—to be uniformly false. Moral error theorists typically join forces with non-naturalist realists, against naturalism and non-cognitivism. Facts that are normative in the reason-implying sense are irreducibly normative, and they are very different. Many non-naturalist realists and error theorists maintain that it is impossible to give a plausible naturalistic account of moral facts, precisely because they are irreducibly normative; moral naturalism therefore falls prey to the "normativity objection". (shrink)

In his recent book The Value Gap (2021), Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen defends a pluralist view of final goodness and goodness-for, according to which neither concept is analysable in terms of the other. In this paper I defend a specific version of monism, namely so-called ‘Mooreanism’, according to which goodness-for is analysable partly in terms of final goodness. Rønnow-Rasmussen offers three purported counterexamples to Mooreanism. I argue that Mooreanism can accommodate two of them. The third is more problematic, but this is in (...) the end not a decisive objection. (shrink)

This thesis examines how we should understand the concept of harm, and its moral and prudential importance. It discusses various analyses of harm and normative principles that appeal to harm. In broad terms, it offers a defense of the view that harm is normatively important and useful for philosophical theorizing. Further it proposes a novel analysis of harm, which aligns with that view. The first paper, "The Harm Principle and the Nature of Harm", defends John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle against (...) the criticism that the principle has unacceptable implications regardless of which analysis of harm we plug into it. I argue that the criticism is built on mistaken assumptions – most importantly, the assumption that the Harm Principle is plausible only if there exists an unproblematic analysis of harm. The second paper, "Feit on the Normative Importance of Harm", criticizes Neil Feit’s suggested solution to the so-called Failing to Benefit Problem for the Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA). Feit argues that CCA’s inability to align with some commonsense views about harm’s moral importance is no flaw since those views are false. I object to that argument, in part by showing that the cases that Feit appeals to are not genuine counterexamples. The third paper, "Doing Away with Skepticism about Harm", scrutinizes the elimination thesis, which states that we should do away with the concept of harm in philosophical theorizing. I examine various claims in support of that thesis – for instance that the concept is defective – but conclude that we lack good reasons to accept it. The fourth paper, "Misfortune and Missing Out", focuses on Kaila Draper’s famous challenge for deprivationism – the view that death harms a subject in so far as it deprives her of life’s goods. Since not winning the lottery is also a deprivation, the challenge is to explain why only death is a misfortune in the sense that it merits negative emotional responses. I argue that the challenge is serious, in part by criticizing some prominent suggested solutions, and identify a parallel challenge for CCA. The fifth paper, "A Fitting Attitudes Analysis of Harm", puts forward a novel analysis of harm. Roughly, this analysis says that an event harms me if, and only if, it is fitting for me to disfavor the event for my own sake. (shrink)

Education for sustainable development (ESD) is nowadays internationally considered an important aspect of the overall education of children and young people in the world. It is included among the goals of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Besides its content – sustainable development – ESD is also characterized by its emphasis on a democratic and participatory educational procedure. In this paper, we show how both these aspects of ESD – its content and procedure – reveal the importance of bringing (...) ethical considerations into ESD, as well as provide challenges for ethics teaching in ESD. (shrink)

Facts about moral disagreement and human evolution have both been said to exclude the possibility of moral knowledge, but the question of how these challenges interact has largely gone unaddressed. The paper aims to present and defend a novel version of the evolutionary “debunking” argument for moral skepticism that appeals to both types of considerations. This argument has several advantages compared to more familiar versions. The standard debunking strategy is to argue that evolutionary accounts of moral beliefs generate skeptical implications (...) because they attribute those beliefs to factors that are unrelated to their truth. That strategy is vulnerable to “third-factor” responses, which invoke first-order moral claims to challenge the assumption that Darwinian factors and the moral truths are really unrelated in that way. In contrast, our version is immune to those responses, as it does not proceed via assumptions about how Darwinian factors relate to the moral facts. Instead, it focuses on what evolutionary accounts of moral beliefs have to say about the fact that people often reach divergent moral beliefs. The argument thereby illustrates how the debunking strategy can join forces with the argument from moral disagreement. The combination of those strategies presents, we think, a challenge that is more formidable than when they are considered separately. (shrink)

Assume that neuro-doping is safe and efficient. This means that the use of it, and similar future safe methods of enhancement in sport, may help those who are naturally weak to catch up with those who are naturally strong and sometimes even defeat them. The rationale behind anti-doping measures seem to presuppose that this is unfair. But the idea that those who are naturally strong should defeat those who are naturally weak rests on a fascistoid ideology that sport had better (...) leave behind. Neuro-doping may be seen as a means to undermine the fascistoid notion of fairness. The conjecture is that, given that society adopts what will be characterized as a policy of biological egalitarianism, this will happen. Then people will compete in society in general and in sport in particular on more equal biological terms. The fascination with natural strength, and the cheering for the winners, can then go away. Instead we see a liberated sport where we take part in it for the sheer fun of doing so. Neuro-doping, and similar techniques, may be a means that helps to liberate elite sport from its perverse view of fairness. (shrink)

In a reply to my recent paper “The Cost of Denying Intrinsic Value in Nature,” Rut Vinterkvist raises an important objection to my claim that environmentalists must ascribe intrinsic value to some natural entities to consistently defend the protectionist views I believe many of them have. To defend this claim, I provided three hypothetical cases, involving threatened natural entities, designed to show that only an intrinsic value of these respective entities could explain a reason to protect them. My claim was (...) that, even in these cases, environmentalists would generally find the natural entities in question protection-worthy. Against this claim, Vinterkvist argues that environmentalists can consistently opt for protection of these entities without ascribing any intrinsic value to them, the idea being that we can argue for protection of the entities on the basis that other people care for them (for whatever reasons, if any). We should protect them, not for their own sake, but for the sake of those who care for them. In this response, I explain why I believe her suggestion—challenging to my argument as it is—does not provide a proper option for environmentalists who want to argue for protection in these and similar cases. (shrink)

The scheme of concepts we employ in daily life to explain intentional behaviour form a belief-desire model, in which motivating states are sorted into two suitably broad categories. The BD model embeds a philosophy of action, i.e. a set of assumptions about the ontology of motivation with subsequent restrictions on psychologising and norms of practical reason. A comprehensive critique of those assumptions and implications is offered in this work, and various criticisms of the model are met. The model’s predictive and (...) explanatory value exploits realistic notions of beliefs and desires as inner states underlying behavioural patterns. It is argued that the popular explication that beliefs and desires differ in their “direction of fit” is insufficient and inescapably normative. Essential to the model is the causal role given to desires. ‘Desire’ is therefore focussed. A dispositional and functional characterisation of desires is compatible with an eliminative view of dispositions. These views taken together do not exclude regarding desires as causes. Desires have propositional content. Content is a feature of desire’s dispositionality, and thereby causally relevant. This functional characterisation of content allows for non-linguistic content. The phenomenal conception of desire is criticised and diagnosed. A theme defended in various ways throughout the work is that desires mostly are unknown to agents and that the agent is in a less privileged position when it comes to analysis of his own motivational states, than e.g. people close to him. There are formal and empirical reasons to be pessimistic about agents’ abilities to make reliable predictions about their own intentional behaviour. The BD model’s concept of ‘intention’ is discussed and compared with non-reductive views of intentions. Criticisms of the common view that David Hume defends a BD model are presented, but it is argued that the BD interpretation of Hume is plausible, although this reading requires important qualifications in order to preserve internal consistency. The BD model leaves room for focussing attention, making foregrounded practical judgements, higher order desiring and other activities affecting one’s decision process. However, these various forms of deliberation in many cases are overrated. Three suggested norms of internal structural rationality are criticised in favour of simple Humean instrumentalism about practical reason. That position implies that criticism of other people’s ultimate ends is not a matter of internal rationality, but an inevitably social practice; it is dependent upon our concern for others, our view of their social roles and our own intrinsic desires. (shrink)

I anledning af 50-året for udgivelsen af et af de mest betydningsfulde værker i det 20. århundredes filosofi, Emmanuel Lévinas' Totalitet og uendelighed, behandler artiklen et grundtema i værket, nemlig forholdet mellem etik og undervisning. Det sker under inddragelse af den pædagogiske model, som Lévinas anser for at stå i et modsætningsforhold til sin egen etiske forståelse af undervisning, den sokratiske maieutik. Den udførlige behandling af de to «positioner» skal imidlertid vise, at de har mere til fælles, end det (...) kommer frem i den første modstilling, hvilket giver mulighed for at formulere en mellemposition, der fastholder det etiske ved begge, og som er mere praktisk anvendelig i undervisning end nogen af dem taget hver for sig.Nøgleord: etik, undervisning, Lévinas, åbenbaring, Sokrates, maieutik, dialogEnglish summary: The Ethical Dimension of Teaching – Based on a Main Theme in the Work of Emmanuel LévinasOn the occasion of the 50th anniversary of one of the most important works in 20th century philosophy, Emmanuel Lévinas' Totality and Infinity, the article presents a main theme of this work, the relationship between ethics and teaching. The discussion draws on another pedagogical understanding, which Lévinas considers to be opposed to his own ethical understanding of teaching, Socratic maieutics. A thoroughgoing interpretation of the two «positions» shows, however, that they have more in common than what the opposition seems to elucidate at first. The sublation of the two will make it possible to sketch out a third ethical point of view, more applicable to teaching in practice than either of the two taken on its own. (shrink)

Sokrates var inte bara en filosofisk nydanare. Genom sitt sätt att involvera sina samtalspartners i den filosofiska processen var han också i hög utsträckning en pedagogisk nydanare. Hans pedagogiska grundidé var den så kallade majeutiska metoden – det vill säga ”barnmorskemetoden”. Med det menade han att han inte överförde sina egna färdiga tankar till den han talade med utan han hjälpte sin samtalspartner att föda sina egna tankar. Inom pedagogiken är det vanligt att använda den så kallade ”Sokratiska metoden” vilket (...) i sin enklaste form bara innebär att man ställer frågor till studenterna. Den här artikeln kommer emellertid att handla om en mer sofistikerad metod som används för begreppsanalys/begreppsdefinition i grupp. Metoden är inspirerad av Sokrates men skiljer sig också en del från hur Sokrates själv grep sig an sina dialoger – åtminstone så som de beskrivs av Platon. Artikeln innehåller en kort historisk och pedagogisk bakgrund men syftar framför allt till att utgöra en praktisk vägledning för genomförande av sokratiska dialoger i filosofiundervisningen. Artikeln bygger framför allt på mina egna erfarenheter av att använda Sokratisk Dialog i undervisningen vid Filosofiska institutionen vid Lunds universitet, Lunds Tekniska Högskola, Sveriges Lantbruksuniversitet och i det privata näringslivet. Artikeln vänder sig till alla som undervisar i filosofi på universitetet eller gymnasiet eller i filosofiska metoder för studenter vid andra utbildningar, t.ex. värdeteori, vetenskapsteori eller tillämpad etik för ingenjörer eller medicinare – eller i vilket annat ämne som helst där det förekommer begrepp som saknar en enkel och knivskarp definition men som är viktiga för ämnet. (shrink)

CONTENIDO: Kant y la pedagogía - De la objetividad a la objetivación - De la tensión entre el investigador y el método - Interdisciplinariedad e investigación cualitativa en educación - Formación y subjetividad: epistemología, lenguaje y pedagogía - La pedagogía ante la tecnología como estructura del mundo de la vida - Alcances y limitaciones de la inteligencia artificial en pedagogía - A propósito de la informática en el mundo de la pedagogía y de la educación - La representación del conocimiento (...) y la inteligencia artificial - La lógica de las ciencias como didáctica: ¿un bastión de modernidad? - La educación del futuro como futuro de la educación - De la epistemología de la pedagogía a la filosofía de la educación. (shrink)