Tato studie představuje specifické uchopení kritického racionalismu jako návrhu způsobu života. Jeho reminiscence jsou patrné již u Karla Poppera, který se však zaměřoval spíše na problematiku filosofie vědy. Ono specifické pojetí kritického racionalismu jako komplexního návrhu způsobu života rozpracoval až Popperův následovník, německý filosof Hans Albert. Popperovské filosoficko-vědní předpoklady Albert rozvíjí a aplikuje na oblast etiky, ekonomie, politiky a lidského sociálního života vůbec. Vychází přitom především z takzvaného falibilismu, který konstatuje omylnost veškerého lidského myšlení a jednání. Falibilismus je v rámci (...) Albertova kritického racionalismu spojen s takzvanými postuláty realizovatelnosti a kongruence, což souvisí s Albertovým řešením problému dichotomie poznání a rozhodnutí, respektive problému hodnotové neutrality vědy a problému tzv. čisté filosofie. V závěru studie je pak podniknut exkurs do současné vědecké praxe a načrtnuty možnosti kritického racionalismu jako způsobu života. (shrink)

The crisis of metaphysics has many roots. One of them is recognized to be a kind of semantic failure. It lies in the fact that the meaning and reference of metaphysical propositions as well as metaphysical terms seems to be problematic. This diagnosis was first established by I. Kant and then repeated by some of the XXth century philosophers. In this paper I will show what role is played by what I called the Requirement of Reference (RR) in the analysis (...) of the metaphysical discourse. I will argue that the RR draws the limitations for the conceptual and propositional schemata of metaphysics and, at the same time, prevents metaphysics from making de re assertions and utterances. I shall also examine in this light some of Ludwig Wittgenstein's theses from Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations in order to argue that two sorts of metaphysical considerations are possible despite of the above-mentioned criticism. One of them is the analysis of what might be shown but cannot be expressed in language. The other is the deep analysis of the conceptual schemata that constitute the foundations of human thought. (shrink)

In this article we will present the Leibniz-Mycielski axiom (LM) of set theory (ZF) introduced several years ago by Jan Mycielski as an additional axiom of set theory. This new postulate formalizes the so-called Leibniz Law (LL) which states that there are no two distinct indiscernible objects. From the Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski theorem it follows that every theory which has an infinite model has a model with indiscernibles. The new LM axiom states that there are infinite models without indis-cernibles. These models are (...) called Leibnizian models of set theory. We will show that this additional axiom is equivalent to some choice principles within the axio-matic set theory. We will also indicate that this axiom is derivable from the axiom which states that all sets are ordinal definable (V=OD) within ZF. Finally, we will explain why the process of language skolemization implies the existence of indis-cernibles. In our considerations we will follow the ontological and epistemological paradigm of investigations. (shrink)

Aristote, tout aussi bien que Descartes et Kant, fonde en fait la science sur les exigences ou postulats de la raison. L’idéalisme moderne justifie ces postulats en considérant le monde comme l’expression de l’esprit; c’est là une solution traditionnelle remontant à l'antique théorie du Logos ; seulement les idéalistes nient la dualité de l’être et de la pensée ; à cette doctrine d’immanence, on oppose une doctrine ou l’etre et la pensée tirent leur unité ou homogénéité relative d’une unité transcendante, (...) qui n’est pas du même ordre. Les postulats de la raison ont alors une valeur objective parce que la raison est expression d’être. (shrink)

La question de fond traitée dans cet article est celle des rapports entre la science et la philosophie. Cette question est abordée par le biais d'une considération de la critique de la science élaborée par la phénoménologie. La philosophie de Merleau-Ponty sert d'exemple de la position phénoménologique. Le but de l'article est de démontrer l'insuffisance de la position de Merleau-Ponty — et, par extension, de la phénoménologie en général — en ce qui concerne son appréciation de la nature véritable du (...) projet scientifique. A cette fin, on essaie de saisir le sens véritable des développements récents dans la science en examinant quatre cas particuliers : la physique nucléaire, la psychologie, la biologie moléculaire, la cybernétique. Le résultat de cette analyse est de montrer que la lecture que faisait Merleau-Ponty des visées et des tendances de la science était erronée et que la position classique de la phénoménologie est indéfendable. Comme, cependant, l'auteur se trouve en accord avec la motivation profonde de Merleau-Ponty et de la phénoménologie en ce qui concerne l'irréductibilité du sujet ou de la conscience à l'objectivisme scientifique, il est alors amené à se demander ce que pourrait être une position phénoménologique satisfaisante vis-à-vis de la science. C'est ainsi que l'article se termine par une critique de toute position positiviste en philosophie et par une tentative d'indiquer ce que devrait être la véritable nature du discours philosophique, une fois que celui-ci est purifié de tout empirisme, c'est-à-dire de toute prétention à des connaissances positives.The basic question delt with in this article is that of the relation between science and philosophy. This question is approached through a consideration of the phenomenological critique of science. The philosophy of Merleau-Ponty is taken as an example of the phenomenological position. The aim of the article is to show the insufficiency of Merleau-Ponty's position — and, by implication, of phenomenology in general — as regards his estimation of the true nature of the scientific project. To this end an attempt is made to seize hold of the true meaning of recent developments in science by examining four special instances : nuclear physics, psychology, molecular biology, cybernetics. The result of this analysis is to show that Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of aims and tendencies of science was mistaken and that the position normally taken by phenomenology cannot be defended. As, however, the author is in agreement with the basic motivation of Merleau-Ponty and of phenomenology as regard the irreducibility of the subject or consciousness to scientific objectivism, he is thus led to ask what might be a satisfactory phenomenological position vis-a-is science. The article thus ends a critique of all positivist positions in philosophy and with an attempt to indicate what must be the true nature of philosophical discourse, once this has been purified of all empirical elements, i.e., of all claims to positive knowledge. (shrink)

Ovaj rad nudi tumačenje fenomenološke ontologije putem razrade njenih temeljnih stavova, kako bi objasnio njihov značaj za znanost i naš osobni svjetonazor. U radu je fenomenologija shvaćena kao ispravna metoda ontologije ili „znanosti o bitku” kao najopćenitije filozofijske discipline. Ovo utjelovljuje ideju „prve filozofije” koja je slobodna od svih predrasuda i koja odbacuje ili kritizira metafiziku, dualizam subjekt–objekt, empirizam, racionalizam, realizam, idealizam, materijalizam, skepticizam i relativizam. Članak odbacuje ontološki objektivizam kao metodološku zabludu i nastoji dosegnuti jasno razumijevanje znanosti te nas (...) samih i našeg odnosa prema svijetu. Kao takav, on predstavlja uvodni dio u metodologiju znanstvenog rada te alternativnu perspektivu na probleme egzistencijalizma, religije i duhovnosti. (shrink)

Surveys ofpatients show that in crisis situations decisions about their life are primarily left to physicians and relatives. Only few actually have drawn or wish to draw up a living will, and that the trust in physicians and relatives is rnuch more irnportant to thern than any autonomaus self-deterrnination about their life and the type of their treatrnent. So the author points out that a renaissance of an ethics of care is needed, which places the well-being of the ill and (...) dying at the centre of ethical considerations and which constantly attempts to clarify the proper and good goals at which medical treatment and medical care should aim. Such ethics of care is based on relations of trust between the physician and patient which is not possible to establish without confidence-building talks and acquisition and habitualisation of medical and care virtues such as sympathy, goodwill, recognition of limitations of their own abilities, honesty and others. Just plain specialised information about the diagnosis and prognosis, which leaves the »autonomous enlightened« patients alone with their decision is not a sufficient basis for an ethics of care. (shrink)