This volume is a detailed study of the concept of the nutritive capacity of the soul and its actual manifestation in living bodies in Aristotle and Aristotelianism. Aristotle’s innovative analysis of the nutritive faculty has laid the intellectual foundation for the increasing appreciation of nutrition as a prerequisite for the maintenance of life and health that can be observed in the history of Greek thought. According to Aristotle, apart from nutrition, the nutritive part of the (...) class='Hi'>soul is also responsible for or interacts with many other bodily functions or mechanisms, such as digestion, growth, reproduction, sleep, and the innate heat. After Aristotle, these concepts were used and further developed by a great number of Peripatetic philosophers, commentators on Aristotle and Arabic thinkers until early modern times. This volume is the first of its kind to provide an in-depth survey of the development of this rather philosophical concept from Aristotle to early modern thinkers. It is of key interest to scholars working on classical, medieval and early modern psycho-physiological accounts of living things, historians and philosophers of science, biologists with interests in the history of science, and, generally, students of the history of philosophy and science. (shrink)

This paper argues that focusing on Aristotle’s theory of generation as primarily ‘hylomorphic’ can lead to difficulties. This is especially evident when interpreting the association between the male and sentient soul at GA 2.5. If the focus is on the male’s contribution as form and the female’s as matter, then soul becomes divided into nutritive from female and sentient from male which makes little sense in Aristotle’s biological ontology. In contrast, by seeing Aristotle’s theory as ‘archēkinētic’, a (...) process initiated by the male, the development of nutritive and sentient capacities emerges as intertwined, neither capacity originating in only one sex. (shrink)

In De Anima 2.4, Aristotle claims that nutritive soul encompasses two distinct biological functions: nutrition and reproduction. We challenge a pervasive interpretation which posits ‘nutrients’ as the correlative object of the nutritive capacity. Instead, the shared object of nutrition and reproduction is that which is nourished and reproduced: the ensouled body, qua ensouled. Both functions aim at preserving this object, and thus at preserving the form, life, and being of the individual organism. In each case, we show (...) how Aristotle’s detailed biological analysis supports this ontological argument. (shrink)

In Ennead 3.6, Plotinus maintains that the soul is unaffectable. This thesis is widely taken to imply that his soul is exempt from change and free from emotional ‘affections’. Yet these claims are difficult to reconcile with evidence that Plotinian souls acquire dispositional states, such as virtues, and are subjects of emotional ‘affections’, such as anger. This paper offers an alternative account that aims to address these difficulties. In denying affections to soul, Plotinus is offering a distinction (...) between the soul’s self-actuated motions (or "activities") and the passive motions (or "affections") of bodies. But this distinction does not imply the soul’s changelessness, since Plotinus regards psychic motions that culminate in the soul’s acquisition of new dispositional states as changes. As for emotional ‘affections’, these (as activities) are merely homonymous with the affections denied to soul, and so do not violate the ban on the soul’s affectability. (shrink)

For Aristotle, animals, by contrast to plants, possess a perceptual soul. However, there is disagreement concerning the point at which the perceptual soul is acquired, for him. On one influential interpretation, Aristotle thinks that the perceptual soul is acquired not during the initial formation of the embryo, but at some later stage of its development. On such interpretations of Aristotle’s view, the newly formed embryo is not yet an actual animal, but a plant-like living being or even (...) inanimate matter. We argue, by contrast, that Aristotle views the embryo, from the very beginning, as an actual animal exercising basic nutritive and perceptual functions. We show that this interpretation is consistent with Aristotle’s views on embryogenesis in the GA, HA, PA, and the Metaphysics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotle's On the Soul: A Critical Guide ed. by Caleb M. CohoeAttila HangaiCaleb M. Cohoe, editor. Aristotle's On the Soul: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Hardback, $99.99.Guiding readers through Aristotle's science of the soul, this volume covers many major topics of De Anima (DA) and addresses specific questions, including perennial interpretive problems. The self-contained chapters approach the text either by illuminating its (...) context or by elucidating key psychological concepts. While some contributions refer to relevant [End Page 318] positions by Aristotle's predecessors or contemporary philosophers, connections drawn to other Aristotelian texts predominate. Throughout, the emphasis is on philosophical questions. The result is a first-rate philosophical guide through this densely written treatise, which allows experienced readers of DA to deepen their understanding of Aristotelian psychology. Since most chapters approach interpretive issues from new angles and presuppose familiarity with the existing scholarship, beginners may want to start elsewhere.In Reeve's reading (chapter 1), Aristotle pursues dialectic in DA to define the soul as the first principle for the science of life. He construes dialectic as "going through puzzles and solving them by appeal to endoxa" (21), and equates it with induction from perceptual experience to knowledge of principles and causes. Contesting this view, Carter (chapter 2) argues that the physicist's method is not dialectical because the predecessors' views, conflicting as they are, do not constitute endoxa. Through close readings of DA II.2–5, he shows that Aristotle investigates earlier theories to assess how well they explain the main functions of the soul. One pertinent theory takes the soul to be attunement (harmonia). Shields (chapter 4) elucidates Aristotle's case for hylomorphism as an advance over the harmonia theory. Although harmonia (as the proper arrangement of parts) implies normativity, it falls short of rendering the soul as a final cause with its own good, so it cannot explain the unity of the body. Frey's chapter 5 on the soul's unity deals with this latter function. The problem of unity stems from the fact that each level in the hierarchy of souls—nutritive, perceptual, rational—can be defined independently, yet a posterior soul presupposes the existence of all prior ones. The key Frey uses to understand unity is potential presence. Just as a triangle is present potentially in a quadrangle—for division of the latter yields triangles—so too is the nutritive soul present potentially in the perceptual soul, although not due to a separating act. This, however, has counterintuitive implications: animal nutrition would be the function of a perceptual soul; furthermore, the nutritive soul of the embryo (in Frey's biological example) would first be present potentially (as undeveloped) and, once actualized (when developed), would revert to potentiality (at the development of the perceptual soul). Frey's other proposal is more promising. It turns on the notion of natural continuity: having an internal cause for a characteristic change with a unitary goal. Thus, the soul's unity for Frey (despite his reservations) seems to boil down to teleology: the soul sets a goal achieved through the manifestation of species-specific life functions. Invoking the biology of animal reproduction, Gelber (chapter 6) complements the teleological unity regarding the nutritive soul-part with the unity constituted by the continuity of the processes of nutrition, growth, and reproduction, namely, unity by material and efficient causes.Among the three contributions on reason (nous), Scheiter (chapter 3), examining its separability, breaks with the traditional interpretation and takes Aristotle to show (in DA III.4 and I.3) that reason is independent not only of bodily organs but of any magnitude (megethos). This envisages DA III.4–8 as an investigation into how reason functions as a different kind of capacity. It turns out, according to Kelsey's insightful chapter 11, that reason's actuality—insight (noēsis)—is the same as its intelligible object (noēton), and so intelligibility depends on separation from matter by the actuality of reason, making all and only the immaterial things intelligible and intelligent. Cohoe (chapter 12) draws the conclusion: human reason for Aristotle—being the defining part of the human soul, most... (shrink)

Aristotle's De Anima is one of the great classics of philosophy. Aristotle examines the nature of the soul-sense-perception, imagination, cognition, emotion, and desire, including, memory, dreams, and processes such as nutrition, growth, and death.

Provision of adequate nutrition to elderly patients who develop dysphagia after a stroke can be quite challenging, often leading to the placement of a percutaneous entero‐gastrostomy (PEG) tube for nutritional support. This hypothetical case describes the additional challenge of cross‐cultural belief that leads a daughter to provide oral feeding to her mother, an act that the medical team believes is dangerous and the daughter sees as salubrious. In this case, what is the proper balance between patient safety and deference to (...) cultural traditions and norms? Where are the limits? Two commentaries offer insights for conflict resolution, including recommending that the medical team seek to understand the cultural motivations of the family, balancing safety and respect for cultural norms. The second commentary also disagrees with the team's presumption that the daughter's feeding of her mother is a greater threat to the patient than the PEG tube feeding is. (shrink)

Aristotle outlines two methods in De Anima that one can employ when one investigates the soul. The first focuses on the exercises of a living organism’s vital capacities and the proper objects upon which these activities are directed. The second focuses on a living organism’s nature, its internal principle of movement and rest, and the single end for the sake of which this principle is exercised. I argue that these two methods yield importantly different, and prima facie incompatible, views (...) about what souls are. According to the first, the soul is a set of independently specifiable capacities that are related to one another in a manner that effects a unity of soul over and above the multiplicity. According to the second, the soul is a single, unitary nature that has a living organism’s form as its end. I bring the differences between these two conceptions of soul into relief and then attempt to reconcile the opposing views in a way privileges the conception according to which the soul is a unitary nature. In doing so, I discuss the following interrelated topics: (a) what makes a capacity a part of soul, (b) the relationship between the parts of soul within a given organism, (c) how a soul can be a unity while comprising various parts, (d) whether it is possible to give an adequate definition of life or soul, (e) what unity obtains among the various ways life is said that would allow for a proper, scientific investigation of life, and (f) the principle that grounds the hierarchy of souls—the nutritive, the perceptual, and the rational. (shrink)

In the history of ideas, innumerable attempts to explain life and to define living activities have invoked the notion of the soul. Yet this theoretical entity seems to be an unfathomable thing. Difficulties beset the mere definition of it, and controversies span from whether the soul is a material body or an immaterial form, an immortal or a mortal thing, a subject of experiential or of theoretical knowledge, to the question of whether it is the subject of a (...) specific discipline or rather of a scientia de anima that, in the Aristotelian tradition, was also regarded as a part of natural philosophy—the field of philosophy that deals with natural particulars. Not only was the soul thought, from a theological angle, to define the unity and unicity of living beings, but it was also seen as the source of several bodily activities such as nutrition and growth in living beings. And since some of the beings that grow and nourish themselves also sense and think, the relation of the origin of vegetative powers to the origin of perceptual and intellectual powers has always been an object of debate. In this sense, the soul has not just been a topic of one specific field, but has rather drawn upon many disciplines, combining the work of philosophers, religious thinkers, physicians, naturalists, chymists, and so on, thereby blurring the boundaries between different fields of knowledge. Botanical treatises of the Renaissance, for example, begin with the definition of the soul of plants and its primary role in bringing forth vegetal activities. Indeed, the presence of the soul was thought to be involved also in the life of animals, human beings, and, in some cases, it was even ascribed to minerals and stones, not to speak of the world-soul, the latent idea that the entire cosmos is animated with a soul. Furthermore, the theory of the materiality of the soul was developed since Antiquity and found new momentum in early modern times, in the reappraisal of Epicurean ideas by thinkers such as Guillaume Lamy, Pierre Gassendi, and Julian Offray de La Mettrie. Yet, with the Cartesian Henricus Regius, the understanding of vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls as material importantly surfaces as a peculiar attempt to mechanize the living functions of bodies. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, the three main varieties of soul – nutritive, perceptual, and rational – are hierarchically ordered. I develop and defend an interpretation of the soul’s unity that centers on Aristotle’s attempt to explain this hierarchy’s organizing cause. Aristotle draws an analogy between this series of souls and the series of figures. I first elucidate the fundamental feature both series share: each series’ prior members are present in capacity in its posterior members. I do so by (...) examining several other cases – mathematical, biological, and physical – where Aristotle appeals to presence in capacity. I then argue that an organism’s living body is continuous by nature. That is, an organism’s soul is the principle, cause, and end of a single, articulate activity of living and each of an organism’s vital bodily movements are aspects or partial manifestations of this unitary, natural activity. This account of natural continuity is, I contend, the key to understanding what it is for one soul to be present in capacity in another. And this account of presence in capacity is, I contend, the key to understanding what it is for a soul that comprises parts to be a unity. (shrink)

This paper aims to establish that, for Aristotle, the state of the physical body is crucial to the human capacity for theoretical understanding. In recent years, scholars have begun to recognise the importance of Aristotle’s biological writings for understanding his psychology, after the relative neglect of these connections. The relevance in particular of the so-called Parva naturalia, small works on what is common to body and soul, and the De motu animalium, a work devoted to animal motion in broad (...) terms, has begun to fill in the picture of how the living body is involved in cognition. This paper will support this point of view by adding the De generatione animalium, a work which gives an account of the advent of soul capacities through the development of the body from the blood, under the control of the nutritive soul. An Aristotelian science of human physiology is a study of the “thinking body”, a person as a whole rather than disembodied nous. I will first set out factors that have made it difficult to integrate Aristotle’s biological treatises into our understanding of human thinking. Next, I will distinguish the thinking shared with other animals, from theoretical understanding, which is something only humans can achieve. I will then explain the aspects of the body that must facilitate and eventually bring about the capacity for thinking, before turning to Aristotle’s embryology where nutritive soul is ultimately responsible for the construction and maintenance of the thinking body. It will be concluded that only a human body leads to theoretical understanding and only a healthy human body can do so adequately. (shrink)

This chapter addresses an interpretive question about why Aristotle identifies generation, growth and nourishment as the three distinct functions or activities of nutritive soul. Scholars typically try to explain this by appealing to the shared goal of these activities, though there is no consensus about what that goal is: Does Aristotle think that generation is a way of keeping oneself alive (and thus that the shared goal is self-maintenance), or is nourishment really a quasi-generative activity (and thus that (...) the shared goal is “form (re)production”)? Rather than taking that approach, Gelber offers a different but complementary way of accounting for the unity of these activities, by focussing on the continuity of their shared physiological basis. As it is argued here, the fact that these biological processes form a continuous cycle stems from Aristotle’s adherence, in his biological theory, to principles from his hylomorphic metaphysics. Attending to the details in works such as Generation of Animals that focus on the mechanisms underlying generation, growth and nourishment, it is shown how we can construct a coherent account of the unity of the three nutritive soul activities. (shrink)

For Aquinas the vegetative powers of the soul (viz. nutrition, growth, and reproduction) are properties of living organisms: that is, they are characteristics of living organisms which, while not being essential characteristics, can nevertheless be predicated necessarily and convertibly of living organisms. Furthermore, they are active powers in the sense that they are capacities to perform certain actions which can have effects. But such and interpretation of Aquinas leads to the conceptual difficulty of allowing for the possibility of non-active (...) living organisms (i.e., organisms which do nothing). This difficulty can be avoided if we consider at least one of the vegetative powers as being a capacity which is of necessity always exercised, and this not because of what it is, but because of what it is related to. Thus, on this interpretation, all living organisms perform at least one action by consequence of their necessary relation to an end. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 127-128 [Access article in PDF] Dennis Des Chene. Life's Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. Pp. viii + 220. Cloth, $45.00. The history of philosophy aims at the recovery and interpretation of past thought, and its reconstructions seek to avoid anachronism. Dennis Des Chene's book is exemplary in this respect. It offers a (...) sophisticated and accurate report on Late Scholastic views and arguments about life and its form and principle, the soul. It is full of subtle and informed discussions of texts from, principally, Francisco Toledo, Pedro Fonseca, the commentators from Coimbra, Francisco Suárez, and Rodrigo de Arriaga.But the aim of the history of philosophy is philosophical and not exclusively historical. Recovery of the past is, for the historian of philosophy, at the service of contemporary understanding. The Late Scholastic authors studied by Des Chene understood this to be so. Suárez, for instance, distinguished between those doctrines and inquiries which are "antiquated (antiquatae) and wholly relegated from philosophy" and those which are not (Metaphysical Disputations, "Copious Index to Aristotle's Metaphysics," Book I, ch. 7). Unfortunately, when judged from this perspective, Des Chene's book is not as successful.In spite of its many comparisons between current debates, Descartes's views, and Late Scholastic doctrines, the book does not succeed in extracting much by way of genuine philosophical insight. Though well-informed and intelligent, for the most part these glosses are mere statements of Late Scholastic views in contemporary terms. But correctly describing alchemical theories from the point of view of modern chemistry does not make them any less archaic.This book is indeed more a contribution to the history of ideas or of science than to the history of philosophy. To be fair, it is true that, first, as such it is a most valuable contribution; second, much of what Late Scholastics had to say about life and the soul is indeed antiquated; third, even if philosophically antiquated, an adequate grasp of Late Aristotelian thought on these matters is necessary to understand Descartes and subsequent developments; and finally, the kind of informed historical recovery that Des Chene has provided here is a necessary condition for whatever philosophical lessons could be gained from these texts.Life's Form is divided into four parts. The first, "Data for the Study of Souls," looks at the phenomena which the Late Aristotelians sought to understand and explain, recovering both their grasp of the place of the living among other substances, and the constraints, [End Page 127] originating both from accumulated experience and from Christian faith, to which they were subject.The second part, "Defining the Soul," first examines the question of how to define life. It then looks at the definition of the soul as "first act of an organic or potentially living physical body"—whether the soul is an accident of the body, an entirely separate substance, or the substantial form of the body. Here one finds addressed the question whether there is a form of the body separate from the soul, or whether strictly the body has only one form, the soul. The issue of cadaveric forms, peculiar forms of corpses arising after death and the departure of the soul, comes up here. In the last section of this part Des Chene examines the definition of the soul as a principle of life and the relation, both epistemological and ontological, between this definition in terms of the operations of the soul, and the earlier one of the soul as form, that is, in terms of its being.Part 3, "Powers and Parts," looks at the vegetative (nutritive, reproductive, and augmentative), animal (sensitive), and spiritual (intellective) powers of the soul. Des Chene examines the criteria for distinguishing between powers, the relation between the one soul and its many powers, and the unity of the soul. "Unity," the fourth part of the book, takes up this last topic. It looks at the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual powers as "parts" of the... (shrink)

This short chapter explores Aquinas’s teaching on the vegetative soul. At first glance, Aquinas does not seem too interested in the vegetative soul, and this type of soul certainly takes last rank compared with the sensory and the intellectual souls, which are of more relevance when it comes to human perfection and morality. However, this does not mean that Aquinas’s teaching on the vegetative soul lacks sophistication. The chapter first examines why there is a need to (...) posit a vegetative soul in the first place. It then turns to the three main functions of the vegetative soul – nutrition, growth, and generation – and how they are related. After addressing in what sense, according to Aquinas, human beings possess a vegetative soul, the chapter closes with a reflection on the relative obscurity of the activities of the vegetative soul. (shrink)

Aristotle was the first antient philosopher who systematically represented the doctrine of the soul (psychology) in the treatise “On the Soul” (De Anima) and in the minor natural science works called Parva naturalia, among which the most significant treatises are “De Sensu et Sensibilibus” and “De Memoria et Reminiscentia”. Aristotle considers psychology as the doctrine that explores the soul and its properties. He defines the soul as the principle of life, but the notion of life varies (...) greatly depending on whether we are talking about a plant, an animal or a person. This Aristotle’s approach distinguishes his psychology from modern ones. Aristotle’s psychology considers all animate entities, and not just those who possess mind, that is, human beings. Aristotle gave a general definition of the soul as the first entelechy of the organic body. He also identified three types of souls depending on their functions: nutritive, perceptive and intellective. Each type of soul has certain properties and capacities. The nutritive soul nourishes, due to which a living being grows and lives, the perceptive soul perceives, and the intellective soul thinks. (shrink)

The discussion of the soul as a principle of life in ancient Greek philosophy was not limited to the soul’s relation to the body, the capacities of the soul, and the functions of the living organism. The debates about the soul and life also concerned issues of embryogenesis, such as the generation, formation, and animation of an organic body in the womb. The fragments of these debates can be traced in the writings of Alexander of Aphrodisias, (...) particularly in his treatise On the Soul. In this paper, I examine Alexander’s views on animal reproduction, especially considering the problematic question of the life and animation of the embryo. Analyzing generation among the other capacities of the nutritive soul in On the Soul, Alexander considers the causes of embryogenesis. As the first cause, he indicates the nutritive capacity, which is transmitted from the parent through the seed and acts in the embryo. In addition, as Simplicius states in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Alexander claims that the soul of the parent acts as a paradeigma that specifies the order and the goal of the embryo’s development. Thus, I explain Alexander’s understanding of the causes of the embryo’s development and animation in the context of his idea of the soul as a capacity (δύναμις) and state (ἕξις). (shrink)

The soul is an explanatory principle of Aristotle’s natural science, accounting both for the fact that living things are alive as well as for the diverse natural attributes that belong to them by virtue of being alive. I argue that the explanatory role of the soul in Aristotle’s natural science must be understood in light of his view, stated in a controversial passage from Parts of Animals (645b14–20), that the soul of a living thing is a “complex (...) activity” of its organic body. This paper explores the role of this “complex activity” model of soul in Aristotle’s study of soul in De Anima. I argue, first, that the model has its origins in De Anima II.4, where Aristotle argues that living things do all they do by nature for the sake of a single, teleologically primary end. I argue further that Aristotle uses this model to account for the psychological attributes naturally present in living things, including their capacities for vital activities like nutrition, reproduction, and perception, and that this is the task to which Aristotle devotes the obscure final chapters of De Anima III. (shrink)

Aristotle's De Anima is the first systematic philosophical account of the soul, which serves to explain the functioning of all mortal living things. In his commentary, Ronald Polansky argues that the work is far more structured and systematic than previously supposed. He contends that Aristotle seeks a comprehensive understanding of the soul and its faculties. By closely tracing the unfolding of the many-layered argumentation and the way Aristotle fits his inquiry meticulously within his scheme of the sciences, Polansky (...) answers questions relating to the general definition of soul and the treatment of each of the soul's principal capacities: nutrition, sense perception, phantasia, intellect, and locomotion. The commentary sheds light on every section of the De Anima and the work as a unit. It offers a challenge to earlier and current interpretations of the relevance and meaning of Aristotle's highly influential treatise. (shrink)

The three sorts of soul in Aristotle’s On Soul (nutritive, animal, and cognitive) may be understood as one insofar as each must go out of itself in order to confirm itself as itself. This feature of soul, without which there would be no distinction between inside and outside at all, proves to be the underlying theme of the Nicomachean Ethics. It is at the core of both moral virtue and intellectual virtue and points as well to (...) the principle of their union. Rationality, whether in the form of morality or of thought, is necessarily incomplete rationality, for its perfection could become manifest only in a completed structure in which neither choice nor longing to know would have any place and in which rationality would be indistinguishable from mechanical structure. It is thus not accidental that although the moral argument of the Nicomachean Ethics seems to require that the human soul be double—with a rational part that governs and an animal part that is capable of being governed by this rational part—strictly speaking the rational part, which Aristotle likens to a father, is never really present in the argument. Its absence points to the character of reason as necessarily hidden and only showing itself as a striving for rationality. Further, it is a sign of the impossibility of ever achieving an adequate structural account of the soul. (shrink)

Soul-body. The soul-body problem (psyche-soma) -- Mental functions. Sense-perception ; Thought and judgement ; Volition (will) and psychomotor function ; Affect (mood) ; Memory ; Consciousness--dreams ; Nutrition and reproduction -- Formation of the personality. The gifts of nature ; The effects of the environment ; The responsibility of one's self ; Special characteristics according to age and gender -- Interpersonal relations. Family relations ; Friendship ; Erotic love -- Psychoanalytic concepts and Aristotle's psychology. Some basic psychoanalytic concepts (...) ; Narcissism--self-love ; Pleasure (hedone). (shrink)

The volume analyzes the natural philosophical accounts and debates concerning the vegetative powers, namely nutrition, growth, and reproduction. While principally focusing on the early modern approaches to the lower functions of the soul, readers will discover the roots of these approaches back to the Ancient times, as the volume highlights the role of three strands that help shape the study of life in the Medieval and early modern natural philosophies. From late antiquity to the early modern period, the vegetative (...) soul and its cognate concepts have played a substantial role in specifying life, living functions, and living bodies, sometimes blurring the line between living and non-living nature, and, at other moments, resulting in a strong restriction of life to a mechanical system of operations and powers. Unearthing the history of the vegetative soul as a shrub of interconnected concepts, the 24 contributions of the volume fill a crucial gap in scholarship, ultimately outlining the importance of vegetal processes of incessant proliferation, generation, and organic growth as the roots of life in natural philosophical interpretations. (shrink)

Your self, family and friends; Interactions -- Love & peace within you, friends; Neighbors -- Wisdom, within yourself, for others, the world -- Arts, Studies; Reflections; Changes from within -- Arts, Shin-Tora-Do rehab, reflections, global awareness -- Arts, Shin-Tora-Do, addictions, illness & abuse (Part 2) -- Arts, disability & pro-sport, recovery, reflections (Part 3) -- Arts, rehab disability...; Pro-sport, recovering & success (Part 4) -- Nutrition and you...Soul food to go -- Shin-Tora-Do techniques & forms, conditioning, healing.

Giulio Cesare Vanini, called by 17th-century theologians the „eagle of atheists”, criticized vehemently the fundamental assumption of Christian anthropology according to which virtues in their nature are something alien to the human being, and only vices and vicious inclinations should be peculiar to it. Vanini discards the theological alienation and restores the dignity of man as an individual of a reasonable and moral nature. According to Vanini, the existence of God as a giver of soul would deprive man of (...) his dignity. Thus, if man received his soul from God, nobody could in fact be father to his children, as he would not be able to transfer his essence to his offspring. An interesting item in Vanini’s considerations is his materialistic idea that men’s nature and conduct are determined by external factors, e.g., by food. As food is transformed into the „substance” of the consumer, „we consist of what we consume”. Vanini observes that rich people feed themselves differently than the poor and concludes that differences in habits may be attributed to different nutrition. Heroic deeds are explained by Vanini by that certain patterns of behaviour of people we adore or esteem are distinctly inculcated on our imagination. In certain situations these patterns „incite us to similar deeds”. To Vanini, the aim of his life was discarding lies and acting „for the enriching of the world of culture”. (shrink)

This paper discusses Aristotle’s theory of reproduction: specifically, the good that he thinks organisms attain by reproducing. The aim of this paper is to refute the widespread theory that Aristotle believes plants and animals reproduce for the sake of attenuated immortality. This interpretive claim plays an important role in supporting one leading interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology: the theory that Aristotelian nature is teleologically oriented with a view solely to what benefits individual organisms, and what benefits the organism is its survival (...) and well–being. This paper challenges the theories that Aristotle takes plants and animals to reproduce for the sake of attenuated immortality, and that he believes survival to be the most basic of goods. It is argued that Aristotle believes reproduction is detrimental to organisms’ health and longevity but nonetheless is central to plant and animal flourishing. It is claimed that, to explain the fundamentality of the reproductive soul function, Aristotle appeals to the eternal and divine. (shrink)

In this chapter, I investigate the metaphysical assumptions that medieval thinkers considered necessary in order to integrate the vegetative powers and processes into their conception of human beings as composed of a material body and an immaterial soul. My aim is to show that vegetative powers and processes are central to the late medieval debate on faculty psychology and on the unity or plurality of substantial forms. The chapter has two parts. First, I present three different accounts of the (...) ontological status of the vegetative powers in relation to the body and the soul, as found in Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, and John Buridan. All three maintain that the vegetative powers belong to the soul but disagree as to whether they are identical with it or somehow distinct from it, especially when the soul in question is immaterial. Second, I investigate how medieval thinkers accounted for the metaphysics behind the operations of the vegetative powers in human beings, who are endowed with immaterial souls, in particular when it comes to procreation and digestion. A pressing problem for the vegetative powers of human beings is how they can produce a new substance when this composite is supposed to include an immaterial soul which is not naturally generated. Regarding procreation, one can distinguish two different approaches: dispositional generation of material conditions and substantial generation of the body. A similar problem for human beings arises in nutrition and growth once this process is taken to be some kind of substantial change, namely, the corruption of food and the production of new parts of the living being. Two accounts can be distinguished: “transmateriation” of the matter of food into the nourished body and generation of parts of the body. (shrink)

In “On the Life of thinking in Aristotle’s De Anima,” the author offers an interpretation of the tripartite structure of the unified soul in Aristotle’s text. The principleactivity that unities the nutritive, sensuously perceptive and noetically perceptive parts of the soul into a single, continuous entity is shown by our author to be genesis (or the sexual begetting of offspring). After establishing this observation, the paper provides the textual grounds to understand how both sensuous and noetic perception (...) can be understood as a kind of embodied genesis. A further consequence of this argument will be an interpretation of “thinking,” of noetic perception, as a kind of open and passive reception of the primary forms of other beings. As such, Aristotle’s conception of thinking, qua nous, is a refreshing, if strange, contrast to the more common modern vision of “thinking” as the activity of an agent mentally seizing hold of beings in the service of the mastery of nature. (shrink)

René Descartes’ mechanization of living activities lays bare a glaring lacuna that concerns vegetative functions, such as nutrition, generation, and growth: his cardiovascular framework affects any exhaustive explanation of these activities. When he mentions a mechanical vegetative power in his 1641 correspondence with Henricus Regius, this definition is unspecified, although it may be correlated to a few posthumous bio-medical notes. Descartes’ mechanization of the vegetative soul remains puzzling. Early Cartesian scholars were thus obliged to fill this lacuna to produce (...) a more exhaustive physiology. In this chapter, after reconstructing Descartes’ own position in L’Homme and in his manuscripts, I explore the positions of Regius, Louis de La Forge, and Florent Schuyl, who dealt with Descartes’ medical texts and physiological doctrine through various perspectives. Yet, while building a mechanization of vegetation upon Descartes’ philosophy, their interpretations of a mechanical vegetative power uncover shortcomings, weaknesses, and failures. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotelian Explorations by G. E. R. LloydRosamond Kent SpragueG. E. R. Lloyd. Aristotelian Explorations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. ix + 242. Cloth, $49.95.Although the essays in this richly rewarding book were given as lectures and seminars in a variety of places over a period of eight years, they possess a unity of theme that welds them into a satisfying whole. Furthermore, by the judicious use of (...) postscripts and additional notes, the author keeps us abreast of current discussion. [End Page 126]Lloyd’s chief concern is to compare Aristotle’s theory (notably as expressed in the Posterior Analytics) with his practice (especially in the zoology). The topic may be, as he admits in his 1990 Boston Colloquium lecture, “The Theories and Practices of Demonstration,” a “hoary old chestnut,” but his response to it is not; as is evident from the very title of his paper, he adopts a pluralistic approach to Aristotle’s methodology. Lloyd’s minute and extensive knowledge of the texts, as when he studies passages in the Topics in which what is there called apodeixis does not meet the conditions laid down in Posterior Analytics, makes his view compelling. Again, a careful study of Parts of Animals I, 1 issues in the caveat that “we had better be careful when talking about demonstration in the physical treatises, to examine what mode or manner of demonstration is in question” (33); it could be the method of deduction of antecedents, for instance, where we start with what will be rather than what is. In general, it needs to be considered not just whether a particular theory of demonstration is applied, but whether it is applicable.In a chapter entitled “The Relationship of Psychology to Zoology,” Lloyd discusses Aristotle’s theory of matter, particularly “the problem of reconciling what is true of earth, water, air, and fire haplōs... and what is true of them as the constituent elements of living uniform parts” (64). This difficulty has its repercussions for his form/matter distinction: the difference between the two is best illustrated by artefacts (as, I might add, is evident to those who attempt to teach it), but the unity of the sonolon by the cases in which the soul is form and the matter a living body of which the soul is the actuality.In this connection Lloyd makes reference to Aristotle’s “top-down theory of life” as being one quite definitely held by him (64, 99). I think that this is only partially the case. A passage such as De Anima 415a25ff. in which not only animals but plants are said, through reproduction, to aim at the eternal and divine, suggests that a “bottom-up” theory of life is equally important in his psychology, especially in view of his pervasive desire to stress the final cause. I think that Lloyd’s own principle of plurality in relation to context could well be applied here. The overall structure of the De Anima illustrates Aristotle’s use of both methods: bottom-up from nutrition through sensation to thought, but top-down from sight to touch. It is, of course, true that the De Anima is not concerned to address the question of how life emerges from not-life, but its discussion of living things quite definitely begins at the bottom of the scala naturae, with plants. Again, at History of Animals 588b4ff. (a passage crucial to Lloyd’s consideration of borderline cases in his chapter entitled “Fuzzy Natures?”), we find that Nature proceeds from the inanimate to the animate, and that first after the inanimate come plants. It also strikes me as being of interest that, when Aristotle discusses the difficult topic of growth in Generation and Corruption 321b16ff., he does so at the level of flesh and not of hands, from the bottom up, that is.Of other topics on which Lloyd has things to say, that of spontaneous generation is of particular interest. Here he points out that spontaneously generated creatures are of regular kinds; they have determinate material causes. As to whether Aristotle’s recognition of such cases has driven him “into admitting a principle that offers a glaring... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Literature in MindH. G. Wells and the Evolution of the Mad ScientistAnne StilesIn 1893, H. G. Wells's article "Man of the Year Million" dramatically predicted the distant evolutionary future of mankind:The descendents of man will nourish themselves by immersion in nutritive fluid. They will have enormous brains, liquid, soulful eyes, and large hands, on which they will hop. No craggy nose will they have, no vestigial ears; their (...) mouths will be a small, perfectly round aperture, unanimal, like the evening star. Their whole muscular system will be shriveled to nothing, a dangling pendant to their minds.2The editors at Punch evidently found this prediction hilarious, publishing a poem and accompanying sketch ridiculing Wells's lopsided future humans (Figure 1, p. 318). But not everyone was laughing.As ridiculous as Wells's bodiless, large-headed "human tadpoles" may seem, they were based on the most rigorous evolutionary science of their day. Wells, a lower-middle-class academic prodigy, received a prestigious [End Page 317] Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 1."1,000,000 A.D.," Punch, or the London Charivari, 25 November 1893, 250.[End Page 318]government scholarship to attend the Normal School of Science in South Kensington (later absorbed into the University of London). Though Wells left South Kensington in 1887 without earning his degree, he was greatly inspired by his biology teacher, famed physiologist Thomas Huxley. Wells absorbed Huxley's pessimistic take on late-Victorian evolutionary theory, particularly his emphasis on the inherent brutality of natural selection.Huxley's pessimism surfaces in Wells's dystopian scientific romances, which imaginatively probe the consequences of evolutionary theory run amok.3 Beginning with the eponymous mad-scientist villain of The Island of Dr. Moreau (1896) and continuing with alien invasion narratives like The War of the Worlds (1897–98) and The First Men in the Moon (1901), Wells depicts brains becoming steadily larger and more powerful as bodies grow smaller and more useless, emotions increasingly muted, and conscience all but silenced. Wells's nightmarish vision of the massively over-evolved brain unites these three works, as the ruthlessly intellectual biologist Moreau morphs into the amoral, top-heavy Martians and lunar inhabitants.Wells's malevolent mad scientists and extraterrestrials owe an intellectual debt not only to Huxley, but also to discussions of genius and insanity in late-Victorian issues of Mind (1876–present).4 The now-familiar trope of the mad scientist in fact traces its roots to the clinical association between genius and insanity that developed in the mid-nineteenth century. Authors like Scottish journalist and materialist philosopher John Ferguson Nisbet, English eugenicist Francis Galton, and Austrian Jewish physician Max Nordau—all of whose works were reviewed in Mind—argued that mankind had evolved larger brains at the expense of muscular strength, reproductive capacity, and moral sensibility.5 Wells drew upon these arguments in his fiction and even contributed his own article to Mind, a philosophical reflection on science entitled "Scepticism of the Instrument" (1904).In its unique role as "the first English journal devoted to Psychology and Philosophy." Mind was an ideal venue for an inherently interdisciplinary [End Page 319] subject like the clinical study of genius.6 The journal's first editor, George Croom Robertson, was particularly concerned that articles in Mind rise "above the narrowing influences of modern specialism."7 This disciplinary breadth attracted contributors from all fields, including fiction writers and literary critics like George Henry Lewes, Grant Allen, Andrew Lang, and, of course, H.G. Wells. During the same period, literary works probed ideas discussed in Mind, such as the nature of the soul, the possibility of free will, and the ramifications of biological determinism. In the four decades following its auspicious start, Mind provided a venue where scientists, philosophers and literary authors could find intellectual common ground.In this essay, the early fiction of H.G. Wells will serve as a case study of cross-fertilization between literature and scientific ideas discussed in Mind. The goals of this exploration are threefold: to gain a better understanding of the journal's history and influence; to investigate why Victorians associated genius with insanity; and to illuminate the shared... (shrink)

With Spirits and Clocks, Dennis Des Chene completes a two-part project begun with Life’s Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul. In both volumes, Des Chene is concerned with the question of what makes living things living. For the Jesuit Aristotelians, the answer requires a complex analysis of the ontology of soul and power. For Descartes, of course, the answer is completely different; arguably, there is a sense in which his answer is: nothing. Indeed Des Chene does argue (...) this, concluding that for Descartes there are no living things in the Aristotelian sense: the body machine does not live, because it has no powers; the soul does not live because it has no role in nutrition, growth, and generation. Descartes’s physiology thus represents the most radical aspect of his natural philosophy, for he must eliminate souls from living things as part of the general project of eliminating Aristotelian forms from nature. As such, the importance of Descartes’s physiology is manifest; Des Chene’s study is a very welcome and original addition to the still-modest philosophical literature engaged with Descartes’sL’Homme and La description du corps humain. (shrink)

In René Descartes' works there are four major references to living bodies as objects of his natural philosophy. The first is contained in the Fifth part of the Discours de la Méthode, published in June 1637, where Descartes provides a mechanical explanation of the heartbeat and other living functions of the body. The second is in a bio-medical note collected in the Excerpta anatomica dated November 1637, where he discusses nutrition and growth. The third is the famous claim on the (...) absence of a section on living bodies in the Principia philosophiae, published in 1644. The fourth is in La Description du corps humain, Descartes' late physiology likely dated 1647-1648. In this article, by exploring these passages and contextualizing his physiological observations of animals and plants, I reassemble Descartes' science of life: his dismissal of soul, his mechanical framework, his interpretation of bodily self-maintenance and growth, his understanding of living bodies as integrated and organic systems, and the role of a power such as the immutatio and forces such as the impetus. (shrink)

In this article, I investigate Johann Christoph Sturm’s (1635–1703) mechanist account of plant life. The problem of life is one of the touchstones of any early modern mechanist philosophy. Plant life, in turn, constitutes the most rudimentary form of life. Sturm’s account is functionalist: plants perform the life-function: nutrition, growth, self-preservation, and generation. Sturm makes clear that what his Aristotelian predecessors called the ‘vegetative soul’ must be reduced to (1) the possession of an organic body (i.e., a higher-order structure (...) of matter and its modifications) and (2) the extrinsic kinetic heat of the sun. In contrast to mechanists like Descartes, Sturm accepts teleology. He deals with the origin and transfer of motion on occasionalist grounds. For Sturm, all processes associated with the life of plants can be accounted for mechanically—all but the ultimate origin of the first plant’s seed, for which Sturm relies on the theory of pre-existence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Thomas Aquinas and Cognitive TherapyChristopher Megone (bio)Keywordsemotions, rationality, cognitivism, Aristotelian psychology, powersGiuseppe butera has written a stimulating and persuasive defence of the view that Aquinas’s philosophical psychology (APP) can provide “a profound and cogent philosophical framework for cognitive therapy (CT).” In this short commentary, I respond to Butera’s claims from the perspective of one possible reading of the moral psychology of Aristotle, one of Aquinas’s major philosophical influences. Given (...) the general debt that Aquinas owes to Aristotle, as noted by Butera, this may provide a helpful slant on Butera’s interpretation of Aquinas.Indeed although Butera offers Aquinas as an alternative source for a philosophical underpinning of CT, rather than the Stoics cited by Beck, one might think that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle could in any case be put forward as equally fruitful areas for inquiry in this context. Thus, one might think that Socrates’ moral psychology, which led him to the cognitivist claim that virtue is knowledge, provides a commitment to a CT-related perspective that both predated and itself influenced the Stoics. And one might then expect to learn things of relevance to CT from the ways in which Plato and Aristotle responded to that Socratic cognitivist outlook.From such an Aristotelian perspective, then, Butera’s approach is very welcome. He makes a strong case for considering Aquinas’s broadly Aristotelian conception of the human person as a desirable alternative to any account that depends on Cartesian substance dualism (of mind and body). On the Aristotelian account, by contrast, the human person is itself a single substance comprised of form (the soul) and matter (the body), the ensouled body constituting a substantial unity. The soul is a set of essential powers, the powers each human has which makes him/her a human being. These powers are necessarily linked in such a way as to comprise that unity and enmattered in a body, each enmattered set of powers constituting an individual member of the species.As Butera also notes, Aquinas follows Aristotle in supposing there to be five basic kinds of human essential powers—vegetative or nutritive, locomotive, sensitive or perceptual, appetitive or desiderative, and rational. Taken together, these distinguish humans from other species. And broadly speaking Aquinas thinks of the distinctively human motivational features as having three parts, non-rational appetites or desires, appetites or desires open to reason, and the purely rational intellect.Within this broad framework, Butera offers an account of APP and in particular of the emotions whose treatment is so important with CT. Given that this account is broadly congenial from an Aristotelian perspective, I offer three main comments. First, Butera makes interesting methodological claims, which I briefly explore. Second, and most [End Page 373] substantially, I examine Butera’s claims about emotions in APP in terms of some Aristotelian points about the acquisition of emotions. Third, I suggest that these latter points bring out a slight tension between the way in which Butera endorses CT at the outset of his paper and his slightly more qualified remarks at the end of it.MethodIn footnote 1, Butera talks of “the differences and complementarity of the methods employed by philosophers and scientists.” However, although he fairly notes that the ambitions of his paper far exceed its scope, so he cannot be expected to have elaborated this theme, his methodological comments do raise some questions as to how exactly we might understand the relation between the two modes of inquiry. He suggests, as noted, that APP can provide the philosophical underpinnings for CT. He goes on to indicate that APP can provide a deeply rooted and highly articulated philosophical explanation for the effectiveness of CT (347). This consists in showing that the principles and methods of CT can be philosophically grounded by APP (348), which he exemplifies by identifying seven points of contact between CT and APP.Butera contrasts this approach with that of Beck, who is content for CT to be “an empirically grounded system of psychological principles and therapeutic methods” (347). So what does the philosophical material add? According to Butera, “employing the rational, dialectical method of the philosophers, [Aquinas] is able to sound depths inaccessible... (shrink)

: In Parts of Animals II.10, 655b37-656a8, Aristotle tacitly identifies a group of animals which partake of “ living only”. This paper is an attempt to understand the nature of this group. It is argued that it is possible to make sense of this designation if we consider that some animals, which are solely endowed with the contact senses, do nothing more than mere immediate nutrition by their perceptive nature and have no other action. It is concluded that some of (...) Aristotle ’s merely living animals would be certain kinds of sponge, certain sea anemones and the ascidians among testacea. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Parva naturalia continues the investigation begun in the De anima. The De anima defines the soul and treats its main powers, nutrition, sense perception, intellection, and locomotion. The Parva naturalia — On sense and sensible objects, On memory and recollection, On sleep, On dreams, On divination in sleep, On motion of animals (De motu animalium ), On length and shortness of life, and On youth and old age and respiration — attends more to bodily involvement with soul. (...) While each work offers fascinating and challenging insights, there has never been as extensive a commentary covering them together. A reason is that the works have often been viewed as incidental and even inconsistent. The De motu animalium has not typically been included, when viewed as an isolated work on animal locomotion. This commentary argues that the treatises, considered together and with the De motu among them, display a tight sequence manifesting an artful, yet easily overlooked, design. We reveal many techniques of Aristotle’s writing that have received little consideration previously. Our commentary contributes to a unified and comprehensive account of Aristotle’s overall project regarding the soul and its connections with the body. (shrink)

"The worst thing about food science, the elephant in the room, is that it's not just the opinions that are changing—but the 'facts' themselves shift too." Did you know that the great philosophers were the original foodies? To eat or not to eat? That’s an easy question to answer. But what to eat? That’s a deep and profoundly difficult one. Doctors and nutritionists often disagree with each other, while celebrities and scientists keep pitching us new recipes and special diets. No (...) one thought to ask the philosophers—those rational souls devoted to truth, ethics, and reason—what they think. Until now. (shrink)

My topic is the fundamental Aristotelian division between the animate and the inanimate. In particular, I discuss the transformation that occurs when an inanimate body comes to be ensouled. When nutriment is transformed into flesh it is first changed into blood. I argue that blood is unique in being, at one and the same time, both animate and inanimate; it is inanimate nutriment in actuality (or in activity) and animate flesh in potentiality (or in capacity). I provide a detailed exposition (...) of these manners of being (covering individual substances, artifacts, and mixtures), apply these insights to the case of blood, and then argue that blood's curious status is central to understanding hylomorphism in living organisms. (shrink)