This paper addresses arguments that “separability” is an assumption of Bell’s theorem, and that abandoning this assumption in our interpretation of quantum mechanics (a position sometimes referred to as “holism”) will allow us to restore a satisfying locality principle. Separability here means that all events associated to the union of some set of disjoint regions are combinations of events associated to each region taken separately.In this article, it is shown that: (a) localised events can be consistently defined without (...) implying separability; (b) the definition of Bell’s locality condition does not rely on separability in any way; (c) the proof of Bell’s theorem does not use separability as an assumption. If, inspired by considerations of non-separability, the assumptions of Bell’s theorem are weakened, what remains no longer embodies the locality principle. Teller’s argument for “relational holism” and Howard’s arguments concerning separability are criticised in the light of these results. Howard’s claim that Einstein grounded his arguments on the incompleteness of QM with a separability assumption is also challenged. Instead, Einstein is better interpreted as referring merely to the existence of localised events. Finally, it is argued that Bell rejected the idea that separability is an assumption of his theorem. (shrink)

Consider the concept combination ‘pet human’. In word association experiments, human subjects produce the associate ‘slave’ in relation to this combination. The striking aspect of this associate is that it is not produced as an associate of ‘pet’, or ‘human’ in isolation. In other words, the associate ‘slave’ seems to be emergent. Such emergent associations sometimes have a creative character and cognitive science is largely silent about how we produce them. Departing from a dimensional model of human conceptual space, this (...) article will explore concept combinations, and will argue that emergent associations are a result of abductive reasoning within conceptual space, that is, below the symbolic level of cognition. A tensor-based approach is used to model concept combinations allowing such combinations to be formalized as interacting quantum systems. Free association norm data is used to motivate the underlying basis of the conceptual space. It is shown by analogy how some concept combinations may behave like quantum-entangled particles. Two methods of analysis were presented for empirically validating the presence of non-separable concept combinations in human cognition. One method is based on quantum theory and another based on comparing a joint probability distribution with another distribution based on a separability assumption using a chi-square goodness-of-fit test. Although these methods were inconclusive in relation to an empirical study of bi-ambiguous concept combinations, avenues for further refinement of these methods are identified. (shrink)

Consider the concept combination ‘pet human’. In word association experiments, human subjects produce the associate ‘slave’ in relation to this combination. The striking aspect of this associate is that it is not produced as an associate of ‘pet’, or ‘human’ in isolation. In other words, the associate ‘slave’ seems to be emergent. Such emergent associations sometimes have a creative character and cognitive science is largely silent about how we produce them. Departing from a dimensional model of human conceptual space, this (...) article will explore concept combinations, and will argue that emergent associations are a result of abductive reasoning within conceptual space, that is, below the symbolic level of cognition. A tensor-based approach is used to model concept combinations allowing such combinations to be formalized as interacting quantum systems. Free association norm data is used to motivate the underlying basis of the conceptual space. It is shown by analogy how some concept combinations may behave like quantum-entangled particles. Two methods of analysis were presented for empirically validating the presence of non-separable concept combinations in human cognition. One method is based on quantum theory and another based on comparing a joint probability distribution with another distribution based on a separability assumption using a chi-square goodness-of-fit test. Although these methods were inconclusive in relation to an empirical study of bi-ambiguous concept combinations, avenues for further refinement of these methods are identified. (shrink)

In this paper and its sequel, I consider the significance of Jarrett’s and Shimony’s analyses of the so-called factorisability condition for clarifying the nature of quantum non-locality. In this paper, I focus on four types of non-locality: superluminal signalling, action-at-a-distance, non-separability and holism. In the second paper, I consider a fifth type of non-locality: superluminal causation according to ‘logically weak’ concepts of causation, where causal dependence requires neither action nor signalling. In this connection, I pay special attention to the (...) difficulties that superluminal causation raises in relativistic space–time. I conclude by evaluating the relevance of Jarrett’s and Shimony’s analyses for clarifying the question of the compatibility of quantum non-locality with relativity theory. My main conclusions are, first: these analyses are significant for clarifying the questions of superluminal signalling in quantum phenomena and for the compatibility of these phenomena with relativity. But, second, by contrast: these analyses are not very significant for the study of action-at-a distance, superluminal causation, non-separability and holism in quantum phenomena. (shrink)

The so-called paradoxes of quantum physics are easily disposed of as soon as one accepts that there are no such things as intrinsically existing particles and their intrinsic properties, but that both particles and properties are relational “observables.” Accordingly, quantum physics does not offer a “description of the outer world,” but rather a prescription about how to make probabilistic predictions within a participatory environment. The latter view looks quite radical with respect to standard Western Aristotelian ontology; but it looks natural (...) in the context of the Indian-Buddhist concept of Pratītyasamutpāda which underpins Śūnyatā. Special attention will then be devoted to the quantum feature of non-separability, which displays remarkable similarities with Pratītyasamutpāda. Finally, the meaning of such twofold parallel between quantum physics and Śūnyatā will be discussed. This parallel will be related to the similarity of epistemological situation between knowing a world from which we are not entirely separated and knowing oneself. (shrink)

Robert M. Adams claims that Leibniz’s rehabilitation of the doctrine of incomplete entities is the most sustained effort to integrate a theory of corporeal substances into the theory of simple substances. I discuss alternative interpretations of the theory of incomplete entities suggested by Marleen Rozemond and Pauline Phemister. Against Rozemond, I argue that the scholastic doctrine of incomplete entities is not dependent on a hylomorphic analysis of corporeal substances, and therefore can be adapted by Leibniz. Against Phemister, I claim that (...) Leibniz did not reduce the passivity of corporeal substances to modifications of passive aspects of simple substances. Against Adams, I argue that Leibniz’s theory of the incompleteness of the mind cannot be understood adequately without understanding the reasons for his assertion that matter is incomplete without minds. Composite substances are seen as requisites for the reality of the material world, and therefore cannot be eliminated from Leibniz’s metaphysics. (shrink)

In quantum mechanics, quantum nonseparability is at the core of philosophical debates regarding its meaning. In the context of the process matrix formalism, causal nonseparability characterises quantum processes (connecting the inputs and outputs of different local quantum operations) that are incompatible with any definite causal structure among interacting parties. One talks about indefinite causal orders. A famous example of causally nonseparable processes is called the quantum switch (QS). It is extensively studied in the literature in virtue of its simple architecture (...) and its various implementations in laboratories.The present work will discuss the possible interpretations of the QS's causal nonseparability under the assumption that causal nonseparability is seen as pointing towards novel objective features of nature.It was first defended that a scientific realist approach towards the process matrix formalism, which is an operational theory generalising quantum mechanics, was as much legitimate as any possible antirealist reading, contrary to certain views found in the literature. The reason is that operational formalisms are ontologically and epistemically neutral.From there, the theoretical concepts of interest, namely causal nonseparability and its model-independent counterpart called noncausality, were analysed in more details, in order to highlight in what sense they are distinct from the standard notions of quantum nonseparability and nonlocality in quantum mechanics.The discussion then focused on noncausality. It was argued that noncausality has a strong connection with a notion of temporal nonlocality. In the same way that Bell nonlocality is given different underlying explanations depending on the details of the chosen quantum mechanics' account, noncausality pointing towards temporal nonlocality can be given a variety of underlying descriptions depending on the exact way to interpret the process matrix formalism.The last chapter focused precisely on this particular point, namely on the various ways to understand process matrices and causal nonseparability in a realist context. In order to explore the potential impact of causal nonseparability on spacetime,we shifted from the notion of (indefinite) causal structure to (indefinite) spatiotemporal ones. This shift was allowed under a set of reasonable assumptions regarding the properties of a physical spacetime manifold and the connection between an operational and relativistic notions of causal relations.While different readings were suggested for indefiniteness of spatiotemporal relations, we insisted in particular on an objective understanding appealing to the concept of metaphysical indeterminacy. It was argued that such an approach could prove useful in a more general theoretical context such as quantum gravity, while being already partly supported in standard quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The separable hidden variables theory (Bhave [1986]) of Aspect's [1982] four single channel polarizers is developed further to consider possible modified Aspect's experiment with four double channel polarizers. It is shown that Aspect's commutator is not a truly stochastic commutator, and that until such a truly stochastic commutator is devised, experiments based on Bell's inequalities (like those of Aspect's) cannot be adequate experimental tests of quantum nonseparability.

We consider future cash flows that are contingent both on dates in time and on uncertain states. The decision maker (DM) values the cash flows according to its decision criterion: Here, the payoffs’ expectation with respect to a capacity measure. The subjective measure grasps the DM’s behaviour in front of the future, in the spirit of de Finetti’s (1930) and of Yaari’s (1987) Dual Theory in the case of risk. Decomposition of the criterion into two criteria that represent the DM’s (...) preferences on uncertain payoffs and time contingent payoffs are derived from Ghirardato’s (1997) results. Conditional Choquet integrals are defined by dynamic consistency (DC) requirements and conditional capacities are derived, under some conditions on information. In contrast with other models referring to DC, ours does not collapse into a linear one because it violates a weak version of consequentialism. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that physical theories, including quantum mechanics, refer to some kind of ‘objects’, even if only implicitly. We raise questions about the logico-mathematical apparatuses commonly employed in such theories, bringing to light some metaphysical presuppositions underlying such apparatuses. We point out to some incongruities in the discourse holding that quantum objects would be entities of some ‘new kind’ while still adhering to the logico-mathematical framework we use to deal with classical objects. The use of such apparatus (...) would hinder us from being in complete agreement with the ontological novelties the theories of quanta seem to advance. Thus, we join those who try to investigate a ‘logic of quantum mechanics’, but from a different point of view: looking for a formal foundation for a supposed new ontology. As a consequence of this move, we can revisit Einstein’s ideas on physical reality and propose that, by considering a new kind of object traditionally termed ‘non-individuals’, it is possible to sustain that they still obey some of Einstein’s conditions for ‘physical realities’, so that it will be possible to talk of a ‘principle of separability’ in a sense which is not in complete disagreement with quantum mechanics. So, Einstein’s departure from quantum mechanics might be softened at least concerning a form of his realism, which sees separated physical objects as distinct ‘physical realities’. (shrink)

Nearly thirty years ago, Robert Alexy in his book The Concept and Validity of Law as well as in other early articles raised non-positivistic arguments in the Continental European tradition against legal positivism in general, which was assumed to be held by, among others, John Austin, Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart. The core thesis of legal positivism that was being discussed among contemporary German jurists, just as with their Anglo- American counterparts, is the claim that there is no necessary connection (...) between law and morality. Robert Alexy has argued, however, that the law, besides consisting conceptually of elements of authoritative issuance and social efficacy, necessarily lays a claim to substantial correctness, which is derived from analytical arguments. Furthermore, if this claim to substantial correctness necessarily requires the incorporation of moral elements into law, then the ‘necessary connection thesis’, as defended by non-positivism, can be justified. Some of the most significant objections to this sort of claim, stemming from the Anglo-American world, are those introduced by Joseph Raz. In his ‘Reply’ to Robert Alexy, Raz raises at least three interesting criticisms, including, first, the ambiguity of ‘legal theory in the positivistic tradition’, second, the indeterminate formulations of the ‘separation thesis’, and, third, the necessary claim of law to legitimate authority as a moral claim. As a point of departure, I will argue that Raz’s three criticisms are misleading. For they do not enhance our understanding of the genuine compatibility or incompatibility between legal positivism and non-positivism. Despite the frequently reformulated theses of legal positivism and the various kinds of opponents responding thereto, the essential divergence between legal positivism and non-positivism was and remains the answer to the question of the relation between law and morality. Furthermore, I will clarify that in the strictest sense there can be three and only three logically possible positions concerning the relation between law and morality: the connection between them is either necessary, or impossible (i. e. they are necessarily separate), or contingent (i. e. they are neither necessarily connected nor necessarily separate). The first position is non-positivistic, while the latter two positions are, indeed, both positivistic, but in different forms: one may be called ‘exclusive’ legal positivism, the other ‘inclusive’ legal positivism. I will continue by showing that these three positions stand to one another in the relation of contraries, not contradictories, and that, taken together, they exhaust the logically possible positions concerning the relation between law and morality, never mind the tradition or authority from which these positions are derived. Raz mentions, however, many changeable formulations of the separation thesis, which even leads him to acknowledge ‘necessary connections between law and morality’. One who is trying to understand legal positivism would no doubt be puzzled by this claim. Nevertheless, I will argue that this is an alternative strategy of legal positivism, and it points to naturalistically oriented view. Although this necessary separation between law and morality, understood naturalistically, strikes one as strengthening the separation, in the end it leads to a weakened notion of necessity. This weakened necessary separation thesis, however, cannot be justified through the so-called claim of the law to legitimate authority, defended by Raz, for it is difficult to answer the question of whether a normally justified but factual authority can gain legitimate authority. Finally, the necessary connection between law and morality in a strong sense can still be justified by the claim of law to correctness, as per Alexy’s argument. (shrink)

This paper is part of my journey with Emmanuel Levinas on a dystopic path to the ethical encounter. For the journey, I agree to be Levinas#39;s human subject, to encounter his quot;otherquot;. And he agrees to traverse a path through my world, a world of food and eating. To ready me for the encounter, Levinas tells me the story of his ethics, narratively , and so this paper is unavoidably #39;story#39; too. To preface, then: The ethical encounter is a quot;face (...) to facequot; encounter between a quot;humanquot; subject and an quot;otherquot; . In my encountering the other face to face in the world of food, food production and eating, Levinas tells the story of the violences of my existence- of my #39;eating#39; of the world at the expense of the other. Face to face with the other, I cannot avoid my responsibility for the needs and suffering of the other. In quot;proximityquot; with the other, I am guilty for eating; in proximity, I respond by giving the other quot;bread from [my] mouthquot; . In this first part of the journey, I am hungry, and Levinas leads me through scenes replete with food and eating. He shows me how this world can satiate my needs, but how it will, inevitably and inextricably, leave me, a not-yet ethical human subject, vulnerable and exposed. (shrink)

The present study focused on the dynamics and factors underpinning domestic abuse survivors’ decisions to end the abusive relationship. The experiences and opinions of 12 female DA survivors and 18 support workers were examined through in-depth, one-to-one, semi-structured interviews. Hybrid thematic analysis was conducted to retrieve semantic themes and explore relationships among the themes identified and the differences in survivors’ and professionals’ narratives of the separation process. The findings highlighted that separation decisions derived from the joint action of two sets (...) of factors, the “promoters” and the “accelerators.” Whilst the “promoters” are factors leading to the separation from the abuser over time, the “accelerators” bear a stronger and more direct connection with survivors’ decision to end the abusive relationship. Despite their differences, both these factors acted as propelling forces, leading survivors to actively pursue the separation from the perpetrator. To portray the dynamic links among these factors, we propose a conceptualisation drawn from Newton’s laws of motion. Our findings also highlighted important differences in the views of survivors and support workers, as the former conceived themselves as proactive in ending the abuse, whereas the latter described the leaving process as mainly led by authorities and services supporting survivors. This study has potential implications for research, policy and clinical practice, as it suggests that far from being a linear sequence of multiple stages, leaving an abusive relationship results from a complex interplay of factors that facilitate or drastically accelerate the separation process. We argue that future research should aim at improving our current understanding of the subjective and situational factors that can act as “accelerators” or “promoters” for women’s leaving decisions. Moreover, clinicians and policymakers should invest in creating interventions that aid victims to recognise and leverage promoters and accelerators, thus increasing their readiness to end the abuse. (shrink)

According to High-Dimensional Wavefunction Fundamentalism (HDWF) the wavefunction field evolving in configuration space is all that exists fundamentally. The main argument in favor of HDWF is an argument from separability and locality: separability is a desirable feature of a fundamental metaphysics and HDWF is indeed such a separable metaphysics. Separability in turn is desirable because it is simple and intuitive. Tim Maudlin has recently argued that intuitiveness and simplicity cannot motivate separability. In particular, our intuitions stem (...) from our interactions with the three-dimensional world which is non-separable. Therefore, he concludes, there is _nothing else_ HDWF theorists can appeal to motivate separability. I call this Maudlin’s challenge. The present paper addresses Maudlin’s challenge by showing how the facts that some plurality of entities are separable entail that its constituents are fundamental, for well-motivated notions of fundamentality. (shrink)

A variety of studies show that parental absence early in life leads to deleterious effects on the developing CNS. This is thought to be largely because evolutionary-dependent stimuli are necessary for the appropriate postnatal development of the young brain, an effect sometimes termed the “experience-expectant brain,” with parents providing the necessary input for normative synaptic connections to develop and appropriate neuronal survival to occur. Principal among CNS systems affected by parental input are the monoamine systems. In the present study,N= 434 (...) rhesus monkeys (233 males, 201 females) were reared in one of two conditions: as mother-reared controls (MR;n= 269) or without adults with 24-h access to same-aged peers (PR;n= 165). When subjects were six-months-old, they underwent a separation paradigm involving 4, sequential, four-day social separations from their mothers or peers, with each separation followed by three-day reunions with their mothers or their peers. Prior to the separation paradigm, baseline cisternal CSF samples were obtained, as well as at the end of each the four social separations, and after final separation, during a recovery period. CSF was assayed for concentrations of monoamine metabolites and a blood sample was genotyped for the serotonin transporter (5-HTT) genotype. Replicating earlier landmark findings, PR subjects with thesallele exhibited lower baseline concentrations of the serotonin metabolite 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA), when compared to PR subjects homozygous for theLallele. MR subjects were undifferentiated by genotype. PR subjects exhibited lower CSF 5-HIAA concentrations during baseline, but higher CSF 5-HIAA during social separations, when compared to MR subjects. There were rearing effects for the dopamine metabolite homovanillic acid (HVA) and for the norepinephrine metabolite 3-methoxy-4-hydroxyphenylglycol (MHPG), with PR subjects showing higher HVA and lower MHPG when compared to MR subjects. These findings indicate that there are long-term deficits in the response of monoamines following early maternal absence. The results of this study confirm and extend earlier findings that early parental absence has deleterious consequences for the development of the monoamine systems, and that these consequences are modulated by the 5-HTT genotype. (shrink)

This paper argues that instrumental rationality is more permissive than expected utility theory. The most compelling instrumentalist argument in favour of separability, its core requirement, is that agents with non-separable preferences end up badly off by their own lights in some dynamic choice problems. I argue that once we focus on the question of whether agents’ attitudes to uncertain prospects help define their ends in their own right, or instead only assign instrumental value in virtue of the outcomes they (...) may lead to, we see that the argument must fail. Either attitudes to prospects assign non-instrumental value in their own right, in which case we cannot establish the irrationality of the dynamic choice behaviour of agents with non-separable preferences. Or they don’t, in which case agents with non-separable preferences can avoid the problematic choice behaviour without adopting separable preferences. (shrink)

We argue that planning and control may not be separable entities, either at the behavioural level or at the neurophysiological level. We review studies that show the involvement of superior and inferior parietal cortex in both planning and control. We propose an alternative view to the localization theory put forth by Glover.

In a preceding paper, I studied the significance of Jarrett's and Shimony's analyses of 'factorisability' into 'parameter independence' and 'outcome independence' for clarifying the nature of non-locality in quantum phenomena. I focused on four types of non-locality; superluminal signalling, action-at-a-distance, non-separability and holism. In this paper, I consider a fifth type of non-locality: superluminal causation according to 'logically weak' concepts of causation, where causal dependence requires neither action nor signalling. I conclude by considering the compatibility of non-factorisable theories with (...) relativity theory. In this connection, I pay special attention to the difficulties that superluminal causation raises in relativistic spacetime. My main findings in this paper are: first, parameter-dependent and outcome-dependent theories both involve superluminal causal connections between outcomes and between settings and outcomes. Second, while relativistic deterministic parameter-dependent theories seem impossible on pain of causal paradoxes, relativistic indeterministic parameter-dependent theories are not subjected to the same challenge. Third, current relativistic non-factorisable theories seem to have some rather unattractive characteristics. (shrink)

In Indian philosophy, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Advaita Vedāntins recognize abhāva or anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) as an independent source of knowledge; but no other school of Indian philosophy agrees with them on this issue, and for that reason, arguments have been given by the latter schools for rejecting anupalabdhi as an independent means of knowledge. In this paper, I am going to evaluate only those arguments which have been given by the Vaiśeṣika thinkers, who admit only two pramāṇa-s, viz. pratyakṣa and anumāna, (...) and reject anupalabdhi as an independent pramāṇa. There have been many scholarly studies dealing with the arguments against the reduction of non-apprehension to some other source of knowledge that have been offered by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, but there is hardly any full-length work that deals with the Vaiśeṣika’s reduction of non-apprehension to some other source of knowledge. In the present paper, an attempt has been made at providing a clear and specific account of the same. (shrink)

Ontological separation plays a key role in Aristotle’s metaphysical project: substances alone are ontologically χωριστόν. The standard view identifies Aristotelian ontological separation with ontological independence, so that ontological separation is a non-symmetric relation. I argue that there is strong textual evidence that Aristotle employs an asymmetric notion of separation in the Metaphysics—one that involves the dependence of other entities on the independent entity. I argue that this notion allows Aristotle to prevent the proliferation of substance-kinds and thus to secure the (...) unity of his metaphysical system. (shrink)

If non-human animals experience wellbeing and suffering, such welfare consequences arguably should be included in a social welfare evaluation. Yet economic evaluations almost universally ignore non-human animals, in part because axiomatic social choice theory has failed to propose and characterize multi-species social welfare functions. Here we propose axioms and functional forms to fill this gap. We provide a range of alternative representations, characterizing a broad range of possibilities for multi-species social welfare. Among these, we identify a new characterization of additively-separable (...) generalized (multi-species) total utilitarianism. The multispecies setting permits a novel, weak species-level separability axiom with important consequences. We provide examples to illustrate that non-separability across species is implausible in a multi-species setting, in part because good lives for different species are at very different welfare levels. Finally, we explore the consequences for evaluating climate policy and understanding speciesism and non-climate environmental goals, such as biodiversity. (shrink)

The paper has two aims: (1) it sets out to show that it is well motivated to seek for an account of quantum non-locality in the framework of ontic structural realism (OSR), which integrates the notions of holism and non-separability that have been employed since the 1980s to achieve such an account. However, recent research shows that OSR on its own cannot provide such an account. Against this background, the paper argues that by applying OSR to the primitive ontology (...) theories of quantum physics, one can accomplish that task. In particular, Bohmian mechanics offers the best prospect for doing so. (2) In general, the paper seeks to bring OSR and the primitive ontology theories of quantum physics together: on the one hand, in order to be applicable to quantum mechanics, OSR has to consider what the quantum ontology of matter distributed in space-time is. On the other hand, as regards the primitive ontology theories, OSR provides the conceptual tools for these theories to answer the question of what the ontological status of the wave-function is. (shrink)

Dans le domaine du placement d’enfants, la loi de 1996 préconisant le maintien de la communauté de vie des frères et sœurs est souvent comprise comme une injonction sine qua non. Cet article se fait l’écho des observations d’une équipe pluridisciplinaire (éducateurs, psychologue, psychanalyste) engagée depuis de longues années dans l’accueil familial qui dévoilent, à travers une analyse à la fois quantitative et clinique, une réalité qui vient nuancer cet impératif. Les auteurs montrent que, dans un certain nombre de cas, (...) le maintien de la communauté de vie de la fratrie contribue à l’entretien de la pathologie des liens familiaux et à l’aliénation du sujet. Pourtant, il est possible d’imaginer des dispositifs où séparation de la fratrie n’est pas synonyme de rupture des liens fraternels. (shrink)

This paper argues that instrumental rationality is more permissive than expected utility theory. The most compelling instrumentalist argument in favour of separability, its core requirement, is that agents with non-separable preferences end up badly off by their own lights in some dynamic choice problems. I argue that once we focus on the question of whether agents’ attitudes to uncertain prospects help define their ends in their own right, or instead only assign instrumental value in virtue of the outcomes they (...) may lead to, we see that the argument must fail. Either attitudes to prospects assign non-instrumental value in their own right, in which case we cannot establish the irrationality of the dynamic choice behaviour of agents with non-separable preferences. Or they don’t, in which case agents with non-separable preferences can avoid the problematic choice behaviour without adopting separable preferences. (shrink)

Standard derivations of the Bell inequalities assume a common-commoncause-system that is a common screener-off for all correlations and some additional assumptions concerning locality and no-conspiracy. In a recent paper Graßhoff et al., "The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science", 56, 663–680 ) Bell inequalities have been derived via separate common causes assuming perfect correlations between the events. In the paper it will be shown that the assumptions of this separate-common-cause-type derivation of the Bell inequalities in the case of perfect (...) correlations can be reduced to the assumptions of a common-common-cause-system-type derivation. However, in the case of non-perfect correlations a non-reducible separate-common-cause-type derivation of some Bell-like inequalities can be given. The violation of these Bell-like inequalities proves Szabo's ) conjecture concerning the non-existence of a local, non-conspiratorial, separate-common-cause-model for a δ-neighborhood of perfect EPR correlations. (shrink)

In his book, John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity, Tony Cheng argues that recent changes to McDowell’s theory of perceptual justification should lead him to accept that experiences possess non-conceptual content. In this paper, I take issue with Cheng’s conclusion. Instead, I argue that McDowell should adopt Travis’s position, where experiences aren’t taken to possess content at all. I argue that we can distinguish two separate Myths of the Given in McDowell’s writings. While McDowell often seamlessly moves from one to the (...) other, I argue that it is difficult to see how he can justify this due to his recent alterations to his position. I argue that if we reject one Myth and retain the other, then McDowell can both hold on to a version of his view that the space of reasons is the space of the conceptual, all the while he accepts Travis’s arguments to the effect that experiences are devoid of content. Finally, I consider some arguments McDowell might present against accepting Travis’s position. While these objections do not convince me, what is notable about them is that, if they are sound, then they will equally count against Cheng’s intermediary position where non-conceptual contents are ascribed to experiences. Hence, I conclude that there are no grounds on which McDowell can reasonably endorse that experiences possess non-conceptual contents. Either he should stick to his conceptualism, or he should follow Travis and reject that experiences possess contents at all. (shrink)

Let X\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal{X }$$\end{document} be a set of outcomes, and let I\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal{I }$$\end{document} be an infinite indexing set. This paper shows that any separable, permutation-invariant preference order \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document} on XI\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal{X }^\mathcal{I }$$\end{document} admits an additive representation. That is: there exists a linearly ordered abelian group R\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} (...) \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal{R }$$\end{document} and a ‘utility function’ u:X⟶R\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$u:\mathcal{X }{{\longrightarrow }}\mathcal{R }$$\end{document} such that, for any x,y∈XI\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y}\in \mathcal{X }^\mathcal{I }$$\end{document} which differ in only finitely many coordinates, we have x≽y\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf{x}\succcurlyeq \mathbf{y}$$\end{document} if and only if ∑i∈Iu-u≥0\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\sum _{i\in \mathcal{I }} \left[u-u\right]\ge 0$$\end{document}. Importantly, and unlike almost all previous work on additive representations, this result does not require any Archimedean or continuity condition. If \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document} also satisfies a weak continuity condition, then the paper shows that, for anyx,y∈XI\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y}\in \mathcal{X }^\mathcal{I }$$\end{document}, we have x≽y\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf{x}\succcurlyeq \mathbf{y}$$\end{document} if and only if ∗∑i∈Iu≥∗∑i∈Iu\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${}^*\!\sum _{i\in \mathcal{I }} u\ge {}^*\!\sum _{i\in \mathcal{I }}u$$\end{document}. Here, ∗∑i∈Iu\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${}^*\!\sum _{i\in \mathcal{I }} u$$\end{document} represents a nonstandard sum, taking values in a linearly ordered abelian group ∗R\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${}^*\!\mathcal{R }$$\end{document}, which is an ultrapower extension of R\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathcal{R }$$\end{document}. The paper also discusses several applications of these results, including infinite-horizon intertemporal choice, choice under uncertainty, variable-population social choice and games with infinite strategy spaces. (shrink)

Although logical empiricism is now mostly decried, their naturalist claim that the content of a theory can be read off from its structure, without any philosophical considerations needed, still supports traditional strategies to escape cases of underdetermination. The appeal to theoretical equivalence or to theoretical virtues, for instance, both assume that there is a neutral standpoint from which the structure of the theories can be analyzed, the physically relevant from the superfluous separated, and a comparison made between their theoretical content (...) and virtues. In my dissertation, I examine the presuppositions upon which such strategies depend. I argue that the methodological principle underlying them, according to which theories with no superfluous structure should be preferred, is unpractical, for what constitutes relevant structure is determined by epistemic considerations about the aim of scientific theories. In chapter 1, I analyze the claim that theories with ordinary bosons and fermions are theoretically equivalent to theories with exotic `paraparticles'. I argue that this claim does not do justice to the latter, as the proof is formulated in a vocabulary parochial to the former and thus favors one of the theory while giving an impoverished version of the second. In chapter 2, I examine recent arguments to the effects that any interpretation of Quantum Mechanics that can offer a no-go theorem against paraparticles possesses an explanatory advantage over other interpretations and should, as such, be favored over others. Given that most physicists consider paraparticles as surplus structure whose non-observation does not require an explanation, I evaluate arguments of both sides and suggest a third way to approach the question. Finally, in chapter 3, I turn my attention to methods for excluding another kind of unphysical structure, mathematical artifacts, from rival dark matter models. Simulations are our only window into what rival models predict about the universe’s structure. But for them to play a useful role in generating knowledge, we need to distinguish reliably between real predictions and artifacts. I argue that robustness analysis fails to fulfill this task. I propose in its place another methodology, that of crucial simulations. (shrink)

Gabbay's separation theorem about linear temporal logic with past has proved to be one of the most useful theoretical results in temporal logic. In this paper, we establish an analogous statement a...

L’étude de l’impact émotionnel des séparations entre les mères migrantes, leurs enfants confiés au pays d’origine et ceux nés en pays d’accueil permet d’apporter un éclairage sur une problématique non négligeable au sein d’institutions médico-sociales. Cet article vise à analyser certains effets de ces séparations à partir de l’analyse de cinq entretiens avec des mères migrantes et au travers d’une méthode d’analyse qualitative. Les paramètres mis en avant sont ceux qui influent sur les modalités de choix de confiage des enfants (...) au moment du départ du pays d’origine, les conséquences dépressogènes pour les mères des séparations à long terme et leurs effets sur les interrelations entre frères et sœurs. L’absence de lien proximal avec les enfants confiés conduit les mères à faire appel à des stratégies de transmission de valeurs culturelles éducatives pour maintenir les liens dans la fratrie. (shrink)

This essay seeks to demonstrate that there are no compelling reasons to exclude non-Western artefacts from the domain of art. Any theory of art must therefore account for the universality of the concept of art. It cannot simply start from ‘our’ art traditions and extend these conceptions to other cultures, since this would imply cultural appropriation, nor can it resolve the matter simply by formulating separate criteria for non-Western art, since this would imply that there is no unity in the (...) concept of art. At first sight, cluster theories of art seem capable of accounting for the universality of art since they (can) start from a broad cross-cultural range of artworks and nowhere seem to extend one conception of art to other conceptions. Yet cluster theories remain unsatisfactory, because they can neither avoid misapplication of the proposed criteria, nor clarify the unity in the concept of art. (shrink)

One diagnosis of Bell's theorem is that its premise of Outcome Independence is unreasonably strong, as it postulates one common screener system that purports to explain all the correlations involved. This poses a challenge of constructing a model for quantum correlations that is local, non-conspiratorial, and has many separate screener systems rather than one common screener system. In particular, the assumptions of such models should not entail Bell's inequalities. We prove that the models described do not exist, and hence, the (...) diagnosis above is incorrect. (shrink)

One of the distinctive ideas of contemporary liberal political philosophy is that the separateness of persons is somehow normatively momentous. A proper respect for separateness is supposed to lead us not only to reject aggregative theories such as utilitarianism, but to embrace some particular positive theory about the sorts of obligations and claims we have amongst each other. Typically, philosophers have focused on the way in which the separateness of persons is important to matters of distribution. Given the intuitively unjust (...) distributions often sanctioned by utilitarianism, such a focus makes sense. Much of the contribution of my dissertation, however, is to argue that separateness is relevant not just as a fact about persons as beneficiaries, but perhaps even more fundamentally, as agents. ;Chapter one explores the connection between respect for the separateness of persons and liberal theory, with reference to the cases of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Chapter two defends the reasonableness of respect for separateness against the metaphysical critique of Derek Parfit. Chapters three and four spell out the main idea of respect for separateness as agents. Chapter five examines applies this analysis to free markets, and argues that while separateness provides some grounds for criticizing markets, it also provides some interesting, non-efficiency based grounds for praising them. (shrink)

A realist separable hidden variables theory in conformity with Einstein's principle of causality is developed in this paper to explain the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, and the experimental results (including those in Aspect's four polarizers experiment) obtained so far with a view to test the non-separability of quantum mechanics.

Non-Duality Questions, Non-Duality Answers is an organic, interactive exploration of non-duality--the understanding that in life there is no separation, only seamless Oneness. Designed to answer questions as they arise, this book invites readers to participate in the argument for non-separation, inquire about the nature of the self and the experience of liberation, and understand how non-dual awareness can impact our lives. With a unique blend of patience, compassion, respect, provocation, and humor, author Richard Sylvester helps frustrated spiritual seekers gain clarity (...) on what non-duality is--and what it isn't. (shrink)

This paper contains a corrected proof that the statement “every non-empty closed subset of a compact complete separable metric space is separably closed” implies the arithmetical comprehension axiom of reverse mathematics.

Is the overall value of a world just the sum of values contributed by each value-bearing entity in that world? Additively separable axiologies (like total utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and critical level views) say 'yes', but non-additive axiologies (like average utilitarianism, rank-discounted utilitarianism, and variable value views) say 'no'. This distinction appears to be practically important: among other things, additive axiologies generally assign great importance to large changes in population size, and therefore tend to strongly prioritize the long-term survival of humanity over (...) the interests of the present generation. Non-additive axiologies, on the other hand, need not assign great importance to large changes in population size. We show, however, that when there is a large enough `background population' unaffected by our choices, a wide range of non-additive axiologies converge in their implications with additive axiologies—for instance, average utilitarianism converges with critical-level utilitarianism and various egalitarian theories converge with prioritarianism. We further argue that real-world background populations may be large enough to make these limit results practically significant. This means that arguments from the scale of potential future populations for the astronomical importance of avoiding existential catastrophe, and other arguments in practical ethics that seem to presuppose additive separability, may succeed in practice whether or not we accept additive separability as a basic axiological principle. (shrink)

This essay is a study of Non-actualism, the thesis that there are objects which do not exist. There are several difficulties surrounding this thesis. First, there is the question about how to make sense of this very thesis. Second, there is the problem about what evidences there are for such a thesis. Third, there is a serious doubt about whether such thesis can be held consistently. ;The first question is usually claimed to be answered by Non-actualists by distinguishing two kinds (...) of quantifiers: existential quantifiers and a "broader" sort of quantifiers. My suggestion in this essay is, however, that there is a more ordinary use of the phrase "there is" which makes the Non-actualist thesis perfectly intelligible. After clarifying what I mean by "Non-actualism", especially after clarifying what the phrase "there is" is used to mean, I go on to check what evidences there are for such a doctrine. In the literature, three different sorts of evidences are usually cited by Non-actualists to defend their positions: fictional talk, modal talk, and our experiences about things not existing. I reject the first two but endorse the last one mainly on the ground that non-actual talk is subject to different interpretations and is only remotely related to ontological issues. However, there still is a threat of inconsistency for those Non-actualists who want to defend their positions from the empirical or phenomenological aspect. In this essay, I distinguish three kinds of paradoxes that a Non-actualist has to solve, and show their independence. I call them, separately, the Sosein Paradox, the Sein Paradox and the Cardinality Paradox. Further, I show that most Non-actualist theories which are designed mainly to solve these paradoxes do not really accomplish their task. But, to our surprise, there is a Meinongian thought which solves these paradoxes quite naturally, even though it did not aim at such a solution when it was developed. And I attribute this theory to Butchvarov. (shrink)

Like modal logic, temporal logic, and description logic, separation logic has become a popular class of logical formalisms in computer science, conceived as assertion languages for Hoare-style proof systems with the goal to perform automatic program analysis. In a broad sense, separation logic is often understood as a programming language, an assertion language and a family of rules involving Hoare triples. In this survey, we present similarities between separation logic as an assertion language and modal and temporal logics. Moreover, we (...) propose a selection of landmark results about decidability, complexity and expressive power. (shrink)

Uniformism about the epistemology of modality is the view that there is only one basic route to modal knowledge; non-uniformism is the view that there are several. Non-uniformism is becoming an increasingly popular stance, but how can it be defended? I prise apart two ways of understanding the uniformism/non-uniformism conflict that are mixed up in the literature. I argue that once separated, it is evident that they lead up to two different non-uniformist theses that need to be argued for in (...) very different ways. In particular, one construal allows only for a weak thesis about the actual lay of the current theoretical land in modal epistemology, while the other allows for a strong thesis that can be defended without reliance on claims about the alleged goodness or badness of individual accounts of modal justification. I argue that philosophers inclined towards non-uniformism ought to go for the strong, rather than the weak, thesis. (shrink)

Entangled states are a specific feature of quantum physics that neither have a counterpart in classical physics nor in the realm of our ordinary experiences. In this chapter we outline the debate about these particular states both historically and systematically. We delineate how the debate originated in an argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, and we show why, on the one hand, the argument is not considered convincing today, on the other hand, however, still (...) affects present discussions. In a second part we give a systematic overview over the contemporary debate on entanglement which focusses on Bell’s theorem and its consequences. Discerning different levels, we reconstruct the theorem and its premises in a clear way and discuss possible consequences. We analyze in detail the received view that Bell’s theorem implies non-locality and relate it to concepts such as “non-separability‘ and “holism‘. Especially we examine the question whether the phenomena involving entangled systems can be explained causally and whether the central conflict between a non-locality and the theory of relativity can be solved. (shrink)

I argue that sentence contents should be assigned truth-values relative to parameters other than a possible world only if those parameters are fixed by the context of assessment rather than the context of use. Standard counterexamples, including tense, de se attitudes, and knowledge ascriptions, all admit of alternative analyses which do not make use of such parameters. Moreover, allowing such indices greatly complicates the task of defining disagreement, and forces an odd separation between what is true, and what someone has (...) truthfully said. If non-world indices are always fixed by the context of assessment, a characterization of semantic theories as ?relativist? in terms of assessment-sensitivity converges with a characterization in terms of sensitivity to non-world indices. More tentatively, I suggest that even a possible world index, when used in the assignment of truth-values to sentence contents, should be fixed by the context of assessment, not the context of use. This eliminates MacFarlane's category of ?non-indexical contextualism?, and results in a system in which parameters fixed by the context of use are used only in the assignment of contents to linguistic expressions, and parameters used in the assignment of truth-values to contents are uniformly fixed by the context of assessment. (shrink)